

**TRANSFORMING KIBBUTZ
RESEARCH**

**TRUST AND MORAL LEADERSHIP IN THE
RISE AND DECLINE OF DEMOCRATIC
CULTURES**

Reuven Shapira

Foreword by Professor Emanuel Marx

New World Publishing

Cleveland, Ohio

Copyright 2008 Dr. Reuven Shapira

It is declared hereby that all the material in this book is original, written by the author who hold the copyright for it.

Dedication

For Emanuel Marx,
a dedicated authentic student, teacher and tutor,
and
For my late father, Yaakov (Kubek) Shapira,
a public servant, transformational leader all his life

CONTENTS

Foreword by Prof. Emanuel Marx	i
Acknowledgements	v
1. Introduction: The Mistaken Paradigm of Customary Kibbutz Research	1
Simultaneous Use of Three Strategies and their Contradictions	2
CKP Users Ignored the Context of FOs and Their Negative Practices	4
Researchers Did Not Study How <i>Rotatzia</i> Enhanced Oligarchy	6
Historical and Current Proof of <i>Rotatzia</i> Failures	8
The Conundrum of Trust and Leadership Morality in DWOs	10
Decline and Resurrection in Kibbutzim and Cooperatives	13
Kibbutz Success Secrets and the Required Cultural Perspective	15
2. Kibbutz Cultural Perspective	17
CKP Misses the Main Cultural Conflict of the Kibbutz Field	18
Cultural Uniqueness Three: Creativity	19
Cultural Uniqueness Four: Large Size, 3-4 Deck Federative Structure	21
Cultural Uniqueness Five: Egalitarian, Solidaristic Democracy	22
False Component: Economic Growth by Entrepreneurship	23
False Component: <i>Rotatzia</i>	24
A Non-Unique Component: Self-Work	26
A Non-Unique Component: High-Trust	28
Summary	31
3. CKP and the Lack of a Good Kibbutz Theory	33
Students Ignored Inventions, Inventors' Struggles and Careers	33
Kibbutz Creativity Was Not a One-Generation Phenomenon	34
Recent Loss of Creativity and Viability	35
The Dependency Explanation: FOs' Soft Budget Constraints	38
The 1950s-1960s Crisis did not Parallel the 1980s-1990s	39
FOs Counted on Unquestioned Support from Kibbutzim	40
Modeling Complacency: The Movements' Delayed Downsizing	41
Dependency Ignored Extreme Differentiation of Kibbutzim	42
Ignorance of FO heads' Irresponsibility	43
Other Explanations: The Grains of Truth are Lost in Omissions	44
Disastrous Separation of Sociology, History and Anthropology	45
Anthropologists Ignored the Effects of FOs and Societal Contexts	46
4. The Missing of Kibbutz Stratification	49
Supremacy Ignorance and the Confused Etiology of Stratification	50

Missing Classical Stratification Theorists in Kibbutz Literature	53
A Sociologist and Anthropologists Lay the Ground for the Miss	53
Surveys Missed Stratification but Were Scientifically Legitimized	55
Reviewers Missed Students' Omissions and Sanctioned CKP	55
Kibbutz Member Researchers' Vested Interests in the Omission	56
Critical Sociologists Found Stratification but Missed <i>Pe'ilim</i>	56
5. Additional Mistakes Due to FOs' Evasion	59
Kibbutz Movement – A Part of Encompassing Social Movements	59
Ignoring Kibbutz Oligarchization Followed that of the Histadrut	60
Mid-Levelers Became Main Actors with Oligarchization	61
Neglecting the Uniqueness of <i>Pe'ilim</i> and Its Symbolization	62
Neglecting the Violation of Egalitarianism by <i>Pe'ilim</i>	63
Neglecting FOs Differentiation from Kibbutzim	64
Evasion of Violation of Egalitarianism by Outside Sources	65
Blindness to FO Control of Kibbutzim	66
Overlooking FOs	67
6. FO Heads' Supremacy: Circulation, 'Parachutings,' and <i>Pe'ilim's</i> Fragile Status	73
Continuous FO Heads Controlled Circulative Managerial Careers	74
FO Heads' Iron Law Continuity versus Lower Echelons' <i>Rotatzia</i>	76
<i>Pe'ilim</i> Supremacy Due to Longer Continuity than Kibbutz Officers	77
Self-Agrandizement and Bureaucratic Growth	78
Institutionalized <i>Rotatzia</i> Served FO Heads' Control of <i>Pe'ilim</i>	79
Variability of <i>Rotatzia</i> and Power Accumulation by Senior <i>Pe'ilim</i>	81
Few Ex-Chief Officers Returned to Lower Offices with FOs Growth	82
'Parachutings' of Complete Outsiders and Their Fragile Status	83
Voluntary Resignation of <i>Pe'ilim</i> and Their Fragile Status	85
Frustrating and Purging Effective, Trusted and Creative <i>Pe'ilim</i>	86
Detached <i>Pe'ilim</i> Reigned, FO Heads Prevented Internal Promotion	88
Sidetracking of Creative Radicals: The Catch 22 of <i>Rotatzia</i>	89
How Was a Belief in Egalitarianism Maintained Despite Circulation?	91
Disenchantment with Violation of Egalitarianism Enhanced Exits	92
Compliance Due to a Change from Moral Choice to Expediency	93
7. FO Heads' Supremacy: Circulation, Patronage and Cliques	95
<i>Rotatzia</i> Encouraged Patronage and Rule of Cliques	96
Research Ignored FOs, Patronage Remained Incomprehensible	97
Continuous Versus Circulative Patrons	98
Patronage Due to Continuous Key Local Jobs	100
Patronage was Integral to Oligarchic Processes	101

8. Flawed Democratic Control of FOs and Fringe Benefits of <i>Pe'ilim</i>	103
Changing Reg.Ents' Company Car Norms	104
Stratified FO Cars Symbolized Status, Unlike Most Kibbutz Cars	105
FOs' Sticking to Company Cars System Served <i>Pe'ilim</i> Interests	106
New Solutions Would Have Required Admitting Stratification	107
Creativity Might Have Elevate Radicals into Potential Successors	109
Admors' Choice, Self-Serving Officers and Flawed Democracy	110
Secured Supremacy of <i>Pe'ilim</i> Over Kibbutz Representatives	111
Superfluous Growth, Image Creation, Justified Distrust of <i>Pe'ilim</i>	112
A Lack of Genuine Representation Enhanced Flawed Democracy	113
Flawed Democracy Ruined Trust But Could Be Repaired	114
A Lack of Independent Mass Media	115
9. Trust, Leaders' Morality, and Performance	117
Charismatic or Transformational Leaders?	117
Trust and Organizational Performance	118
Leadership and Morality	120
Leading by Consent and High-Trust Relations is Problematic	121
The Cultural Context Perspective	123
<i>Rotatzia's</i> Contrast with Highly Trusted Leadership	124
10. Transformational Leaders Became Self-Serving Conservatives, Autocratic Leftists	128
Early Era of High-Moral, Servant Radical Admors	129
Admors Ended Creativity and Turned to Sterile Leftism	131
In the Early Days Admors Contained Leftism	131
Admors' Leftist Turn 1937-9, and Problematic Slide Explanation	132
Admors' Growing Predicament Due to Political Inefficacy	133
Admors Dysfunction amid Fast Growth and Mounting Problems	135
Admors Enhanced Power by Leftist Changing of Cosmology	138
Abstention of Direct Involvement in Coping with Challenges	139
Some of the Costs of Leftism	141
11. Supremacy, Minimal Direct Involvement and Ineffective Leadership	144
Minimal Involvement Defends 'Parachuted' Managers' Authority	145
Hazan's Uniqueness: Both Local and National Involvement	146
Tabenkin's Protégé versus Yig'al Allon: Opposite Involvement Strategies	147
Suppressing Potential Successors Made Admors Indispensable	149
The Critical Failure in Absorption of Mass Immigration	152
Admors Prevented a Solution for Problematic <i>Hevrot No'ar</i>	153
Tabenkin's Conservatism and KM's Two Failed Attempts	155

Negative Outcomes of the Failure	156
12. Rama's Lack of Highly Trusted Leadership	158
Field-Work Methods and the Kibbutzim Studied	158
Rama Reacts to Crisis: Self-Reinforcing Imitative Changes	159
Self-Serving Elite Members	160
Outside Work and Growing Inequity	161
Officers' Ignorance of Unfairness	161
Was the Turn to the Outside Worthwhile?	162
Distrust, Dwindling Democracy and Failed Solutions	163
The Rise of Lesser Officers and Their Weakness	164
Distrust, Minimal Communication, Meager Promotion Prospects	165
Rama's Self-Serving Power Elites	166
Veteran <i>Pe'ilim</i> Created a Tradition of Violating Egalitarianism	167
The Talented Followed <i>Pe'ilim</i> 's Violation of Egalitarianism	168
Weak Officers Surrendered to the Talented and the Economists	169
Rama's Power Eclipse: Family Boarding, Private Construction	170
Low Morality of the Economic Elite	171
Low Morality of 'the Slaves Who Turned Masters'	171
13. FOs Enhanced Conservatism, Divisiveness, Distrust, and Destructive Conflicts	173
The Power and Weakness of the Economists	174
Low-Trust Culture and the Threat From Below	175
Alienated Talented, Non-Credible Power, Destructive Conflicts	177
Dependency of the Talented on Officers	178
The Old Guard Shaped Rama as a Conservative Kibbutz	179
Rama's Culture was Largely Shaped by Oligarchic FO Heads	180
<i>Rotatzia</i> Deterred Talents from Offices	182
Outstanding Success of a Genuine Continuous Branch Leader	184
Self-Enhancing Process of Self-Serving Anarchic Conservatism	185
Distrust + Divisiveness + Defensiveness + Doubt = Decline	186
14. Patronage and Moral Decline of Circulative Leaders	187
Hired Labor Deepened Moral Decline of Continuous Patrons	187
Circulation Only Slowed Down Power Accumulation and Moral Decline	189
A Leader's Power Self-Perpetuation by Barring Industrialization	189
Conservative <i>Meshkism</i> , Olim's Rule and a 'Branch Man' Image	191
Conservative <i>Meshkism</i> Disintegrated the Founders' Group	192
Abstention of Plant's Foundation Enhanced Circulative Career	194
Mediocre Clients and 'Riding' on a Group Interests	194
Mati Led Patrons' Obstruction of Democracy	195
Exit Left Zealots, Expediency Seekers and Mediocre Loyalists	196
Kibbutz Chen: Superiority Retention and Leaders' Moral Decline	197

Communal Boarding and Members' Complacency	199
Retention of a Tiny Minority, Largely of Complacent Members	200
Veteran Leaders' Corruption Was to Blame	201
A Complacent Selective Constituency Helped Leaders' Corruption	203
Additional Ideological Factor: Backward Looking to the 1920s	203

15. Carmelit: Self-Server Who Appropriated Others' Creativity **206**

How Was Barak's Advance to Autocracy Misinterpreted?	209
Enhanced Power, Prestige and Privileges, Minimal Accountability	210
Industrialization Geared to Kibbutz Ethos Required Creativity	211
FOs' Conservatism, Creativity Loss and Veterans' Natural Rights	213

16. Kochav's High-Moral Patrons Curbed *Rotatzia's* Contrast With Creativity **216**

<i>Rotatzia</i> Furthered the Iceberg Phenomenon in Leadership	216
Kochav's Success	217
Leaders Solved the Plant's Conflict Concerning Major Norms	218
High-Moral Old Guard Backed Execution of Radicals' Solutions	220
Democracy Nurtured by Authentic, Credible Leaders	221
A Lively and Critical Local Press	222
Highly Involved High-Moral Leaders were Ascetic and Obedient	223
High Morality Enhanced Trust and Creativity	224
Special Appeals Committee Enhanced Social Justice	224
Strong Officers' Authority and Much Discretion Pulled Talented	225
Leaders' High Morality Explains the Curbing of <i>Rotatzia's</i> Perils	226
High-Trust Culture: Members' Discretion Bred Creativity	227
Officers Innovated, High-Trust Democracy Kept Leaders' Status	229
High-Trust Culture: Long-Range Rewards for Contributions	230
Decentralization Enhanced Members' Ingenuity and Innovation	230
Trust Due to Cultural Creativity Enhancing Value Consensus	231
Care for Needs of the Talented = No Self-Serving Power Elite	233
Without Creativity Officers Failed to Care for Special Needs	233
Creative Egalitarianism in Consumption	234
A Creative Solution to Problematic Work Tasks	235
Trust, Branch Leaders Creativity and Free Flow of Know-How	236
Ex-Managers Who Became Expert Artisans Enhanced Creativity	237
Informal Artisan Leaders: Coaching New Generation Creators	238

17. *Rotatzia*, Scale and FOs' Negative Impact Ruined Creativity **240**

Consecutive Losses of Ran's Transformational Leadership	240
<i>Rotatzia</i> Ruined Trust by Elevating Immature Chief Officers	242

<i>Rotatzia</i> Forestalled Trust Creation by Marring Problem-Solving	243
<i>Rotatzia</i> Derailed the Career of a Transformational Leader	244
Scale Problems and Unintended Consequences of Social Action	246
Cooperatives Tendency to Boost Failures Amplified Unknowns	248
Growth Detached Leaders from Problem-Solvers	249
Specialization Furthered Leaders' Detachment	250
Partial Coping with Scale: Decentralized, Trust-Led, Small Units	252
Creative Solutions for Flexibility Loss: <i>Giyusim</i> and <i>Shibutz</i>	253
Plant Partnership Enabled Growth but Also Impaired Democracy	254
Scale Defeated Democracy Due to Decline of Trust and Creativity	255
Did Patrons and <i>Pe'ilim</i> Genuinely Care for Members Interests?	256
Patrons' Dilemma: Trusted Headmen or Coercive Chiefs?	257
Price of Chieftainship: Missing Followers' Beliefs, Aims, Hopes	258
Democracy Declined as Trust of Leaders and Creativity Declined	259
FOs' Negative Impacts on Kochav's Democracy	261
Low-Moral Oligarchic FOs Curbed Morality of Kochav's Officers	262
No Vision: Personal Aims, Officer Shortages, Imitative Solutions	264
The FOs' Role in the Continuation of <i>Rotatzia</i> -Driven Problems	266
18. Conclusions and Sustainable DWOs	268
Circulation and Other <i>Rotatzia</i> 's Perils Were Missed	269
Patronage Promoted Conservative Loyalists, Marred Creativity	270
Missing Unique Elite Careers and Their Grave Consequences	271
Without a Renewed Socialist Vision, Radicals' Incoherent Efforts Failed	272
Servant Leaders and High-Trust, Solidaristic Democracy Were Rare	273
'Parachutings', Imitative Hired Labor and Leaders Detachment	274
Ignoring Stryjan, Scale, Creativity and Democracy Problems	275
The Plausibility of High-Trust, Democratic and Creative FOs	276
Sustainable DWOs: High-Trust Cultures, High-Moral Leaders	277
Inside Successors and Grass-Roots Democracy	279
Slow Promotion	281
Extant Iron Law Solutions, Their Defects and the New Solution	282
Constituency: Membership and Eligibility to Participate in Voting	284
No Bi-Partisan Politics, Parliament of Directly Chosen Delegates	285
Can the Proposed Solution Make DWOs Sustainable for Decades?	286
Bibliography	290
Name Index	313
Subject Index	321

FOREWORD

The Israeli communal settlements (kibbutz, pl. kibbutzim) were established a hundred years ago. The first communal settlement in Palestine, Kinneret, was founded in 1910 and is still a thriving community. It was the prototype of the kibbutz, a spearhead of the Zionist movement's project to acquire land all over Palestine and to settle Jews on it. The policymakers of those days directed the socialist fervor of penniless young Jewish men and women emigrants toward a colonialist project. The Zionist Organization bought the land and supplied the funds for establishing the colonies, while the socialist pioneers provided the necessary manpower. The settlers labored to set up just and egalitarian communities for Jews, without much regard for the Arab peasants some of whom they had displaced. They were inspired by the ideal of a combined national and personal redemption, for which many of them were ready to sacrifice their own and their comrades' and neighbors' lives. The socialist ideology thus served to cover up both the injustice against exploited early pioneers and against dispossessed Arab peasants.

During that century the kibbutz engendered a voluminous political, ideological and scholarly literature. Now comes Dr. Reuven Shapira and argues that most of these writings misunderstood essential aspects of the kibbutz. In particular, they did not treat the essentially non-democratic and unchanging higher echelons of kibbutz leaders and the numerous extraterritorial organizations and enterprises controlled by this elite. Nor did they fully grasp the fact that the kibbutz has never sought to set up a utopian society. It has always been integrated in the wider society and shared many of its norms and beliefs. In the early days the kibbutzim depended on the Zionist Organization. Its successor, the State of Israel, also supported the kibbutzim for extended periods. The total dependence of the early kibbutzim on external funding was a fundamental fact that no one disputed. But even after they had made considerable headway in the 1930s-1950s, they renewed treating the State of Israel as a milch cow. Yet in many accounts of kibbutzim this dependence was scarcely mentioned; it was overshadowed by the interest aroused by the egalitarian way of life. The anthropologists who studied the kibbutz were profoundly affected by the ideological statements of their interlocutors and, even more so, by the manner in which the socialist work ethos was translated into practice. Melford Spiro, author of the classic study *Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia* candidly admits that he succumbed to the ideological pressure of the constantly reiterated emphasis on work (1963: 18). The national kibbutz leaders who controlled and manipulated this ideology remained outside the accounts, largely because they spent most of their time away from their home kibbutz. They worked from office buildings in Tel Aviv that were located in the vicinity of the government *center*. These were the men who mediated the flow of state funds to

the kibbutzim, negotiated state land and loans for kibbutz organizations, obtained state contracts for kibbutz industries and, no less important, committed quotas of kibbutz members for serving the interests of the Israeli Labor party and other national bodies.

In the above passage I use the word 'men' deliberately, for practically all the kibbutz leaders were men. Women were from the outset relegated to the 'inferior' services, as the income-creating jobs were reserved for the males. While some women worked in backbreaking manual tasks, such as road building and harvesting, most of them worked in the 'unproductive' kitchens, laundries, nurseries and schools. The impact of the external world on this sexual division of labor was unmistakable, and should have alerted the students of the kibbutz to its participation in the world. But it was consistently ignored in the research literature. A glaring example was Tiger and Shepher's (1977) study of women in the kibbutz. They treated the kibbutz as a social isolate, which subscribed to a strict equality of the sexes. Yet they found that most women worked in the caring and educational services. Therefore they interpreted this peculiar division of labor simply as the outcome of biologically conditioned preferences of women.

The consternated reader may well ask: How can it be that three generations of kibbutz students missed the true nature of these phenomena, and only one scholar got it right? I argue that this may well be the case: It is not unusual, even in scholarly work, for totally misconceived mental constructs to persist. Just think of the way the tribe has since the days of Morgan (1877) been construed as the overarching and most inclusive unit of simple societies, and kinship - as their cornerstone. When Fried suggested in 1966 that tribes were not found in simple society, but were an element of state control (Fried 1968: 18), he set off a discussion that eventually led nowhere. The same happened to Schneider's 1971 argument that "kinship... does not exist in any culture known to man" (Schneider 1984: vii); it was considered an interesting and provocative formulation that was discussed for a decade or more, and then consigned to oblivion. While both Fried and Schneider presented their arguments in convincing detail, they had in their lifetime little impact on anthropological theory and certainly did not cause a 'paradigm change'. Indeed, any scholar who, like Dr. Shapira, tries to change long-established academic conceptions must be prepared for a long uphill struggle that will not necessarily succeed.

Dr. Shapira was born and bred in Kibbutz Gan Shmuel, has lived there most of his life, and while he teaches in Western Galilee Academic College in Acre, he and his family still reside in Gan Shmuel. He is also deeply committed to the kibbutz way of life. Can such a person rise above the deeply engrained self-evident beliefs embodied in daily praxis, and critically examine his own community? The answer is not to be sought in Dr. Shapira's undoubted capacity to distance himself from his situation, but rather in his burning desire to reform

the kibbutz and make it again viable. This has been the energy driving a research project that has occupied his full attention for over thirty difficult years. His devotion to the kibbutz has not blinded him to its failings. There is an obstinate spirit in him that drives him to get to the root of matters, and the intellectual honesty to face up to unpalatable realities. In his search for the truth Dr. Shapira wrestles with the complex data and constantly revises and checks his arguments, sometimes producing a dozen or more drafts, till he is satisfied that he has got the right answers. Both the academic community and the kibbutz members are deeply obliged to Dr. Shapira for having written this erudite and profoundly practical study.

Dr. Emanuel Marx

Professor Emeritus

Tel Aviv University, Sociology and Anthropology Department

References

- Fried, Morton H. "On the concept of 'tribe' and 'tribal society'". Pp. 3-20 in *Essays on the Problem of Tribe*, June Helm (ed.). *Proceedings of the 1967 Annual Spring Meeting of the American Ethnological Society*. Seattle: American Ethnological Society, 1968. .
- Morgan, Lewis Henry. 1877. *Ancient Society*. New York: Holt.
- Schneider, David M. 1984. *A Critique of the Study of Kinship*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Spiro, Melford E. 1963[1955]. *Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia*. New York: Schocken.
- Tiger, Lionel, and Joseph Shepher. 1977. *Women in the Kibbutz*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is the outcome of a very long intellectual journey commenced 46 years ago when I became a kibbutz member and, thus, involved in coping with some of its main problems, with only minor success. An initial intellectual thrust for this journey was provided by the ideas of Ephraim Reiner, which led to my choice of Sociology studies. Subsequently, Emanuel Marx taught me how the ethnographic study of complex social phenomena could lead to a paradigmatic change which would point to possible new solutions seemingly impossible within the current paradigm, and he has been my teacher, reader and mentor for over three decades. Don Handelman was an excellent critical reader, and the late Dr. Israel Shepher introduced me to the rigorousness of doubting questions and answers in the study of kibbutz, then supported my efforts at understanding by careful reading of drafts of my book on the Regional Enterprises of kibbutzim (plural of kibbutz), and helped me to cope with colleagues' misunderstanding of my radical conclusions. Gideon M. Kressel helped me greatly by careful reading and criticism of many papers, mostly unpublished, through which the ideas of the book were gradually cemented into a coherent structure (at least in my mind). The late Dafna N. Izraeli turned my attention to conflicting paradigms in organizational literature and later read some drafts and gave candid criticism that has helped me much, as have Dani Zamir and Amir Helman. In clearing up my own misunderstandings, leading to the grasping of the right paradigm, many others have provided me with crucial assistance by commenting on drafts, papers and parts of the book. I thank Daniel De Mal'ach, Moshe Shwartz, Victor Fridman, Ze'ev Shavit, Pinchas Shtern, Dvora Kalekin-Fishman, Haim Shferber, Avi Kirschenbaum, Alex Weingrod, Yossi Shavit, Esther Herzog, Efrat Noni-Weiss, Ofra Grinberg, Avi Cordova, Gila Adar, Yuval Milo, Mira Baron, Yehuda Bien, Leora Yaacobi, Zachary Shaeffer, Dan Bar-On, Michael Harrison, Baruch Kanari, Moti Regev, and Daniel Breslau. I would especially like to thank Nigel Rapport who commented on the first half of the manuscript, and Itamar Rugovski and David Wesley whose comments on the whole book were very helpful. Special thanks go to Martin Kett and Barbara Doron whose questions while making my English readable have cleared up much confusion, and to Rachel Kessel who exposed many unclear paragraphs while translating the book to Hebrew. However, any mistakes contained in this book are my own.

I am also grateful for the financial help I received from the Golda Meir Institute for Social Research and the Weizmann Zionism Research Institute of Tel Aviv University, the Ben Gurion Fund of the Histadrut, the Jewish National Fund Research Institute, Yad Tabenkin and Kibbutz Gan Shmuel, which have helped in many other ways, as well.

Last but not least has been the support of my family, which barely understood the prolongation of my journey and its unconventionality, but has nevertheless made it possible.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Mistaken Paradigm of Customary Kibbutz Research

Why kibbutz research requires transformation, a turnaround, a very profound and extensive overhaul? Why is the kibbutz not comprehended by both its students and other observers, including its members and many ex-members? Is it not the most intensively studied of all small societies for more than sixty years?

There is no question about it; the database of the Kibbutz Research Institute at Haifa University includes more than 5000 publications. However, almost all of this voluminous research has used a mistaken paradigm that has led to major misunderstandings. The kibbutz was grasped as a bounded entity defined by its territory, formal organization, residents, economy and labor force. But already its first students Landshut (2000[1944]) and Buber (1958[1945]) had pointed to the unique federative organization of kibbutzim (plural of kibbutz), and I. Shepher (1980) had disproved the simplistic bounded grasping by showing that a kibbutz boundaries were demarcated differently by each defining factor. The kibbutz was supposedly egalitarian and democratic, but although ever since Landshut (2000[1944]) many students had exposed stratification and continuous power holding by elites,¹ some of its later students found no stratification.² However, I will show that even the former students had missed most stratification of the kibbutz as they had ignored the upper strata that dominated the kibbutz field by heading and managing inter-kibbutz federative organizations (hereafter, FOs) or by representing them in national leadership and executive offices. Although field theory was introduced into social sciences by Kurt Lewin (1951) and advanced by Bourdieu (1977) and Marx (1980), it was missed by kibbutz research. This was a fatal oversight since the kibbutz became the most successful of all communal societies by being a radical social movement, highly involved in its surroundings and by creating a large and complex organizational field, which included hundreds of communal kibbutzim, as well as hundreds of bureaucratic, hierarchic and autocratic FOs which implemented this involvement. FO heads, executives and representatives dominated the field and enjoyed power, prestige, privileges, intangible capitals and job continuity far greater than officers of kibbutzim. Thus, without studying FOs as an integral part of the field, kibbutz society was incomprehensible.

¹ Rosenfeld 1983[1951]; Spiro 1955; Kressel 1971; Fadida 1972; Shepher, I. 1983; Shapira 1987, 1990, 2005; Ben-Rafael 1986; Pavin 1996.

² Talmon 1972; Shepher, Y. 1975; Blasi 1980; Shur 1987; Rosner 1991.

No other communal society has been so profoundly shaped by its involvement in national, social and political struggles, nor has any communal society developed a large web of FOs. At most, communal societies have had a common spiritual leadership, have maintained informal ties, and have had some economic cooperation. These societies have always been radical and egalitarian, having a glorious vision of a new, better and more just society, leading to a belief in the millenarian elimination of all social injustices. They have tried to embody their exhilarating ideas by creating radical cultures, hoping that the surrounding society would follow, but have always failed to achieve such emulation. A major reason has been that, except for the kibbutz, all communes which have succeeded in terms of a large and stable membership, long endurance and economic success giving them leverage for societal change, have channeled their main efforts inward. They have not taken part in national efforts such as wars, and they have intensified communal networks, insulating members from the rest of society. Their cultures have blossomed at the price of social marginalization.³

The kibbutz was just the opposite: intensive societal involvement was integral to its spearheading of a much larger social movement, Zionism, aimed at creating a new, better society for a renewed Jewish nation in Palestine (Landshut 2000[1944]). On the one hand, kibbutz was an exceptional success, as this objective succeeded, while the kibbutz became "...a highly successful enterprise by virtue of its longevity (compared to almost every other utopian movement), as well as any other criterion by which the success of social systems is judged" (Spiro 1983: 4). On the other hand, despite the kibbutz taking on the hardest missions of Zionism and obtaining the support of non-socialist leaders who gave it a large portion of World Zionist Organization (WZO) resources, it had only minor influence on the structuring of the Jewish community in Palestine, and then on Israeli society. Even among Zionist socialists it remained a small minority, and after four decades of successful pioneering culminating in a leading role in the winning of the 1948 War of Independence, the new State of Israel opted for a capitalist course of development, contrary to kibbutz socialist ideals. The two main kibbutz federations, which consisted of some 80% of kibbutzim, remained outside the government, and their members and supporters who commanded some half of the units in this war, were marginalized and ousted from the army.⁴

Simultaneous Use of Three Strategies and their Contradictions

One plausible reaction to such a failure could have been isolationism, similar to other communal societies. A second option was to fight back, trying to change society through political and other means open to social movements in a

³ Landshut 2000[1944]; Knaani 1960; Oved 1988; Pitzer 1997.

⁴ Near 1992-1997; Yaar et al. 1994; Tzachor 1997.

democracy, while a third was to adopt new societal aims, while trading the efforts kibbutzim made at their promotion for advantages. The kibbutz movement simultaneously used all three strategies, succeeding with a remarkable list of achievements, and growing far beyond any other communal society to 269 communes, 129,000 inhabitants, and hundreds of FOs with tens of thousands of employees at its peak, in the mid-1980s (Chap. 5). Most FOs catered to kibbutz aims and needs and performed a large variety of functions for which each kibbutz was too small a unit.⁵ However, kibbutz discourse evaded FOs although over 4000 kibbutz members headed and administered them, and so did kibbutz researchers (Chap. 3). A member of veteran Kibbutz Kochav (fictive name of a successful kibbutz; Chaps. 16-17) has said:

“The kibbutz is not, as we imagine, an isolated community. We very much belong to the outside, but since members don't want to sit and discuss our relations with the entities [on the outside] to which we belong, we are not coping with the problem. In order to explain the problem, we must recognize it, and maybe we do not want to do that...”

The speaker was too young to know that this question had often been discussed in Kochav's early days, but then kibbutz leaders externalized FOs, and kibbutz students followed suit and ignored them, avoiding conflicts with leaders in order to gain their cooperation by adopting their egalitarian image of kibbutz, which FO study would have disproved (Shapira 2005). Thus, even elementary data, such as the number of employees, the scope of operations and the financial status were unavailable for most FOs. For example, the true number of employees of FOs called the Regional Enterprises (Hereafter Reg.Ents. Shapira 1987), was three times larger than the one quoted by kibbutz member authors Gelb and Criden (1974: 276. Compare: Cohen, A. 1978: 109). The main reason was that, although FOs were integral for the simultaneous use of the three strategies, their cultures negated kibbutz ones. Quite early Buber (1958[1945]: 141) had asserted that FOs must operate “...under the same principle that operate in their [kibbutzim] internal structure”. However, even the main FOs, called the Movements, which were headed by main leaders and were egalitarian and democratic at first, with success became oligarchic: Leaders continued for life and deputies for decades; they accumulated power, prestige and other intangible capitals, centralized rule and depressed democracy, promoting conservative loyalists and suppressing critics and radicals (cf. Hirschman 1970). They enlarged their own and loyalist privileges in accord with Michels's (1959[1915]) “Iron Law of Oligarchy”, while using political extremism to defend power (Chaps. 10-11). Strong leadership fitted the

⁵ Barkai 1977; Spiro 1983; Stryjan 1989; Maron 1997. On FOs: Rosolio 1975, 1999; Cohen, A. 1978; Shapira 1978, 1978/9, 1986, 1987, 1995a, 1995b; Brum 1986; Niv & Bar-On 1992.

second and third strategies, but conservative autocracy negated kibbutz ethos and impaired essential cultural components such as the creativity required to keep the kibbutz egalitarian and democratic amid growth and success (Stryjan 1989; Brumann 2000). Stryjan found that with success, growth and complexity, self-managed organizations such as cooperatives introduced hired labor, hierarchy, bureaucracy and autocracy that curbed democracy and creativity. This then caused stagnation and either failure or crises leading to transformation into capitalist firms. Only kibbutzim were exempted by remaining relatively small, democratic and creative, eagerly shared knowledge of successful innovations which were adopted by other kibbutzim, while FOs performed functions that required economies of scale.⁶ Brumann's (2000) study of all known successful communal societies corroborated this: Only communes with a federative structure continued to succeed beyond the life span of their founders, since this structure gave individual communes autonomy that prevented suppression of local creativity by a leader of the whole communal society who had become an autocratic ruler.

The sad fact was that despite critique of oligarchic and autocratic FOs which emerged in the kibbutz press since the 1970s, kibbutz students avoided FOs as did kibbutz members, ignoring the few FO studies that had been done (Footnote 5). They accepted the FOs definition as non-kibbutz entities by using the customary kibbutz paradigm (CKP for short) in which a kibbutz was not a unit of a large, federatively organized social movement led by privileged power elites whose main careers were made in FOs or on their behalf in outside bureaucracies. They therefore treated kibbutz as an isolated commune to be studied like other communal societies, ignoring Landshut, Buber, Stryjan and others who had pointed to the decisive role of kibbutz unique federative organizing.⁷

CKP Users Ignored the Context of FOs with Negative Practices

However, when Stryjan was published in 1989, reality had radically changed and kibbutz success explained by him had vanished: Most FOs and kibbutzim were in ruins, deep in a huge debt crisis which has required two national rescue packages costing the government billions (in \$US terms).⁸ Many FOs had gone bankrupt; most of the rest were radically downsized, while a wave of capitalist practices engulfed kibbutzim and FOs.⁹ Stryjan had taken an important step toward eliminating the mistaken CKP by which students externalized and ignored FOs,

⁶ See support in: Gherardi & Masiero 1990; Semler 1993; Russell 1995; Ingram & Simons 2002.

⁷ Even Niv & Bar-On's (1992) study of FOs role in kibbutz success ignored these works.

⁸ On the crisis: Krol 1989; Talmi 1993; Ben-Rafael 1997; Leviatan et al. 1998. On lack of improvement: Halperin 1999; Dloomi 2000; Bashan 2001; Lazar 2001.

⁹ Kressel 1992; Pavin 1994; Bien 1995; Rosner & Getz 1996; Ben-Rafael 1997; Rosolio 1999.

but he still missed the mark since kibbutzim and FOs were together a complex organizational field in which it was impossible to explain one hemisphere properly, without studying the other. Moreover, it was essential to untangle the impact of both hemispheres on its variety of units, their mutual relationships and relations with the encompassing society.

Stryjan's mistake was that, like CKP users, he ignored the impact of contexts on kibbutzim, i.e., both FOs and capitalist society. For instance, Simons and Ingram (1997) found that use of capital markets by kibbutzim for financing industrialization, enhanced the capitalist practice of hired labor. Ethnographers tend to miss impact of contexts, said Marx (1985: 147), and so did kibbutz ones who missed the impact of the context of conformist, capitalist-like, low-trust FOs, on radical, high-trust kibbutz cultures.¹⁰ FOs were aimed at defending kibbutzim from market pressures and providing them with unique services, but became Trojan Horses of capitalist society inside them. The FO functionaries called *pe'ilim* (literally: activists. Singular: *pa'il*), who consisted of kibbutz elite members, gained extra power, prestige, privileges and job continuity, or maintained advantages by circulation among FO and kibbutz offices. Many became autocratic oligarchs, diminished collectivism, democracy, egalitarianism, solidarity, trust and creative innovation by which problems caused by growth and success could be solved in accord with the radical ethos. Stryjan did not allude to works which depicted FOs' capitalist-like cultures and their negation of kibbutz cultures,¹¹ and so he missed the fact that low-trust, hierarchic FOs managed by kibbutz elite members, negatively impacted kibbutz high-trust, egalitarian cultures. As careers of most elite members, and especially of the most powerful ones, advanced primarily in FOs or on their behalf in national executives, their local status and power in kibbutzim were elevated by high-level outside jobs (Cabinet Ministers, Knesset [Parliament] Members, Jewish Agency executives, FO heads, etc.), with conspicuous symbols which procured local supremacy. Anthropologist Rosenfeld (1983[1951]) had already found that the highest status in Kvutzat Kiriath Anavim¹² was held by senior *pe'ilim*, as was found by other ethnographers who sought the connection between outside and inside statuses and powers.¹³ However, they, too, missed the oligarchization of the kibbutz field and

¹⁰ On importance of context: Marx 1985; Bryman et al. 1996. On high- vs. low-trust cultures: Dore 1973; Fox 1974; Ouchi 1981; Fukuyama 1995; Shapira 1987, 1995b. On kibbutz cultures: Next chapter.

¹¹ Rosolio 1975; Cohen R. 1978; Ron 1978; Shapira 1978, 1978/9, 1986, 1987; Brum 1986.

¹² "Kvutza" was called early kibbutz which preferred smallness (Landshut 2000 [1944]).

¹³ Leshem 1969; Fadida 1972; Topel 1979; Rayman 1981; Shapira 1990, 1992; Argaman 1997.

low-moral, self-serving practices of many senior *pe'ilim* (Chap. 4).

Researchers Did Not Study How *Rotatzia* Enhanced Oligarchy

Stryjan discussed the degeneration of democracy with growth and economic success (1989: 86-91), but as was usual in organizational democracy literature,¹⁴ he ignored the leadership factor, Michels's Iron Law, Jay's (1969) critique of Machiavellianism and Hirschman's (1970, 1982) decline theories due to leaders promoting only loyalists and shifting to private ends. Following dominant kibbutz students, Stryjan supposed that the *rotatzia* norm (meaning: rotation) aimed at preventing oligarchy by replacing officers every few years, indeed prevented it.¹⁵ He missed both the lack of *rotatzia* in the field's highest echelons such as prime leaders, Cabinet Ministers, Knesset Members and FO heads, as well as the growing rareness of genuine *rotatzia* in mid- and low-management, i.e., officers returning to the ranks and workers taking their place.

With growth of FOs creating many new managerial jobs, most kibbutz ex-chief officers became *pe'ilim*, and their prospects of coming back to the ranks involuntarily became negligible; they either found a continuous *pe'ilut* (being a *pa'il*), or circulated to other offices in the field, or got an office outside it, or left.¹⁶ Few mid-level *pe'ilim* continued *pe'ilut* for life, while the majority circulated and sometimes returned to kibbutz chief offices; only some lesser ones returned to the ranks. Many continuous *pe'ilim* and circulators became conservative self-servers and suppressed innovators who sought new solutions for pressing problems.¹⁷ The seemingly egalitarian, high-moral *rotatzia*, which was hailed by students as a main reason for kibbutz success, was, in fact, a negative practice. It encouraged self-serving circulation of conservative officers among privileged FO jobs as clients of FO heads or executives, while intermittent returning to kibbutz chief offices enhanced their local dominance. Their success in the circulation was due to FO heads' patronage which promoted conservatism, while patronage enhanced FO heads accumulation of power, intangible capitals and privileges; thus *rotatzia*

¹⁴ C.f. Whyte & Whyte 1988, Morrison 1991; Russell & Rus 1991; Lafferty & Rosenshtein 1993; Heller et al. 1998; Darr & Lewin 2001; Cloke & Goldsmith 2002; Darr & Stern 2002; Sen 2003.

¹⁵ Their works: Leviatan 1978, 1993; Rosner 1964, 1982; Talmon 1972; Cohen & Rosner 1988.

¹⁶ Ron 1978; Shapira 1978, 1987, 1990; Helman 1987. Leshem (1969) did not allude to this, but many of his cases support it. Masculine terminology is used as continuity and/or circulation were true of most men, but very rare among women who almost never became oligarchic leaders.

¹⁷ This accorded Michels (1959[1915]) and Hirschman (1970, 1982). See: Beilin 1984; Shapira 1987, 1990, 1992a, 1992b; Kynan 1989; Kafkafi 1988, 1992, 1998; Vilan 1993; Rosolio 1999; Aharoni 2000; Shure 2001.

enhanced autocracy, conservatism and Machiavellianism.

Rotatzia helps to explain why, despite democratic and egalitarian ethos, prime leaders continued for half a century: It magnified the oligarchic process by detaching power from responsibility; power was concentrated at the continuous top, while responsibility rested on fast-changing mid- and low-level officers.¹⁸ This invited conservative, hands-off management, self-serving shirking of essential leadership tasks in which one could fail and lose prestige and power which might lead to demotion. Yaakov Hazan, one of the two prime leaders of the Kibbutz Artzi federation (KA for short), declared at its convention (I was present): "Leadership is not done rotationally". Indeed, genuine leadership that solves major public problems requires creativity which necessitates a long time horizon (Jaques 1990), and high-trust relations among actors which require time and motivation to create (Fox 1974; Axelrod 1984). However, continuous FO heads and executives thrived on lower echelons' *rotatzia* which caused distrust and depressed creativity, as it marred careers of young officers who promoted public aims by innovation: Their successes were a menace to the authority of conservative patrons and their loyalists. Hence, innovators received, at most, passing glory, but rarely office continuity and promotion. They were mostly demoted and sidetracked although they knew what would solve major problems, how to achieve it, and had enough public trust to carry out their ideas. In contrast, mediocre conservative officers who sought power, status and privileges, were promoted to FOs due to loyalty to their heads (cf. Hirschman 1970), and either continued in jobs or circulated among offices, obtaining power, prestige and privileges which symbolized high status and enhanced power (cf. Lenski 1966). Often such *pe'ilim* became local oligarchs as patrons of younger mediocre officers, ruining trust, democracy, egalitarianism and creativity (Chaps. 12-17).

Kibbutz students missed this: surveys never asked about it, and those ethnographers who saw local oligarchs and patronage, did not expose the fragile status of kibbutz officers and low-rank *pe'ilim* due to *rotatzia*, missing findings which pointed to this fragility such as Leshem's (1969). Nor did they untangle how this fragility crippled problem-solving by innovators and deterred many of them from assuming offices, causing major leadership failures due to managerial brain-drain. While problematic abstention of taking offices by competent members was a well-known phenomenon, called 'internal leaving' (Am'ad & Palgi 1986), as it was not connected to *rotatzia*'s perils, kibbutz students failed to explain it.

¹⁸ For example, chief officers of younger Ichud Movement's kibbutzim served about 1.6 years, and veteran kibbutzim about 3.3 years (Meged & Sobol 1970: 27).

Historical and Current Proof of Rotatzia Failures

Kibbutz research ignored *rotatzia* literature which has shown that its principle element, a fixed and short time in office, was tried and failed in ancient Athens, 2400 years ago, in Imperial China from about 1300 to 1949, in Latin American presidential regimes, in the US army and in the Israeli armed forces. Its recurring failures remained unrecognized without integration of research findings of various disciplines (cf. Wallerstein 2004). Time in office was short in order to prevent power and capitals accumulation by which officers could bar succession. In Athens, it was one year, Imperial China's district magistrates were given three years, and Latin America's one-term-only presidents have four to six years. In Imperial China, power was also limited by 'parachuting', sending a nominee to be a district officer and magistrate over 165 miles away from home. The inevitable price was weak, inexperienced and ineffective officers who soon learned that they could not promote public aims and shifted to personal ends, resulting in rampant corruption, which, in some eras, brought the majority of them to trial.¹⁹ Low morality was built-in: Aristophanes, Athens' famous playwright, depicted *rotatzia* as "the rule of embezzlement and evil... leadership is the interest of complete ignoramuses and the lowest of degenerates" (Fuks 1976: 56). In the Israeli armed forces, Colonel (Reserve) Dr. Vald (1987: 158) found that "*rotatzia* turned into a sacred ritual kept zealously because it served promotion needs ...of unprofessional, inexpert and inexperienced officers". Gabriel and Savage (1981), Segal (1981) and other students explained US military failure in Viet Nam by rotation of both soldiers and officers which marred trust and solidarity both within and between hierarchic ranks. Henderson (1990) found the US army "hollow", without effective fighting units due to a lack of trust and solidarity because of the rotation system. Guest (1962), Gabarro (1987), myself (1987, 1995a, 1995b), and Oplatka (2002) supported this: New outsider managers, as was common in the kibbutz field and in other cases of *rotatzia*, needed years to build trust with subordinates, to learn local problems thoroughly and to invent, test and implement radical solutions. *Rotatzia*, however, marred trust building, left little time for its use and made success at radical changes implausible; hence it encouraged officers' conservatism.

Though kibbutz research explained adaptability and innovation by *rotatzia*, it never referred to this literature and rarely bothered to study how it really functioned. Since the mid-1970s the kibbutz press criticized extra continuity of *pe'ilim*, both continuous and circulative, but *rotatzia* was studied only inside kibbutzim by survey researches, ignoring this press and ethnographies untangling

¹⁹ On Athens: Burn 1964; Bowra 1971; Fuks 1976. On China: Chang 1955; Chow 1966; Folsom 1968; Watt 1972. On Latin America: Davis 1958; Sanders 1989; Linz 1990; Mainwaring 1990. On shifting to personal aims: Hirschman 1982.

circulative continuity of *pe'ilim* and the fact that circulators became local patrons much like continuous *pe'ilim* (e.g. Topel 1979). Students missed the dark side, the non-democratic face of *rotatzia*: both types of *pe'ilim* acted as local patrons who controlled clients' circulation in managerial jobs and through them a kibbutz.²⁰ Other structural failures were also missed: With FOs growth creating many new offices, an *ex-pa'il* taking a kibbutz office was often provisional, until his next *pe'ilut* commenced; thus he evaded major problems or camouflaged solutions (Chaps. 12-14). Often *ex-pe'ilim* took only lesser jobs as it was easier to find a successor for these when a *pe'ilut* became available (Fadida 1972: 89). Am'ad and Palgi (1986) missed this reason for 'internal leaving', failing to notice that asking to be freed for *pe'ilut* from an office before a term had ended and a successor had been found, was grasped as "careerism" and led to gossip or even open criticism. However, members might not dare to oppose it in the General Assembly by raising their hands, as this could precipitate revenge by an injured protagonist, and since in most cases, after a short time, he got approval for another *pe'ilut*.²¹

Heidenheimer's (1970: 184-8) critique of the corrupt US public service supports the above: High turnover of officers due to political nominations created a structure without adequate motivators to grasp public office as a public trust; hence, relatively few officers were truly public servants, dedicated to solving public problems when it required paying some personal price. Among the hundreds of *pe'ilim* and *ex-pe'ilim* whom I studied from 1975 to 1992, only a few were corrupt like US officials, but not many more were truly public servants either. *Rotatzia* demoted many of these, preventing office continuity by which trust gained by early truly public service, enhanced solving harder problems later on. For instance, Pericles brought Athens to its Golden Age, 444-429 B.C., since he had become Strategos, the only office in which reelection was allowed, and due to fourteen reelections he succeeded. *Rotatzia* is a Procrustean bed for genuine leaders aimed at the public good; it legitimizes their replacements without intrinsic reason, and deprives them of a clear mandate that defends authority used positively. This deters talented radicals from offices and enhances continuity of mediocre officers. They defend their fragile status by low morality: evading coping with difficult problems, masking failures or blaming them on others, taking credit for successes, even those which one tried to abort, nurturing ties with patrons, not bothering about public interest and concealing or camouflaging its evasion, just keeping the image of caring for it.²² Kibbutz *rotatzia* often failed to

²⁰ Critical publications concerning *rotatzia* will be detailed. Kibbutz *rotatzia* studies: Meged & Sobol 1970; Leviatan 1978, 1993; Helman 1987; Einat 1991; Shapira 1995a.

²¹ Vilan 1993: 247-8; Kafkafi 1998: 30. On the General Assembly voting: Argaman 1997.

²² Dalton 1959; Maccoby 1976; Shapira 1987; Jackall 1988; Scharfstein 1995; Chaps. 12,

replace such officers who ignored informal pressures to resign, using patrons' backing and the lack of a formal succession timetable, no clear-cut procedures and no open competition for offices. As Banfield (1958) has shown and others supported (See Chap. 9), low morality ruins trust in an officer: commoners who discern shirking of duties and seeking private ends as well as its concealment, resist his decisions and orders. Then the officer uses coercion that ruins trust: he centralizes control, threatens and then punishes inconformity, monopolizes information, rewards and promotes his loyalists, and sidetracks, demotes and pushes to exit critics who are truly public servants.²³

Many FO heads used such means from the early days to control both hired employees and *pe'ilim*, but even if some coercion was legitimate for the former, it was illegitimate for *pe'ilim* who, as kibbutz members, had to be trusted as co-owners and part of democratic decision-making. As this was rare in FOs, and as *pe'ilim* included a majority of kibbutz power elites, it was clear that the true dynamics of kibbutz society were inexplicable without untangling the malfunctioning of this incommensurate control. Moreover, by ignoring this, kibbutz research missed dealing with the leadership factor although ample evidence has proved its decisive role in both large organizations and social movements.²⁴

The Conundrum of Trust and Leadership Morality in DWOs

Burns (1978) points to dependence of long-term viable democracy upon transformational leaders who make radical changes, required to solve major problems that impair the advance of public interests, aims and wishes. Organizational theorists and practitioners have alluded to the high-trust level required between transformational leaders and followers in order to overcome the hurdles of radical changes, and have recognized that high-trust required high-moral behavior by public servant leaders.²⁵ While it was clear that the kibbutz movement could not overcome the huge obstacles it faced in the early era without such highly trusted leaders, the ultra-long continuity of its prime leaders, their oligarchization and self-serving behavior (to be described later), proved that their morality had already started to decline in the late 1930s. This was four decades before they vanished and the peak of success of the kibbutz system. So how was

14, 15.

²³ Michels 1959[1915]; Dalton 1959; Jay 1969; Hirschman 1970; Shapira 1987, 1995b.

²⁴ Guest 1962; Downton 1973; Greenleaf 1977; Geneen 1984; Sieff 1988; DePree 1990; Graham 1991; Sergiovanni 1992; Kouzes & Posner 1993; Terry 1993; Brumann 2000; Guiliani 2002.

²⁵ See sources in previous footnote and: Banfield 1958; Ouchi 1981; Shapira 1987, 1995b, 2001; Harvey-Jones 1988; Kets De Vries 1993; Hosmer 1995; O'Toole 1999; Cloke & Goldsmith 2002.

this success possible in such a fast-changing environment and in a fast-growing system, while leaders were oligarchic and conservative? Can the explanation of this unique society reveal the secrets of the trust and leadership conundrum in democratic work organizations (DWOs) which will change basic ideas about the possibilities of making democratic management viable for good? Can it pave the way to its replacement of bureaucracy as a main control mode of large work organizations, as has been proposed by some authors?²⁶

“Democratic Work Organizations” is a better term than “Self-Managed Organizations” used by Stryjan (1989), since it indicates their culture’s main feature, a high-trust, solidaristic democracy that requires no market forces to coerce people to take their jobs, and no hierarchic, autocratic bureaucracy to control their work, since managers are chosen and replaced by them, as has been in successful kibbutzim. In principle, an individual is chosen manager since he is trusted by the majority, and is replaced when trust vanishes. However, the growing interest in trust as a prime factor of organizations and societies emphasizes the omission of this factor in industrial democracy literature, making it barely relevant for the advancement of DWOs theory and practice.²⁷ The kibbutz experience would point in the same direction: success was achieved by effective democracy and high-trust cultures, led by competent, effective and high-moral leaders committed to common aims. These leaders modeled hard work and asceticism, and motivated members to achieve these aims by seeking new solutions to problems, even when such solutions enhanced members’ prestige and curbed their own.²⁸ Stryjan’s (1989) finding that democracy in cooperatives declined with success and growth, missed the fact that concomitant oligarchization of leadership was a major reason for it, for growing distrust of officers and for loss of work motivation curbing efficiency, effectiveness and innovation required to compete in markets. Without effective democracy, the ample power of a leader prevents members’ distrust from bringing about his succession; hence, the DWO is led to inevitable deterioration, since there is no one with supreme authority to replace him, unlike many public firms. This is a prime reason for the fact that, despite many successful DWOs, low-trust, coercive bureaucracies, whose acute and insoluble ailments have been documented by a

²⁶ Whyte & Whyte 1988; Morrison 1991; Semler 1993; Cloke & Goldsmith 2002; Sen 2003.

²⁷ This literature: footnote 14. Trust in organizations: Hosmer 1995; Bigley & Pearce 1998; Korczynski 2000; Adler 2001; Dierkes et al. 2001; Maister et al. 2001; Reed 2001; Shapira 2001; Noteboom 2002; Kramer & Cook 2004; Preece 2004. Trust in societies: Gambetta 1988; Fukuyama 1995; Misztal 1996; Govier 1997; Seligman 1997; Putnam 2000; Cook 2001.

²⁸ Dore (1973: Chap. 9) exposed this in a high-trust Japanese firm.

vast literature, have remained hegemonic among large organizations.²⁹

This continued hegemony raises a troubling question for everyone who believes in democracy: Why is democracy preferred in the control of states and communities, but not in work organizations? Moreover, with globalization and the large number of firms that are much larger, richer and more powerful than many states, not to mention communities, can the latter remain democratic while the former are autocratic? Feenberg (1995) has pointed to this drawback of Western democracies, explaining it by modern technology's tendency to lend itself to autocratic administration, although "in a different social context it could just as well be operated democratically" (p. 4). Creating such a context requires creativity, but modern technology encourages scale that depresses creativity, as in Stryjan's theory of DWOs failing and becoming capitalist firms with success and growth. Scale enhances a leader's power that tends to encourage self-perpetuation efforts by neutralizing democracy, another reason for a DWO becoming an autocratic and oligarchic bureaucracy without creativity. This decisive problem has never been solved by any DWO, including the kibbutz.

This problem is decisive since power and intangible capitals accumulation by leaders enhance themselves by additional means to those cited by Michels and Hirschman. For instance, privileges that assure loyalty of deputies and staff also add prestige and enhance power that engenders more privileges, adding prestige and power in a cycle, until the price of power increment exceeds profit (Lanski 1966; Harris 1990: 365-85). However, while an oligarchic leader may hold power for half a century, like prime kibbutz leaders did, his dysfunction phase in which he becomes a self-serving conservative may commence after less than a decade (Hambrick & Fukutomi 1991). To avert this, US corporations encourage 87% of their heads to retire within 12 years by generous endowments called "golden parachutes" (Vancil 1987: 79). Without any replacement mechanism or with an ineffective one such as *rotatzia*, past effective leaders tend to be dysfunctional for dozens of years. According to Lord Acton they are corrupted, and according to Kets De Vries (1993) extra continuity multiplies the negative metamorphic effects of power on these leaders and their organizations. Worse still, when they vanish, deterioration tends to deepen since the successor who has to cope with problems left by decades of a leader's dysfunction is usually a loyalist who lacks critical thinking, and, due to this deficiency, he fails (Hirschman 1970). Thus, without a solution for succeeding leaders just as they enter the dysfunction phase and become self-serving conservatives, successful DWOs' effectiveness, efficiency, democracy, trust and creativity are virtually doomed. Even if a successful DWO

²⁹ It is too vast to refer more than classics: Selznick 1949; Roy 1952; Gouldner 1954, 1955; Parkinson 1957; Dalton 1959; Crozier 1964; Presthus 1964; Jay 1969; Peter & Hull 1969.

survives decades of its leader's self-serving conservatism, an uncritical loyalist successor furthers the degeneration of the culture by which it succeeded. Eventual collapse is prevented usually only if the inept successor is replaced by a talented outsider who uses hierarchy and market controls rather than trust and democracy, save the firm by cancelling the remnants of the DWO culture.³⁰

Decline and Resurrection in Kibbutzim and Cooperatives

Neither DWO students, nor post-modernists and other critics of modernism have given any positive answers to this troubling scenario, nor have they offered new ways of democratic, timely succession of leaders that would curb it. The alleged kibbutz solution, *rotatzia*, encouraged oligarchy and the Hirschmanian purging of radical creative talents, enhanced continuity of FO heads who became self-serving conservatives, emasculated democracy and curbed solidarity, trust and creativity both in FOs and in kibbutzim. Hence, something else or, perhaps, additional factors, must explain how, despite these phenomena, most kibbutzim succeeded for four additional decades and some even continue to succeed up to the present, seven additional decades, while their main leaders were dysfunctional and their loyalist successors did even worse.

In veteran Kibbutz Kochav (established in the 1920s), I found renewed creativity from the mid-1950s, when a new generation of radicals entered chief offices. Their creative solutions renewed trust, egalitarianism and solidarity, revitalizing their kibbutz and other kibbutzim that imitated it. This revitalization of local culture engendered a social context in which modern technologies lent themselves to democratic management in accord with Feenberg (1995), and the kibbutz flourished. However, *rotatzia* soon demoted and sidetracked the radicals as they did not advance to prestigious FO jobs after finishing short local terms, or were soon replaced in FO jobs due to clashes with conservative superiors, so they returned to local lesser jobs and/or left. Loyalists of the conservative old guard who were promoted to FO jobs, subdued innovators, creativity vanished, and with it adaptability and profitability (Shapira 1990). The dominant scientific coalition of kibbutz students has ignored my findings, although these could have explained both past kibbutz success, despite conservative Movement leaders, and its more recent crisis and decline.³¹ Moreover, kibbutz literature depicted leaders as charismatic, but I have found that both these radicals and the old guard were transformational leaders who trusted followers and encouraged use of their own faculties for creative problem-solving, unlike charismatic leaders who urge the public to follow their solutions without questioning their rationale which only

³⁰ On outsider successors see: Gouldner 1954; Chung et al. 1987; Shapira 1987; Cannella & Lubatkin 1993.

³¹ On such coalitions: Collins 1975: Chap. 9. On ignoring my findings see: Shapira 2005.

they understand.³² Furthermore, creative innovations by radicals were successfully implemented due to the above tradition of trusting followers, and because old guard leaders remained high-moral and democratic locally, though their power and prestige largely stemmed from high-level jobs in conservative FOs. Thus, they mostly opposed innovations, but they remained democratic, and due to high morality, they never used power to obstruct innovations, as patrons in other, more conservative kibbutzim had done, as they became low-moral quite early and obstructed innovations by various undemocratic means, aiming at preventing ascendance of new, radical powers (Chaps. 12, 14, 15).

Interestingly, the bulk of large, veteran kibbutzim, to which the majority of kibbutz population belonged resurrected in their fourth and fifth decades (1960-1980). This occurrence is explicable by the high morality of the old guard and the democratic tradition it created, together with the rise of second generation radicals to chief kibbutz offices and their following old guard morality but not its conservatism. This seemed to resemble Staber's (1989) Canadian cooperatives: resurrection emerged if kibbutzim overcame the 'mid-life crises' of their second and third decades.³³ It seemed that, since the late 1930s, old guard leaders had entered a dysfunction phase. Negative metamorphic effects of continuous power encouraged the blocking of creativity in kibbutzim, causing the 'mid-life crises' of the 1950s,³⁴ and then, a new generation radicals had revitalized them. But how did they accomplish this, despite the growing imitative impact of powerful FOs? Does this impact explain the fact that these cases were rare, and creativity soon vanished again, while innovations prolonged organizational success for some decades but the re-ascent of conservative, uncritical loyalists led to the current crisis? Why, despite the dominance of FOs and conservative *pe'ilim*, did most kibbutzim imitate these innovations in the resurrection period and even adopt norms that reduced *pe'ilim* privileges, although conservative FO heads and *pe'ilim* dominated the field? Can an explanation of this complex development lead to a new paradigm that integrates FOs and kibbutzim, corrects Stryjan's omissions and provides a new model that points to solutions which can turn "impossible" DWOs into an attractive alternatives to bureaucracies?

Kibbutz Success Secrets and the Required Cultural Perspective

Both the dominant kibbutz scientific coalition and Stryjan missed secrets of high-trust, democratic and creative cultures which made kibbutzim effective, efficient and adaptable for so long: transformational, public servant leaders (Greenleaf

³² Leaders were charismatic: Rayman 1981: 268; Argaman 1997: 216; Ben-Rafael 1997: 45; Niv & Bar-On 1992: 221; Rosolio 1999: 23. Charismatic versus transformational leaders: Barbuto 1997; Beyer 1999.

³³ See some support by findings of French cooperatives by Estrin & Jones 1992.

³⁴ Near 1997; Rosolio 1999; Shalem 2000.

1977; Graham 1991) who remained highly moral locally, even after they had become conservative FO heads, and the democratic tradition shaped by such servant leaders. The main reason for these omissions was the lack of FO research and the use of mistaken customary research paradigm that missed kibbutz uniqueness. Another was the disregard of ethnographies that exposed local dominance of kibbutzim by informal power structures consisting of patrons who were *pe'ilim* and/or *ex-pe'ilim*, their clients and loyalists, or patrons and cliques who managed large, mass hired-labor local plants while imitating *pe'ilim* with Movement backing (Kressel 1971, 1974). A third reason was the fluctuations of creativity due to cultural struggles between FOs and kibbutzim, and within each type, especially when a high-moral second generation of radicals emerged, and the fourth reason was confusing trust and leadership literature (Chap. 9). The fifth reason was that industrial democracy literature ignored leadership and oligarchy as did Stryjan,³⁵ the sixth reason was schisms among disciplines which prevented the use of one discipline's findings for others' benefit (Wallerstein 2004), and the seventh was preference by dominant social researchers for promoting their own careers over scientific progress (Shapira 2005).

Anthropologist Hammersley (1992) has pointed to the problematic record of ethnographies in the development of new theories. However, I will outline a kibbutz success and decline theory, in accordance with more positive views of organizational anthropology,³⁶ by using the multiple ethnographies made during dozens of years in various parts of kibbutz society. I will also utilize the fact that this society has been intensely studied, using lessons of long experience in kibbutz executive jobs (Shapira 2005) and the help of organizational anthropology classics and moral leadership studies, which have been ignored by both kibbutz and DWO students. I will point to a new kibbutz theory that leads to a trust and moral leadership model which explores possible democratic solutions for the Iron Law and Hirschman's (1970, 1982) problems, without stratification-enhancing solution such as "Golden Parachutes". Its cornerstone is the choice and succession of leaders in a way that encourages solidaristic democracy, high-trust culture and creativity. This may prevent the tendency of DWOs to imitate capitalist firms with success and growth, and to fail more frequently than such firms during periods of recession (Hirschman 1984). In this way, large, federatively organized DWOs can become an attractive alternative to authoritarian bureaucracies.

The advancement of a new, better DWOs theory is greatly needed for the creation of more just and effective alternatives to current coercive bureaucracies.

³⁵ This literature: footnote 14; only Cloke & Goldsmith (2002: Ch. 11) deal with leadership, and only normatively, ignore its ample complications.

³⁶ Czarniawska-Joerges 1992; Martin 1992; Linstead et al. 1996; Bate 1997; James et al. 1997.

However, without a cultural perspective that exposes the components of kibbutz cultures that brought success, the reasoning behind this idea and its potential for giving rise to sustainable DWOs will remain unclear. Bate (1997) pointed to the negative effects of four decades of separation of organizational behaviorists and sociologists from organizational ethnography. DWOs research followed the former; hence, it lacked a cultural perspective. Thus, the next step towards comprehending kibbutz and proposing a new model for sustainable DWOs, is introducing this perspective.

CHAPTER 6

FO Heads' Supremacy: Circulation, 'Parachutings' and *Pe'ilim's* Fragile Status

There is little question now that power and capitals were mostly accumulated in the field by advancing from local offices to FO jobs or other outside jobs. Less common was power accumulation by continuous heading a local factory and enlarging it with hired Labor to become a main provider of kibbutz sustenance (Kressel 1971). E. Cohen (1983: 101) found a shortage of "managerial resources" in kibbutzim, but he ignored prime reason for this shortage, *rotatzia* which unduly replaced successful officers and caused 'internal leaving', brain-drain and unique career ladders in which kibbutz offices with negative balances of rewards led to well-rewarded FO jobs. Moreover, outside jobs gave better chances for promotion to higher echelons, giving *pe'ilim* authority over larger organizations, furnishing them with more power, prestige and privileges for longer periods, controlling the vital resources of kibbutzim and brokering their interests on the outside. In addition, in hierarchic FOs *pe'ilim* ruled over hired workers, while a self-work kibbutz usually consisted of only three authority levels:

1. Responsibility for a function or sector of a branch, heading a minor committee.
2. Heading a branch or a mid-level committee, a main committee membership.
3. Chief office, including heading the plant which was usually the largest branch, heading a main committee and membership in others.

From a kibbutz chief office, usually the next career step was *pe'ilut*; almost all *pe'ilim* came from among local kibbutz elites.¹ However, advancement to chief offices and *pe'ilut* varied greatly: leaders of founding groups of kibbutzim were chief officers from inception; a few others of the group might have succeeded them shortly if the leaders became *pe'ilim* rather early, at the age of 24-27 or even less, as was common in some younger kibbutzim due to the fast growth of FOs in the 1960s-1970s (Chaps. 14-15). However, leaders of joiner groups (called *Hashlama*, meaning: completion) might have waited for decades for such a promotion or completely missed one, since due to *rotatzia*, after some years, founding leaders who were *pe'ilim* often returned to chief offices, while their successors became *pe'ilim*, so that a close group circulated between chief offices and *pe'ilut*, and it was rare for anyone new to enter it (Spiro 1955). This occurred

¹ Shepher, Y. 1964: 46; Shapira 1978; Rayman 1981: 230; Helman 1987; Vilan 1993; Gelb 2001.

when members left the group by continuing a *pe'ilut*, or by going from one *pe'ilut* to another, or by demotion and kibbutz exit. For instance, a Kochav veteran was a kibbutz secretary seven times and seven times a *pa'il* up to Knesset (parliament) Membership. *Hashlama* leaders often abandoned hope for advance and turned to other careers, so that, when at last a veteran circulator found continuous *pe'ilut*, a younger, second generation member entered the circulators group. This group usually numbered more than twice the number of chief offices, due to both *pe'ilut* terms being longer than local ones (see below), and to the fact that some members took charge of longer tasks, such as the founding of a new plant or a new FO.²

Continuous FO Heads Controlled Circulative Managerial Careers

Circulation of *pe'ilim* was controlled by FO heads who decided on their nomination and continuity, and whose power, capitals and continuity far exceeded that of newly appointed local kibbutz officers. Take, for example, the case of Kibbutz Hachof (fictitious name, as are names below), a large and successful kibbutz founded in the 1930s, which in the mid-1970s numbered some 500 members and 900 inhabitants, and had a profitable economy with a turnover of more than \$US20 million. However, its four chief officers, aged 32-45, were juniors compared with one of the kibbutz founders, Zelikovich, aged 57. For eight years he headed Mishkay Hamerkaz, a Reg.Ents conglomerate of Hachof and more than thirty other kibbutzim, with six plants, some 650 hired employees, 230 *pe'ilim*, almost 200 company cars, and an annual turnover of some \$US350 million. Zelikovich not only had power and intangible capitals on a different scale than that of Hachof chief officers, but he had already attained their status three decades before, and ever since, had advanced through FO jobs of growing power and prestige to head this large FO and to be a senior partner in the powerful group of Reg.Ents heads (see below). Moreover, a *pe'ilut* at Mishkay Hamerkaz, which he controlled, was a major career advance alternative of the chief officers of dozens of kibbutzim. Heading 230 *pe'ilim*, he held a key position in the kibbutz field, controlling the promotion and continuation in management of a large portion of the region's circulative officers.

However, the *rotatzia* norm was strong in Mishkay Hamerkaz, and heads were replaced every seven-nine years: Formally their terms were five years, but without a formal timetable and no open, competitive elections, negotiating replacements took some years.³ In accord with the Iron Law, Zelikovich's power and status was beneath that of Ushi Fridman, a veteran leader of Kibbutz Gaaton (a kibbutz of middle age and size), who from 1959 to 1988 headed Milu'ot (all real names, as

² Spiro 1955; Meged & Sobol 1970; Fadida 1972: Chap. 2; Argaman 1997; Gelb 2001: Chap. 11.

³ See, for example, Arieli 1986 on such negotiations in another Reg.Ents concern.

are other names below), a Reg.Ents concern of 26 Western Galilee kibbutzim and three moshavim. At Milu'ot's peak, in the mid-1980s, Fridman headed 14 plants, some 200 *pe'ilim* and some 1500 hired employees. This was true in spite of the smaller number of Milu'ot settlements which were mostly younger and smaller than Mishkay Hamerkaz's large veteran kibbutzim. Due to smallness, the Western Galilee kibbutzim gave fewer *pe'ilim* to the Movements and, hence, *pe'ilut* in Milu'ot was more important as a promotion outlet for an ex-kibbutz chief officer. As kibbutz chief officers' terms lasted only 2-3 years, the careers of ten to twelve generations of ex-chief officers in these kibbutzim were impacted by Fridman's nomination decisions. This enhanced his power, and together with other power sources, he gained the status of a prominent national economic leader, quite similar to Itzhak Landesman of Ayelet Hashachar who headed Tnuva from 1970 to 1995 and likewise enlarged it quite successfully.⁴

In order to pinpoint Fridman's status on the kibbutz managerial career ladder, one must consider the fact that, already in 1969, he had proven to be more powerful than three General Secretaries of the Movements: Despite their efforts, Milu'ot's subsidiary took over computerization service of its kibbutzim from national FO Heshev (Rosolio 1975). Later on, in 1979, his supremacy was proven once again: A product of Milu'ot's fodder mill contaminated by botulinum microbes, caused the deaths of some 1600 milking cows, ruining some of the best milking herds in Israel at Merhavia, Beit Alfa, Yas'ur and other kibbutzim, causing damage worth millions of \$US, as the yearly milk production of each of these cows amounted to some 10,000 liters. After years of negotiation which was kept secret in order to prevent a public outcry against the fodder mill's managers, Fridman forced a settlement on the General Secretaries of the Movements who acted on behalf of the injured kibbutzim, in which Milu'ot paid only a very small part of the damage.⁵

Additional cases also proved Fridman's supremacy.⁶ This, and his seniority among the eleven heads of Reg.Ents concerns, made him their informal leader, which was another reason for the capitulation of the General Secretaries. A clear sign of this status was his election, after his 1988 demotion due to the bankruptcy of Milu'ot, to head the Reg.Ents national desk which represented all Reg.Ents in national arenas. He held this post until his death a decade later. As the office of Movement secretary was the main step that led to Knesset membership, Fridman's supremacy over them meant that his power somewhat equaled that of a Knesset

⁴ Ginat 1979a, 1979b; Barkai 1982; Chizik 1982, 1983; Harpazi 1982, 1983; Lifshitz 1983, 1985, 1986c; Ben-Hilel 1988a; Arad 1995; Halevi 1990, 1995.

⁵ Both the Movements and Milu'ot tried to conceal it. See: Ginat 1979a, 1979b.

⁶ Chizik 1982, 1983; Lifshitz 1983, 1986c.

Member.⁷ This meant that, while Admors and Ichud heads were at the top of kibbutz career ladders, and their deputies as cabinet ministers stood on its second step, Fridman and Landesman of Tnuva were on its third step, while Zelikovich only occupied its fourth rung, since due to his shorter incumbency he had less power; his deputies were situated on its fifth and chief officers of kibbutzim on its sixth or seventh. Thus, it is clearer how great a mistake was the depiction of chief kibbutz officers as highest stratum (Chap. 4).

FO Heads' Iron Law Continuity versus Lower Echelons' *Rotatzia*

In order to fully understand the consequences of Iron Law continuity in the kibbutz field, one must grasp the effects of the *rotatzia* norm which supposedly enhanced egalitarianism. The decisive impact was the opposite, i.e., larger power and longer continuity gaps than in usual organizations whose middle managerial and expert echelons accumulated considerable power due to continuity.⁸ Large corporations restricted leaders' continuity by the use of 'golden parachutes' which caused 87% of them to retire within 12 years (Vancil 1987: 89). In contrast, when delegates at the KA convention called in the late 1960s for *rotatzia* to apply to Yaari and Hazan after forty years of leadership, Hazan excused continuity thus: "Leadership is not done *rotationally*", meaning that only officers could be rotated, but not leaders whose tasks required continuity. Continuity at the top and frequent succession in low- and mid-echelons created continuity gaps larger than in customary organizations and furthered oligarchization rather than curbing it.

Continuity difference was considerable even at the top: While Admors continued for 48-53 years, the Mashbir Merkazi's head, After, continued for 44 years, Tnuva's Verlinski for 35 years, Milu'ot's Fridman for 29 years, KM Fund's Sack for 28 years, and Tnuva's Landesman for 26 years. The differences can be explained by the extra power of the Admors, their commencing offices earlier, and Machiavellian use of leftism for keeping power by Tabenkin and Yaari (Chaps. 10-11). In 1920, the two were among Histadrut founders who were chosen as executives and committee members, and, from 1925, they traveled bi-annually on its behalf to WZO Congresses, the pre-state parliament of Zionism, in Europe.⁹ As early as 1935, Tabenkin led the rejection by a Histadrut referendum of Ben-Gurion's pact with right-wing leader Jabotinski, KM and KA took part in *Yishuv* (Jewish community in Palestine before statehood) elections; Admors were

⁷ In a caricature of TKM's weekly of 3.8.1988, when Ben-Shachar's report exposed Milu'ot's failure, Fridman is heading a board meeting with pacifiers in all the other directors' mouths.

⁸ Gouldner 1954 ;Crozier 1964 ;Mechanic 1964; Burawoy 1979.

⁹ *Minutes of WZO Congresses*, no. 14-17, 1925-1931. Hazan traveled for the first time in 1931.

members of its executive, as were heads of Hever Hakvutzot, while the Mashbir Merkazi's After was a powerful Histadrut figure.¹⁰

Admors' continuity legitimized continuity of other senior *pe'ilim*, such as other Knesset Members, twelve of whom continued for more than two decades after 10-20 previous years of *pe'ilut* up to 1948,¹¹ and the similar continuity of Fridman, Landesman and other FO heads: 21 years for Mishkay Emek Izrael's Bar-Haim, 19 years for Mishkay Emek Hayarden's Laish (who has been reinstated again in the nineties), and 27 years for Cotton Marketing Council's Noymark.¹² This Council was small, a few dozen employees, but controlled marketing worth hundreds of millions of \$US and the lion's share of kibbutz agricultural profits in the 1970s, conferring great power on Noymark. Similarly, for three decades, Yaakov Sack (1996) headed KM's Fund with a dozen employees, but, as head of the main financial organ of a large Movement, he held the power to decide organizational life-or-death matters for many kibbutzim and FOs.

However, even when FO heads abided by *rotatzia*, as in the case of Mishkay Hamerkaz where seven heads reigned during its 67 year-history, their average term in office of 9.5 years was still three to five times longer than the average terms of kibbutz chief officers: Megeed and Sobol (1970) found that in Ichud kibbutzim, these averages were 1.5-2 years in younger kibbutzim and 2-3.5 years in older ones, while others found that the longest continuing type of kibbutz chief officers, plant managers, continued to serve on the average of 3.5-3.8 years.¹³ Mishkay Hamerkaz heads continued 2.7-5 times longer than kibbutz chief officers, but fifteen of their deputies, plant managers and top experts continued even longer, up to 20 years or more, that is 6-10 times longer, and in Milu'ot, under the continuous rule of Fridman, 38 *pe'ilim* continued likewise.¹⁴

***Pe'ilim* Supremacy Due to Longer Continuity than Kibbutz Officers**

These continuity gaps enhanced the supremacy of FO heads in the kibbutz field beyond that obtained in usual organizations also because longer continuity of *pe'ilim* in comparison to kibbutz officers turned the formal control of FOs by kibbutzim into a reality of FOs hegemony. A case in point was Mishkay Hamerkaz in which leaders were *rotated* to a greater extent than in most other FOs; hence it was assumed to be relatively democratic. Until the 1980s, every

¹⁰ Ben-Avram 1976; Kanari 1989: 187; Near 1992; Grinberg 1993; Kafkafi 1998.

¹¹ *Kibbutz* 1987; Gvirtz 2003: 186.

¹² Arieli 1986; Lifshitz 1986a; Yahel 1991; Halevi 1995; Bashan 2000a.

¹³ Leviatan 1978; Blasi 1980: 102; Einat 1991. Gelb (2001: 98) was a treasurer for only one year.

¹⁴ *Annual Report of Mishkey Hamerkaz Manpower Dept.* 1976; Raz 1986.

three-four years a convention was held allegedly to decide its main policies. Each kibbutz was represented by its economic manager, treasurer and secretary. Due to *rotatzia*, at each convention, almost all these delegates were new at their jobs, in contrast to only 30-40% of Mishkay Hamerkaz *pe'ilim*. While most kibbutz representatives did not know each other, *pe'ilim* were enmeshed in close-knit networks which met daily in committees, management sessions and the concern's dining hall; thus, they were much more united.¹⁵ Moreover, as all senior *pe'ilim* were ex-kibbutz chief officers, they were acquainted with the kibbutz side of the questions discussed to the same or even to a greater extent than representatives, who were mostly younger and less experienced. The latter knew very little of Mishkay Hamerkaz reality beyond what was reported by *pe'ilim*. For instance, they were largely ignorant of the plants' major failures.¹⁶ No wonder *pe'ilim* easily defeated motions initiated by kibbutz delegates.

Oligarchic continuity of FO heads created a self-enhancing supremacy cycle which enabled the growth of Reg.Ents concerns far beyond the requirements of kibbutzim, making their growth quite independent of kibbutz agricultural growth, even though they were supposed to be its servants (See Chap. 8). It was no coincidence that Milu'ot grew to more than double the size of Mishkay Hamerkaz in terms of plants and employees, although the latter served some 50% more kibbutzim which were mostly larger than Milu'ot's kibbutzim. Extra growth was a clear outcome of the extra power of Milu'ot's long serving Fridman.

Self-Aggrandizement and Bureaucratic Growth

Fridman's supremacy promoted aims which served himself and other *pe'ilim*, mainly self-aggrandizement by growth and technological virtuosity, as depicted by Galbraith (1971). My ethnography (1978/9, 1987) of Mishkay Hamerkaz's major enlargements concluded that superfluous growth was explicable using this theory: Personal interests of *pe'ilim* in the accumulation of power and capitals were best served by using plant profits for growth and for the introduction of new technologies (sometimes not better ones, due to *pe'ilim*'s ignorance; see below), which necessitated frequent travel to experts in the cities, as well as travel abroad to study and to buy equipment. In accord with Parkinson (1957), this legitimized the addition of staff under their control, offices and amenities, such as company cars, which enhanced prestige and, in accord with Lenski (1966), led to self-enhancing power, prestige and privilege spirals.

Lenski (1966) and Galbraith (1971) were ignored by kibbutz students, as were

¹⁵ This resembled Western corporate elites: Galbraith 1971; Maccoby 1976; Kanter 1977; Davis 1994.

¹⁶ Shapira 1987. The same in Milu'ot: Ginat 1979a, 1979b; Lifshitz 1986c; Abramovitz 1988.

classics of bureaucracy critics mentioned above. Thus, they missed how bureaucratic growth served the unique interests of officers in a culture formally sanctioning *rotatzia*, namely, self-aggrandizement in order to prevent *rotatzia* in their jobs. Growth enhanced power and capitals of Reg.Ents' *pe'ilim*, and their use enhanced office continuity. The same etiology explains similar continuity of managers of kibbutz plants with mass hired labor, as Kressel (1974) depicted, and I (1980) and Rayman (1981: 138) corroborated.

This situation might have been prevented had FO norms allowed continuity for only effective, public-servant *pe'ilim* who were trusted by role-partners, while replacing those who were mediocre and ineffective, and those who had reached dysfunction oligarchic phases. Why should effective public servants have been under the threat of *rotatzia*? Did they not do all they were asked to? If they had been allowed to continue, and only self-serving, ineffective ones had been succeeded, they would have needed no self-aggrandizement to defend status, fewer mediocre self-servers would have advanced to high offices and kibbutz aims would have been much better served. The kibbutz movement could have used democracy way to differentiate the two types of officers, the re-election ballot with a necessary improvement: Since Michels (1959[1915]) showed that the ballot became an ineffective succession tool after incumbency of 10-12 years, just as most leaders become ineffective (Hambrick & Fukutomi 1991), continuity beyond this period might have been allowed for only those who gained a higher majority (See Chap. 18). Alas, instead of improving on a democratic solution, 'automatic' *rotatzia* was adopted, seemingly to enhance egalitarianism, while enhancing self-serving continuity of FO heads and their loyalists. Fortunately, up to the 1950s, *rotatzia* was rarely institutionalized, so many effective local leaders continued and brought successes.

Institutionalized *Rotatzia* Served FO Heads' Control of *Pe'ilim*

This raises the question: Why was *rotatzia* institutionalized? Topel (1990) has explained it by promotion pressures from below, by members of *hashlama* groups and kibbutz offspring who, after years of branch management, demanded *rotatzia* in chief offices in order to advance. He has dated it to the 1950s, and this provides a clue to the answer: This was the oligarchic era, in which dysfunctioning Movement leaders used privileges to control *pe'ilim* who were given either no salaries or uniform ones (Chap. 8). Nor was there any exhilarating socialist vision to motivate them after the USSR vision had proved to be a bluff (Chap. 10). Thus, additional controls seemed required and *rotatzia* fitted in, made the status of *pe'ilim* more dependent on FO heads' whims, and legitimized their frequent replacement. In some problematic kibbutz offices such as work organizer (*sadran avoda*) *rotatzia* had already been institutionalized. Hence, the demand to emulate it in chief offices and *pe'ilut*, as well, seemed legitimate. However, in accord with

Hazan's statement that "leadership is not done *rotationally*", the outcome was that, instead of chief officers being kibbutz leaders, these offices became mere springboards to the privileged stratum of *pe'ilim*, while a *pe'ilut* became mainly a service to a patron, an FO head who mandated it, instead of a public service.

Members supported the demand for *rotatzia* which seemed egalitarian, as some chief officers who vacated jobs after a term, returned to humbler jobs. These returnees helped to maintain the norm, much like US Presidents Washington and Jefferson who refused a third term in office in 1797 and 1809 respectively (Sobel 1975). The *rotatzia* norm made continuous *pe'ilut* in a non-leadership FO job a violation of egalitarianism which lowered members esteem for the violators. For that reason, as the ethnographies will show, smart leaders of younger kibbutzim who came late to the FO managerial market and found only such jobs, kept local supremacy by circulating between *pe'ilut* and local chief offices, as well as by nurturing ties with senior *pe'ilim* and patronage of cliques of clients who were promoted to local chief offices.¹⁷ Both officers who believed in egalitarianism, and circulators who used *rotatzia* to keep local supremacy, vacated offices in accord with *rotatzia* and helped its institutionalization. However, as they did not control the field, institutionalization was an outcome of the interests of major power-holders, Admors, FO heads and other senior *pe'ilim* who became senior patrons. This is clear from the facts that:

1. *Rotatzia* enhanced patrons' power in contrast to short-term clients, making clients dependent on patrons for managerial status continuity and advance.
2. *Rotatzia* eased replacement of non-loyal *pe'ilim* by patrons who then installed loyal clients instead, while patrons' accumulated power prevented their own *rotatzia*.
3. *Rotatzia* enhanced the kibbutz egalitarian image, while masking its control by oligarchic leaders who evaded the requirements of genuine democratic leadership.

The latter point is of prime importance. In accord with Hawthorn (1991), the historic choice of a social solution must be explained against a background of plausible known alternatives. If, up until recently, kibbutz students believed in *rotatzia*'s positive effect,¹⁸ certainly in the 1950s no kibbutz member knew that it had already failed many times before, as Chapter 1 has depicted. Thus, it seemed a plausible egalitarian solution at a time when members were negativistic concerning *pe'ilim* privileges, as in the case of Hazan's car painting. With *rotatzia*, these privileges were presented as provisional, except for the cases of a few leaders, and violation of egalitarianism seemed minimal. Up to 1978, no one,

¹⁷ On such ties: Vilan 1993: 264. On patronage see Chap. 8.

¹⁸ For instance: Stryjan 1989; Leviatan 1993, 1999.

including researchers, had pointed to hundreds of continuous *pe'ilim* and thousands of circulators continuing among privileged jobs for decades, thus the bluff of provisionality was not exposed (Next chapters).

Variability of *Rotatzia* and Power Accumulation by Senior *Pe'ilim*

The differential adherence to *rotatzia* as revealed by the differential job continuity of FO heads and *pe'ilim* of Mishkay Hamerkaz and Milu'ot, was another proof that *rotatzia* was a late solution, not integral to kibbutz culture, while continuity differences engendered differential power and capitals accumulation. However, the use of accumulated power and capitals for job continuation varied: Some left jobs as they failed in them due to being 'pure parachutists' (see below), and/or lost power and/or patron's protection, while others left due to a belief in *rotatzia*'s positive impact, and still others sought promotion: A *pa'il* with a powerful patron might be less influential in his short-term jobs, but by rapid advancing to higher offices s/he could gain more extensive formal authority, higher status and more power. On the other hand, such authority might be more volatile due to political changes and his patron demotion (Shapira 1995a). However, due to accumulated power and capitals patrons maintained high status even after failure and demotion: Milu'ot's Fridman became head of the Reg.Ents' national desk, and Tnuva's Landsman remained head of the board of directors of some Tnuva subsidiaries.¹⁹

Case studies of industrialized kibbutzim also proved *rotatzia* in one's job could be averted by accumulation of power and capitals. Kressel (1974, 1983) detailed how the managers of Netzer Sereni's two plants became irreplaceable by using hired labor and outside financial aid for rapid growth that turned the plants into main income providers of the kibbutz, and how they enhanced prestige by privileges and became powerful patrons by nominating loyalists from among ex-kibbutz officers to plant administrative jobs. In a metal engineering plant of a veteran kibbutz, I found (1980: 35-6) a manager who had continued in his post for over three decades. Employing some 35 hired employees and 30 members, he behaved like Yaari's "I, Me'ir, am Mapam, I am Hashomer Hatzair...". I contacted him to arrange interviews with academic educated employees, but instead of naming them, when I asked about the chief engineer, he answered: "I am the chief engineer". I asked who the chief accountant was and was told: "I am the chief accountant", and so on. His power was obtained, at first, by nurturing a few loyal hired engineers and mechanics who, besides him, held all critical know-how and expertise. When his continuity engendered autocracy, they left, and new ones were hired, and even though some kibbutz offspring also had become engineers, the factory in 1977 was still a one-man-show. Such 'shows' tended to fail, but this one succeeded due to know-how bought from abroad and heavy

¹⁹ Abramovitz 1988; Ringle-Hofman 1988; Halevi 1995

customs duties on imported competing products. When these were lowered in the 1980s, the plant became unprofitable and soon it was closed. A similar autocracy due to continuity I saw in other hired-labor plants which were barely controlled by short-term kibbutz chief officers. However, the dominant coalition of kibbutz researchers ignored this phenomenon, as proved by the vehement denunciation of Kressel's excellent ethnography by Ben-David (1975) and Y. Shepher (1975).

Few Ex-Chief Officers Returned to Lower Offices with FOs Growth

CKP users missed the fact that *rotatzia* failed in its mission of preventing oligarchy since it enhanced continuity gaps between short-term officers and circulators on the one hand, and FO heads and other managers who avoided *rotatzia* in their jobs by various means. Every sociologist should know that status loss is problematic and arouses strong opposition. Few people in any known society, even most egalitarian hunters and gatherers, accept status loss willingly unless it is provisional or/and during a revolutionary period (Goldschmidt 1990). CKP users ignored this and did not probe how kibbutz chief officers, mostly under forty, solved status problems due to *rotatzia* by using circulation to the thousands of FO jobs which granted power, prestige, privileges and continuity. This was the principal cause of their readiness to conclude service after a few years, and to view *rotatzia* positively (Lanir 1990: 272). Though kibbutz members mostly externalized FOs, as did Kochav's member cited in Chapter 1, everyone knew of the many ex-chief officers who became *pe'ilim* and circulated between managerial jobs until retirement age. Most researchers ignored this and the few who did not, remained unpublished or published only in Hebrew, as this phenomenon negated the kibbutz egalitarian image held by the dominant scientific coalition which controlled publication outlets.²⁰ This was clear from the abovementioned vehement assault by two of its members on Kressel's (1974) ethnography.

Rotatzia served FO heads power by making other *pe'ilim* and kibbutz chief officers dependent on them for keeping managerial status, while the latter did not oppose this as they almost always kept managerial status (see below). Although sometimes the new job was of a lesser status, for instance a senior *ex-pa'il* becoming a chief officer again, this was grasped as provisional, until another, perhaps better *pe'ilut* had been found. Researchers did not address the negative effect of provisional incumbency on officers' coping with major local problems, missing a main reason for mismanaged kibbutzim (Chaps. 12-15), while returnees helped creating an egalitarian image which marred members' critique of *pe'ilim* continuity and privileges, as well as masking stratification from researchers. As a

²⁰ On such coalitions: Collins 1975: Chap. 9. On that of Israeli sociology: Ram 1995.

part of missing stratification, no sociologist investigated whether kibbutz officers and *pe'ilim* who abided by *rotatzia* really lost status by coming back to the ranks or to lower offices. Economist Helman (1987) found that, during the decade of 1970-1980, 80% of ex-kibbutz economic managers and 77% of ex-kibbutz treasurers circulated to other managerial jobs, while only 54% of ex-kibbutz secretaries did so. In contrast to many ex-secretaries who returned to minor offices, in accord with the dominance of economic FOs in this era (Cohen, R. 1978), almost none of the economic managers and treasurers did so; the 20-23% who did not circulate either furthered their education, turned to outside, non-kibbutz jobs, or became powers-behind-the-scenes as comptroller-accountants, dominating economic decisions due to weakness of rotational chief officers.²¹

Even before Helman, Fadida (1972) had shown that circulation to *pe'ilut* was an integral part of the careers of kibbutz prime elite members who, from kibbutz inception returned to the ranks only for brief periods, if at all, and exchanged *pe'ilut* in Israel and emissary service abroad for chief kibbutz offices, while acquiring higher education during *pe'ilut*, furthering outside mobility prospects.²² I found (1978) that Reg.Ents *pe'ilim* mostly obtained their jobs through ties created in previous jobs, either as chief kibbutz officers or as *pe'ilim*, and they wasted much time seeking ties and job opportunities at the expense of official duties, as was common among US managers with precarious jobs.²³ They did not lose jobs despite inevitable failures, due to a notorious "cost plus" pricing system which assured that client kibbutzim would pay for their negligence. In one such case which I witnessed, the tort amounted to US\$150,000-200,000 without any formal negative sanction against responsible *pe'ilim*; only a year later they were replaced, seemingly as a normal *rotatzia* (Shapira 1987).

'Parachutings' of Complete Outsiders and Their Fragile Status

However, kibbutz officers' efforts to maintain status by circulation enhanced the practice called 'parachuting': an officer who had finished a short term without failing, was considered a legitimate candidate for a wide range of managerial jobs for which s/he was a complete outsider, that is, lacking almost all intangible assets required to function in it. This lack enhanced the fragility of managerial status and encouraged its defense by auspices of a patron. This practice was facilitated by the growth, especially in the 1960s, of the kibbutz managerial job market with the establishment of Reg.Ents, other economic FOs and kibbutz plants. Reg.Ents and Regional Council subsidiaries grew from a few small plants into some 150 larger

²¹ On dominance of economic FOs: Cohen, R. 1978; On comptroller-accountants' power: Kressel 1974: 148; Chap. 17. A typical circulative economist's career: Tzimchi 1999.

²² See a similar case in Kibbutz Hamadia in Tzimchi 1999: 132.

²³ Downs 1966; Maccoby 1976; Granovetter 1983; Luthans 1988.

plants and service facilities, with some 1300 *pe'ilim* and almost 10,000 hired employees, while kibbutz industry expanded from a hundred plants with some 4,800 employees, to 300 employing some 11,500.²⁴ This large managerial market was open to kibbutz members only, and thousands of ex-kibbutz chief officers were 'parachuted' to these new managerial jobs. 'Parachuting' in English refers only to bringing in an outsider as an executive, while in Israel the range of the term is wider. Since the armed forces use *rotatzia*, officers' promotion is rapid (one might be a colonel before the age of thirty); they retire early and are 'parachuted' into all types of authority positions.²⁵ Hence, many managers in Israel were complete outsider 'parachutists' who like paratroopers tried to control an alien place, an unknown organization, with little relevant experience and knowledge for its decision-making, no acquaintance with its employees, suppliers and clients, no knowledge of its markets, specialized know-how, technologies and other intangible assets which a manager advancing from within the plant or the industry brings with him/her (Gabarro 1987). In the organizational literature there is no answer as to how complete outsiders gain these assets, while in the Reg.Ents I found (1987, 1995a, 1995b) that only a few *pe'ilim* who had some relevant intangible assets for the job had gained full knowledge from local experts by exposing their own ignorance which made them vulnerable and gained their trust (Zand 1972), while most other *pe'ilim* were 'pure parachutists' with little relevant knowledge, who preferred not to take such a risk to their authority, remained 'half-baked managers' (Dore 1973: 54) without knowledge for sound decision-making, impaired plants functioning, but survived in jobs by coercive and even corrupt means, like those depicted by classic organizational ethnography.²⁶

Circulation and 'parachutings' proliferated in the field with FOs growth and the institutionalization of *rotatzia* in the 1950s. FOs adopted these practices as they served the power of their heads, making the status of *pe'ilim* more vulnerable as their continuity almost totally depended on the will of FO heads. Kibbutz literature ignored 'parachutings' and their effects on officers' functioning, as part of ignoring real *rotatzia* practices. It only properly explained the *rotatzia* of kibbutz branch managers who, like foremen, were promoted from among ordinary workers, and much of the time did manual labor. Lacking any status symbols and formal remuneration, with a heavy workload and responsibility that required extra working hours, with work planning and guidance mostly performed after working hours, a negative balance of high costs but few rewards propelled their *rotatzia*

²⁴ Shtanger 1971; Malchi 1978; Banay 1979; Bar-On & Shelhav 1984; Brum 1986.

²⁵ Vald 1987; Maman 1989; Shapira 1992, 2001.

²⁶ Gouldner 1954, 1955; Banfield 1958, 1961; Hughes 1958; Dalton 1959; Levenson 1961; Jay 1969.

(Rosner 1964). As Gelb (2001: 97-101) has noted, such a balance caused the early succession of the treasurer of a financially struggling kibbutz, but this could not explain Reg.Ents *pe'ilim* such as plant managers voluntarily resigning at the end of their terms in higher status jobs with a positive balance of rewards. Though formally responsibility was heavy, 'cost plus' pricing system eased responsibility considerably since losses due to mismanagement were passed on to kibbutzim, while power, prestige and privileges abounded, as well as social ties for finding future managerial jobs. In addition, workloads were lighter and working hours were shorter and more flexible than those of kibbutz officers; a major reason was that Reg.Ents plants usually did not compete in markets, as this was done by marketing FOs. So why resign at the end of a term when so many *pe'ilim* in parallel jobs violated *rotatzia*, and why resign before finding new managerial job?

Voluntary Resignation of *Pe'ilim* and Their Fragile Status

The prime reason for voluntary resignation of *pe'ilim* was failures in their jobs by 'pure parachutists'. Although the kibbutzim usually paid the price, managers lost prestige and left before more failures, hoping for future success by 'parachuting' elsewhere, while gaining a bonus, the image of *rotatzia* abiders. This was appreciated by kibbutz members who had to approve their next *pe'ilut*.²⁷ But there were additional reasons to leave (Shapira 1995a): First, members expected *pe'ilim* who did not lead an FO to abide by *rotatzia*, and violators were tagged with a negative image of 'careerists'. However, kibbutzim rarely cancelled the *pe'ilut* of *rotatzia* violators, and only sometimes refused direct exchange of one *pe'ilut* for another due to such violations. Secondly, a violator who quit was rarely demoted to the ranks for long, and was usually asked to fill a local office and then allowed another *pe'ilut*. Thus, *rotatzia* lost much of its egalitarian meaning, did not symbolize status equalization, but rather conformity, barely a tool for enhancing egalitarianism. For this reason when FO heads asked a kibbutz to allow their client *pe'ilim* to continue, their requests seemed legitimate in view of their high status, and were usually approved, while *pe'ilim* without patrons asking for their continuation, were pressed to leave *pe'ilut* on time and tended to conform in order to keep their kibbutz good-will for the next *pe'ilut*. Another major reason was that *pe'ilim* were pushed to leave by a new FO head, seemingly as a normal *rotatzia*, though, in fact, to install his own clients in their place in order to assure loyalty beneath him (masculine language as all known patrons were males). This is supported by the fact that where an FO head continued, like Milu'ot's Fridman, many subordinate *pe'ilim* did likewise, pointing to the major reason for the voluntary resignation of most *pe'ilim*: their fragile status and extra dependence on FO head patronage due to *rotatzia* and 'parachutings'.

²⁷ Shapira 1987; Vilan 1993: 271-2.

These two features enhanced FO heads' power as against lower echelons. In a usual bureaucracy, managerial continuity is normative and even a 'pure parachuted' officer has good reason to risk authority by direct involvement in coping with major problems: although s/he exposes his ignorance to subordinates and makes her/his authority vulnerable, s/he obtains local knowledge and learns to solve problems, gains workers' trust and becomes an effective leader (Shapira 1995b). Thus, after a while, the chance of arbitrary firing is unlikely. A superior's power to arbitrarily fire or demote competent, effective highly esteemed veteran officers, is limited. Without clear proof of violating major orders and directions, s/he may not dismiss them, as this disrupts working relations with their many friends and loyalists, and may cause a critical loss of precious expertise if the latter left after their leaders; hence, superiors usually seek other ways to handle such problems.²⁸

Questions of this type rarely bothered FO heads whose *pe'ilim* were constantly under the Damocles sword of *rotatzia*, and could be sent back to their home kibbutz within a year or two, ostensibly as a normative event. No matter how a *pa'il* excelled in her/his job, it was legitimate for an FO head to replace her/him after a few years. Thus, the status of *pe'ilim* was very fragile, FO heads could replace them by their own clients. Moreover, most FOs gave *pe'ilim* either no salary or a uniform one; therefore, FO heads used fringe benefits as major controls in addition to the threat of *rotatzia*. Unlike a salary cut or lack of promotion which could be hidden outside the workplace, the loss of *pa'il* status and FO car could not be concealed from fellow kibbutz members. It was a painful event, and *pe'ilim* avoided it by rarely criticizing mistaken decisions of superiors, a major reason for inefficiency and ineffectiveness (Shapira 1987).

Frustrating and Purging Effective, Trusted and Creative *Pe'ilim*

From the point of view of FO heads, the drawback of fringe benefits as major controls was that some *pe'ilim* were not sensitive to possible cuts, as they were 'jumpers' in Downs (1966) terms: one's FO job served to further a kibbutz career in a specialization. Such an 'impure parachutist' tended to be greatly involved in coping with challenges, exposing his/her ignorance and gaining others trust, learning from them, succeeding and gaining power and prestige; thus, his/her status was less dependent on fringe benefit symbolization. An example was the technical manager of the high-capacity, automated Hamerkaz cotton gin plant, a practical engineer whom I called Thomas. He was not disturbed much about the old station wagon he was given as a company car in contrast to the new, family cars of other *pe'ilim*. "Most decisive for me" he said, "is that I can load everything I must repair in an outside shop, so that I can shorten the gin's

²⁸ Dalton 1959: Chap. 3; Martin & Strauss 1959; Levenson 1961; Mechanic 1964.

downtime”. Downtime was the plant’s total stoppage in high season when it was operated around the clock seven days a week; an hour downtime meant the costly storing of 25 tons of raw cotton in the fields. Educated for two and a half years at the Ruppin College, his prior experience had been twenty years as a mechanic of agricultural machinery, starting at the age of fourteen (kibbutz youth worked 3-4 hours daily in kibbutz branches as life education for work; see Pearlman 1938: 151), and as a tank mechanic in the army. He was an exception among *pe’ilim*, gaining the full trust of hired technicians and foremen since he never masked ignorance, always asking, trying to help to cope with technical problems and learning from direct experience. In the three month high season, he worked 15-18 hours a day. His dedication to work left no subordinate indifferent, and positive reactions to his efforts by almost all of them created ascending trust spirals (Fox 1974), which opened all of the secrets of the trade for him; within a short period, he became a well-known expert among Israel’s cotton gin plants, as effectiveness soared, much like in Guest’s (1962) classic.²⁹

This was exactly what frightened his superior, whom I called Shavit, a younger ‘pure parachutist’ whose prior knowledge and experience had been largely irrelevant for coping with major problems. He and his like mostly minimized involvement in such problems, defending authority by keeping what Edgerton (1967) called “The Cloak of Competence”, that is, he retained an image of competence by detachment that prevented exposure of incompetence and ignorance. Unfortunately, the detachment which defended his authority, caused distrust of both *pe’ilim* and hired employees, who kept him ignorant of the plant’s secrets. In his fourth year of office, he still did not know some of these secrets which I learned as an operator within my first week of work there. He kept his cards close to his chest, but subordinates did the same, so he could barely differentiate experts who successfully solved problems, from fools and/or impostors who failed.³⁰ He abandoned efforts to understand the plant and chose conservatism, as did most ‘pure parachuted’ *pe’ilim* who used coercive means for subordinate control. With only filtered information, they made gross mistakes, evaded essential tasks, but often advanced managerial careers more successfully than ‘impure parachutists’ like Thomas who promoted effectiveness but rarely advanced careers, as the power they gained from successes menaced that of ignorant superiors who marred their promotion. The negative correlation between managerial effectiveness and career success resembled that of US managers

²⁹ On trust, openness, and effectiveness see: Deutsch 1962; Zand 1972; Fox 1974; Geneen 1984; Shapira 1987; Harvey-Jones 1988; Sieff 1988; Semler 1993; O’Toole 1999; Cloke & Goldsmith 2002.

³⁰ See the same in Gouldner (1954). See also: Dalton 1959; Jay 1969; Kets de Vries 1993.

whose tenures were also quite shaky.³¹ Jobs of uninvolved, 'pure parachuted' *pe'ilim* were precarious and they were prone to failure because of inevitable mistakes, with all that this implied for their images and further careers; hence, they sought intensive ties in other FOs for their next jobs. If they bothered to innovate, it was usually for image building only, preferring well-worn alternatives that could be presented as innovative. This minimized both the danger of failure and power-diminishing dependency on local experts.³²

Detached *Pe'ilim* Reigned, FO Heads Barred Internal Promotion

Many detached *pe'ilim* were successful careerists due to uncritical loyalty to FO heads, who, in turn, backed their shaky authority and helped their promotion. However, they clashed with dedicated *pe'ilim*: Thomas was both indifferent to fringe benefit cuts, and very interested in an innovation he had proposed, which Shavit feared, as a possible failure would damage his image, while a possible success would enhance Thomas' power and status. But rejecting it outright might cause him to lose his best expert. For three years, Shavit and his patron, Mishkay Hamerkaz head Zelikovich, used a variety of subterfuges in order to obstruct Thomas' proposal. Eventually it was successfully introduced, but heartbroken Thomas had resigned and returned to his kibbutz garage, and Shavit suffered a major setback: Thomas's successor, a 'pure parachutist' who preferred detachment, did not cope with a major operational problem and caused heavy losses, amounting to US\$150,000-200,000 within a single season, so that he and Shavit had to resign. Thanks to Zelikovich's backing, the resignation was postponed for almost a year, and then it was presented as normal *rotatzia*. Without public exposure of the fiasco, the two soon found other managerial jobs and advanced in managerial careers (Shapira 1987).

The fragile status of circulative 'pure parachuted' *pe'ilim* enhanced dependency on patrons, as 'parachutists' often faced employees' objections to their amateurish solutions for complex problems which they did not comprehend. As they seemingly represented the kibbutzim which owned FOs, they tended to coerce hired employees and caused destructive conflicts which led to failures, in accord with Deutsch's (1969) explanation. Similar to the *defense* of managerial authority as described by Hughes (1958) and Dalton (1959), Reg.Ents *pe'ilim* camouflaged or concealed failures, or blamed them on others. They defended jobs by clique building and patronage, and were self-aggrandized by plant enlargement and technological virtuosity (Galbraith 1971).

This negated both the ethos and interests of kibbutzim, but served FO heads' power. Though an effective deputy was often the best choice to succeed a plant

³¹ Dalton 1959; Maccoby 1976; Luthans 1988; Kramer & Tyler 1996: 226, 266, 339-48.

³² See: Crozier 1964; Shapira 1987; Thomas 1994.

manager who left, usually a 'pure' client of the FO head was 'parachuted' in, as it better served the boss's interests. For example, prior to Shavit's nomination, there had been a deputy plant manager whom I called Yaakov, who was talented, experienced, committed to the job and highly trusted by both employees and cotton growers since he behaved like Thomas and was very effective. Zelikovich, himself, defined him as "the natural candidate for managing the plant". So why was ignorant Shavit nominated? The logical explanation was that Shavit was Zelikovich's client and dependent on him, while Yaakov was quite independent thanks to his intangible assets. Zelikovich has been depicted above as a big boss, but as a 'pure parachutist' himself, he lacked knowledge and loyalists among Mishkay Hamerkaz executives. In order to maintain control without much involvement, he built a clique of clients by 'parachuting' loyalists to head plants or staff departments and including them on his Board of Directors. Yaakov did not suit this clique due to the independence he had gained by involvement, trust of subordinates and competent problem-solving.³³ Shavit had helped Zelikovich previously, when he had represented his kibbutz in the Regional Council headed by Zelikovich. This help brought success and Zelikovich had been promoted to head Mishkay Hamerkaz;³⁴ thus, he owed Shavit a debt for his help. In order to nominate him for the job, Zelikovich used a dirty trick against Yaakov, causing him to lose status, to come into conflict with cotton growers, and eventually, to resign (Shapira 1987: 132-6).

Shavit, however, rightly understood that further promotion was dependent more on a positive image and close ties with Zelikovich than on genuine success. Like most US managers, he adopted an upward-looking posture, and cared about his superior's approval rather than coping with tasks at hand.³⁵ His looking upward and seeking personal aims were not a result of prior kibbutz managerial socialization, nor of circulation and 'parachuting' *per se*, but rather due to operating in a field dominated by autocratic, self-serving Admors and FO heads who did not promote critical thinkers like Brum, Thomas and Yaakov, and suppressed radicals (cf. Hirschman 1970; Chap. 11). Forsaking public aims in favor of personal ones is common in fields with *rotatzia* and 'parachutings', as seen in Imperial China with its oligarchic emperors and 'parachuted', short-term District Magistrates.³⁶

Sidetracking of Creative Radicals: The Catch 22 of *Rotatzia*

Circulation and 'parachuting' made the status and power of *pe'ilim* fragile; the

³³ See quite similar cases in Gouldner 1954; Dalton 1959.

³⁴ It was a promotion since the Regional Council was a much smaller organization.

³⁵ Prethus 1964; Maccoby 1976; Kanter 1977; Luthans 1988.

³⁶ Chang 1955; Chow 1966; Folsom 1968; Watt 1972.

forced succession of dysfunctioning Admors and FO heads by critical thinkers and radicals seeking democracy and egalitarianism was next to impossible. In addition, to do this, there would have had to be a change in the belief that *rotatzia* was egalitarian and democratic. That was not easy, as this belief was common outside kibbutzim, as well, especially in the army, in which all young kibbutz members served and some of them advanced by circulation, and in the academy, including all kibbutz students. It took me twenty years of kibbutz life as an adult and seven years of ethnographies of both Reg.Ents and kibbutz plants to overcome this belief, which is still prevalent among Israeli social scientists. Unless young radicals, themselves, concluded and persuaded kibbutz members that *rotatzia* negated democracy and egalitarianism, and that a new, true measure for oligarchy prevention was required, they could not remain in office long enough to both introduce the new measure and assure its success. They were in a 'Catch 22' situation: without violating *rotatzia* they could not eliminate it as they could not accumulate enough power and capitals, while its violation made them suspect of seeking self-serving continuity.

A second major belief they had to overcome in order to replace *rotatzia* by a democratic succession system, was that of the indispensability of Admors. Exposing their dysfunctioning as an inevitable and irreversible result of their extra continuity and *pe'ilim* circulation, could have persuaded elites that only a new system of succession could solve this problem and could save democracy and egalitarianism. However, this, too, was next to impossible to achieve, since Admors seemingly had overcome the crises of the 1950s, and they became charismatic saviors (cf. Tucker 1970), so that many of the minority of members who had not left kibbutzim in this era, tended to believe that their exceptional gifts had rescued the movement. Kibbutz studies enhanced belief in Admors' charisma by ignoring oligarchization, stratification and the decaying processes of kibbutz cultures which their dysfunction engendered. Kibbutz students deserve two considerations for their mistakes:

1. No leadership student defined in which situations and for how long gifted leaders like Admors might continue functioning beyond the eleven years which Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991: 723) viewed as the usual limit of effectiveness of large organization heads.
2. As Barbuto (1997) has pointed out, literature of charismatic leadership is quite confusing and barely helped in coping with the belief in the exceptional gifts of Admors (Also: Beyer 1999).

Thus, it was not easy to eliminate a third important belief, that is, in the public-service motivation of Admors and their deputies, their unselfishness and their devotion to the kibbutz cause. Exposing Admors' failures was not enough; their very aims had to be placed in doubt and the 1948-54 crises had to be grasped largely as their fault, and as resulting from the self-serving, self-perpetuating

leftist admiration of the USSR and evasion of major problems (Chaps. 10-11). Even critical historians, not to mention other students, have not suspected that leftism was a power perpetuation strategy, nor have students exposed this evasion. Without doubting their motivation, young radicals could not use all political means at their disposal against Admors' rule. Admors managed to retain their facades of asceticism and public commitment almost intact, except for their cars (Chap. 8), and few, if any, members suspected their self-perpetuation strategies. It would have been very difficult to convince members that there was no chance to rescue kibbutz culture without replacing Admors. Moreover, challengers would have had to identify their own Achilles heel: their fragile status as kibbutz officers or *pe'ilim* under *rotatzia*. Criticizing *rotatzia* was not enough; they would have had to propose an alternative that would stabilize their own status by allowing job continuity subject to periodic democratic decisions, in a way that would prevent oligarchic continuity and any suspicion of a self-perpetuation motivation on their own parts, as was the refusal by US Presidents Washington and Jefferson of third terms.

How Was a Belief in Egalitarianism Maintained Despite Circulation?

Pe'ilim circulation raises a fundamental question: What happened to the egalitarian ethos and kibbutz members who believed in it? They could ignore the extraordinary continuity of Admors, deputies and major FO heads as an inevitable leadership necessity, but privileged continuous *pe'ilim* and circulators numbered thousands, including too many to be ignored by believers in egalitarianism, some 7-8% of members. In the large Kibbutz Givat Brenner, with some 800 members, Levy (1991) found some fifty circulators. In Fadida's (1972) small Kibbutz Chen, repeated discussions of freeing circulators for *pe'ilut* were considered a nuisance for assembly participants, and Argaman (1997) pointed to similar findings in five veteran kibbutzim. It was impossible for most members to miss the contradiction between a privileged circulating stratum and an egalitarian ethos. Until hegemony of FO heads is fully explained in the following chapters, I have only partial answers as to how belief in this ethos was maintained.

One answer was the belief in the need to preserve rare managerial talent without allowing for oligarchic continuity. Bourdieu (1990) pointed to cultures' gravity to practical solutions. Circulation seemed a practical and easy-to-use solution for manning thousands of managerial jobs without creating oligarchic rule. At the same time, it appeared that circulation solved the problem of dependence on a continuous ruler; thus, injustice caused by one officer, might be redressed by a successor. Secondly, members might have ignored inequality which circulation engendered, since *pe'ilut* often reimbursed an ex-chief kibbutz officer for the negative balance of rewards of his/her previous job, especially in

offices which up to the 1970s were part-time and were combined with manual work, such as kibbutz secretaries.³⁷ A third answer was that many ex-chief officers, especially of unsuccessful kibbutzim like Bowes's (1989) Goshen, or early days Carmelit (Chap. 15), rarely circulated and often left kibbutzim, since they lacked auspices of a patron, as most patrons belonged to veteran and/or successful kibbutzim and had their own loyal clients from these kibbutzim.

The crucial answer, however, was the evasion, masking and/or concealment of the true nature of *rotatzia* by power monger FO heads, *pe'ilim* whose careers advanced by circulation and the dominant scientific coalition whose members advanced academic careers by ignoring it (Shapira 2005). Due to the use of CKP this concealment never ceased as circulation's negative effects, revealed by some kibbutz ethnographies, were never connected to FO growth and their heads' self-enhancing cycle of power and privilege accumulation. While the continued growth of Reg.Ents beyond the needs of kibbutzim was questioned by the kibbutz media from 1977, critics missed seeing how it served the job continuity needs of *pe'ilim* by self-aggrandizement.³⁸ Thus, members have rarely if ever encountered a critical exposure of *rotatzia*'s true nature and the fact that its very existence was largely due to kibbutz officers' circulation that prevented status loss.

The lack of criticism of circulation is explained, as well, by the fact that those capable of voicing effective criticism were mostly either *pe'ilim* who benefited from it, or kibbutz managers who expected to benefit in the near future, as well as the dominant scientific coalition which accumulated academic capital by ignoring stratification and circulation (Shapira 2005). A critic of circulation faced a powerful stratum, backed by FO heads and loyal academics. S/he was usually in too low a position to be publicly heard, and remained so until s/he gave up and exited without harming the latter's power. This resembles Hirschman's (1995) analysis of the collapse of the German Democratic Republic: Up to 1988, its leaders could ignore disenchantment since it did not cause an exodus massive enough to endanger survival; a public uproar toppled them in 1989 when mass exit endangered survival. In most younger kibbutzim, mass exits did not endanger survival, as the Movements helped them by loans and *hashlamot* (groups of joiners), while ignoring inequality and autocratic, conservative rule by patrons who repeatedly caused waves of exits of innovative talents and critical thinkers, in accord with Hirschman's (1970) theory, as Chapters 14-15 will disclose.

Disenchantment with Violation of Egalitarianism Enhanced Exits

A sixth answer, however, was that the disenchantment of the violation of egalitarianism by circulation joined other failures of kibbutz ethos implementation

³⁷ I met them on factory lines when studying kibbutz industry; Bowes 1989: 51.

³⁸ Pe'eri 1977; Atar 1982; Harpazi 1982; Lifshitz 1983, 1986c.

that caused exits, but no one studied circulation's impact apart from the impact of these failures. As mentioned, for each member who stayed in kibbutzim, there were four-five others who departed, i.e., 240,000-300,000 adults (Leviatan et al. 1998: 163), but CKP users were blind to stratification and ignored oligarchy and Hirschmanian exit process. Hence, no one studied exit caused by suppression of voices raised against oligarchic circulation of *pe'ilim*. Kressel's (1974, 1983) ethnography which exposed oligarchization causing mass exit by kibbutz youth whose voices failed to curb it, was rejected by the dominant scientific coalition as unrepresentative, while its academics ignored the question.

A corroboration of Kressel's findings can be found by a careful reading of Ben-Horin's (1984) study of the disintegration of kibbutzim. It exposes at least eight cases in which mass exit followed non-egalitarian practices by local leaders and suppression of members' criticism.³⁹ Sabar's (1996) study of kibbutz offspring living in Los Angeles has also indicated exit due to disenchantment caused by violation of egalitarianism. In most of the interviews, exit followed a feeling of inequality. I heard similar sentiments in interviews with 57 former members of three kibbutzim. However, in the two younger ones, exit rates were very high, reaching 75-80%, and criticism of inequality was harsher among their ex-members than among Kibbutz Kochav's ex-members. Kochav was much more egalitarian, democratic, high-trust, creative and stable than these kibbutzim; unlike these kibbutzim, its *pe'ilim* shared cars with other members since 1962, and their privileges were largely viewed by members as balanced by their greater sacrifices, something which was rare in interviews with ex-members of younger kibbutzim. The case of younger Kibbutz Carmelit corroborated this (Chap. 15): At first inequality caused so high exit rate that the kibbutz collapsed; in the renewed kibbutz egalitarianism was promoted and exit rates sharply dropped.

Compliance Due to a Change from Moral Choice to Expediency

Compliance with circulation can also be explained as Fox (1985: 33-43) explained compliance of British workers with managers' rules and orders as a part of their acceptance of the extant societal structure, principles and conventions due to socialization, awareness of power superiority of the elite and mass media support for the current order, which made any thought of changing it futile. Such an explanation for kibbutz members can be objected to by asserting that, unlike British workers' expediency considerations, members joined for ideological reasons, and moral considerations prevailed. However, Kressel (1974) shows that when Netzer Sireni became oligarchic and prosperous, with hired labor and

³⁹ The cases: Kfar Hachosh, Revivim, Avuka, Gezer, Gvulot, Kedma, Alumot, Har'el. Most kibbutzim were renewed by new groups of settlers, only Avuka and Kedma vanished.

lavishly privileged managers, May Day celebrations and raising red flags were abolished, symbolizing an end to socialist ideology. Expediency became the recognized motive for members staying and complying with leaders' deeds, similar to the case of the British workers. In the oligarchic and prosperous kibbutz field of the 1960s-1970s, as well, while most seekers of egalitarianism and democracy either left or became mute, only a few managed to promote these values. Morality was largely replaced with expediency as a major motive, and Fox's (1985) explanation was valid for reconciling with circulation (Chap. 17).

Responses I received to my critique of *pe'ilim* circulation and 'parachuting' in both the kibbutz press and in management courses at Ruppin College supported this explanation: My critics ignored moral considerations, using only expediency arguments, such as the need to preserve rare managerial talent and preventing stagnation, while questioning the validity of findings which pointed to the opposite. It was a reasonable reaction for students who were junior managers aimed at advancing their own careers mainly through circulation. Fox (1985) pointed to media support for the current order, and this was also true of the kibbutz field: Up until the mid-1970s, members faced complete media support for *rotatzia* and 'parachuting', as most kibbutz media were controlled by Admors and both social scientists and the national media supported this system which reigned in the armed forces, and ex-army officer 'parachutists' held most top authority offices in Israel. Only Vald (1987) dared to criticize *rotatzia* in the armed forces after the failures of the 1982 Lebanon war, and sometimes a journalist exposed the failure of a 'parachutist', and explained it by his 'parachuting' to an alien job.⁴⁰ Kibbutz journalists' critique commenced only after Tabenkin's death and Yaari's neutralization by illnesses.⁴¹ Even then, kibbutz students did not question *rotatzia* and 'parachuting'. For instance, Sheaffer and Helman (1994) exposed brain-drain in kibbutzim, but did not refer to my works' explanations as to how *rotatzia* and 'parachutings' encouraged it.

Success of circulators' careers could not be explained without considering their loyalty to powerful FO heads and executives who were the patrons who provided them with managerial jobs each time one was required, due to *rotatzia* or apparent *rotatzia*. CKP users missed how circulation enhanced yet another troubling phenomenon for democracy and egalitarianism, that is, patronage and cliques.

⁴⁰ For instance: Shavit 1980; Avneri 1983.

⁴¹ For instance: Adar 1975; *Bakibbutz* 1977; Pe'eri 1977; Ilana and Avner 1977.

CHAPTER 12

Rama's Lack of Highly Trusted Leadership

The next chapters will use ethnographies of five kibbutzim: a conservative veteran Rama, younger conservatives Chen and Olim, a younger creative, Carmelit, studied by Schwartz and Naor (2000), and a veteran creative Kochav (all names are fictive, as are members names below). Rama is first, representing the rare case of a 'liberal' kibbutz in which many talented members, including *ex-pe'ilim* whose managerial careers had stumbled, advanced in outside careers such as army officers, professionals, professors, authors, editors and experts, among others. I have called them the Talented; they both foiled egalitarian norms which interfered with their privileges and accumulation of power and intangible capitals, and challenged the dominance of the circulative elite of *pe'ilim* and *ex-pe'ilim*, mostly economic ones, as well as the authority of kibbutz officers. This foiling and other reasons deterred talented members from taking public offices, and, without talented officers, anarchy ruined communal culture. At first glance, this process was largely independent of the impact of FOs, but detailed analysis has exposed that the oligarchization of FOs was the prime culprit; without it, Rama's anarchy and relative backwardness are inexplicable.

Field-Work Methods and the Kibbutzim Studied

The time is fit to present ethnographic work I personally conducted in four kibbutzim. My work commenced in 1986, in Kochav, which was founded in the 1920s, and distinguished itself by creativity, becoming large and successful. It was studied for fifteen months, two days a week. In addition to observations and study of its archival records, open interviews were conducted with 123 people, mostly present and past officers, of all ranks and generations, as well as many who had left, some of whom had become nationally prominent. Interviews lasted between thirty minutes and several hours, and some people were interviewed several times. Subsequently, two younger and smaller kibbutzim were studied: Olim, founded in 1949, with some 450 inhabitants in 1990, and Chen, founded in 1954, with some 300 inhabitants in 1991. Field-work lasted only three months in each, as previous ethnographies of both kibbutzim were used, and was done in the same manner; only Chen's archival records were not studied.¹ Interviews consisted of 35 and 29 people respectively, and included ex-members. The last to be studied was medium-sized, veteran Rama (some 650 inhabitants, founded in the 1920s) in which field-work took six months. Methods were quite similar

¹ Fadida 1972; Topel 1979; Bloomfield-Ramagem 1993.

except that no ex-members were among the 51 interviewees, and my own previous ethnography of its plant was used. In addition to interviews with chief officers and branch managers of the crisis period (1986-1991), many other elite members were interviewed. Some interviewees read the research report and expressed no reservations, further strengthening the validity of findings.

Rama Reacts to Crisis: Self-Reinforcing Imitative Changes

Rama is situated in central Israel, and its some 400 members and 250 children live in a scenic, green, suburban-like community interspersed with trees and lawns.² A casual visitor who sees many renovated houses would barely discern crisis, but between 1990 and 1992 its membership decreased by some thirty people, and the total population decreased by some fifty people. While less committed youngsters had left, families stayed, twelve new ones were absorbed, and others applied for membership. Rama is encumbered by an average sized debt due to late and conservative industrialization with few investments in innovation. Until the crisis, it depended largely on agriculture, which had become less profitable, and a plastics plant which employed some sixty, mostly hired workers, and sells mature products in shrinking markets. More profitable are a small chemical plant with fifteen member employees, several workshops (three-four workers each), and a new food plant with twenty-five employees. It is based on imported know-how and a brand name, and also uses hired Labor.

In the past, kibbutzim abstained from commerce, but now (2008) Rama's commercial park, adjacent to a main road, hosts private businesses on a rental basis: various road services, restaurants, shops and a supermarket. Some members are part-time employees of these businesses, earning some extra private money after their day's work in Rama. The change in this direction commenced in 1986, as Rama started coping with dire economic straits. At first, internal services turned to outside customers. Though this seemed to be a rational reaction that made better use of kibbutz assets, it was a process with far-reaching consequences and self-reinforcing change to a quasi-capitalist society which, at least up to now, has had little success, although it may have averted collapse. Be that as it may, parallel to introducing outsiders, hired Labor increased and many members took outside jobs. This was legitimized by setting a minimal condition: that members working outside were to be paid at least the national average wage. However, due to mandatory employer payments, having a member work on the outside and an outsider hired to replace him was worthwhile only if the outsider was paid much less than the member. Often this was not the case, and worse still, as the chief work officer (*rakaz avoda*) confessed, "The kibbutz ability to assign members to

² As usual in ethnographies, unless explicitly stated otherwise, present is the time of observations.

jobs became negligible". This was because outside job markets impacted members considerations concerning local jobs, since outside work had become a legitimate alternative.³

In the past, however, it was unheard of for a member who wanted outside work to propose a hired worker to succeed him. Until industrialization in 1968, hired Labor was limited to a few seasonal tasks and manual construction jobs. In the plastics plant, it was, at first, limited to arduous work in a department working on shifts, but later diffused to other tasks. As kibbutz industry research found, hired Labor encouraged boring, Labor-intensive techniques that deterred members, especially women, from taking industrial jobs, caused brain-drain and conflicts among members, which also deterred taking industrial jobs and furthered dependency on hired Labor.⁴ This explained members seeking other jobs, and indeed, mass hired Labor in Netzer Sireni's factories was escorted by much outside work (Kressel 1974). In Rama's case, another factor encouraged taking outside jobs: the influx of higher status clients which accentuated the disadvantages of Rama's jobs; many of the jobs were in unprofitable branches and seemed non-secure, were given no fringe benefits, were assured no pension, etc. The chief work officer said:

"Generally, today, there is no identification with the kibbutz. People care only for their own private needs, working where it is convenient, easy and fashionable, where one can associate with peers and see prospects of promotion soon. The tendency is towards ignoring the system's needs when deciding where to work".

Self-Serving Elite Members

According to Swidler (2001), culture shapes human action by repertoires and codes it provides for actors. In accord with the maxim that low morality begins at the top (in Hebrew we say "The fish stinks from the head"; e.g., Kets De Vries 1993), elite members introduced self-serving capitalist repertoires and codes: the plastics plant manager and its chief engineer "jumped" to outside high-level jobs in spite of plant needs.⁵ Their move seemed to resemble turning to *pe'ilut*, but it was different: Their know-how and expertise were sold for large salaries which they gave to Rama and, thus, enjoyed a new kind of prestige unknown in *pe'ilut*. Sharing their company cars with members as some *pe'ilim* did, was out of the question, and soon their status was symbolized also by enlarging apartments with money they had saved from expense accounts, using another outside norm, private

³ Likewise in Carmelit although Schwartz and Naor (2000) ignored it. I deduce it from the manning of jobs known as problematic in kibbutzim, by hired labour (pp. 128-30).

⁴ Shapira 1979a, 1980; Zamir 1979; Rosner et al. 1980; Satt & Ginzburg 1992.

⁵ On "jumping" see Downs 1966. For more details: Shapira 2001: 19.

construction which Talented elite members had introduced (see below).

Yet the kibbutz lost: without them, major plant changes were thwarted which would have generated revenues far greater than the salaries they brought to Rama. Worse still, the same happened at lower echelons with the chief mechanic, a plant department manager, a senior cook, etc. This was common in kibbutzim from the late 1980s; their unique values lost meaning as economic survival legitimized imitation of outside society, and thus, personal motives guided members' behavior, without consideration of community needs.⁶

Outside Work and Growing Inequity

Outside work magnified problems of equity which were not solved by managers in a just and fair way, causing wide distrust, in accord with Hosmer (1995). Many held company cars, and conceding to pressure by others who lacked cars and who cited three Rama cars given to outside-working professionals long ago, it was decided to provide a car for anyone who earned a salary of over \$3000 a month.⁷ This was arbitrary and unfair to any male member who earned more than \$1800 and less than \$3000: even if he had received a car costing \$300-\$400 a month, he would still bring in more than the minimum to which he was obliged, the national average of \$1400. A woman had to earn only \$1,000 (the national average); thus, the bylaw unjustly punished women even more: all those who brought in more than \$1400 and less than \$3000. Alas, the senior cook mentioned above was allowed outside work even though her employer deducted \$250 for a car, essential for her work, from her \$1000 salary. This was a clear violation of both bylaws without a convincing explanation. In contrast, a professional woman working as a freelancer and who was well-paid by the hour, did not receive a car, as her monthly earnings were sometimes below \$3000. This hampered her work until she stopped, bitterly critical of officers' injustice.

Officers' Ignorance of Unfairness

In many other cases, unfair norms were introduced or unfairly executed by officers, who did not abide by their own rules, as with the above cook. Kibbutz ethos required just and fair solutions, but short-term, inexperienced and/or incompetent officers lacked the motivation to create them or were too weak to introduce them, using simplistic rules that could answer needs of 'normal' cases. This marginalized other seemingly 'abnormal' cases, as in the case of the above professional woman, who remained at the officers' mercy. Extended officers' discretion rewarded them with feelings of power and competence (Kets De Vries 1993), encouraging them to continue in jobs despite bitter criticism by injured

⁶ Leviatan 1995; For a similar point: March & Olsen 1989: 131.

⁷ I translated Israeli New Shekels to \$US due to inflationary economy.

members. This continuity was important, as often they were the only members who agreed to the job (see below).

The turn to the outside brought in norms of a culture incommensurate with kibbutz ethos. In kibbutz ethos, work is a social obligation to the community, not a market commodity; part-time work is not differentiated from full-time, nor men's work from women's. The differentiation of those above the \$3000 line from those below it was neither a kibbutz norm, nor a capitalist one, but the officers' hybrid of the Movement policy of giving cars only to *pe'ilim* above mid-rank; hence officers decided that a \$3000 salary represented such a rank and seemingly followed the Movement. Unfortunately, in many cases, other FOs and outside employers gave cars to much lower echelons; for instance, the Reg.Ents gave cars even to low-status provisional young female clerks; thus, the officers' solution was spurious. Worse still, outside markets rated work of women thirty-fourty per cent less than men (Alexander 1997); hence, if a man had the right to a car with a salary above \$3000, then a woman should have had this right if she earned above \$1800-2100. Alas, Rama's women were weak; the two power elites were both male, and chief officers included only one female in the weaker job of co-secretary, together with a male secretary;⁸ thus the inequality women suffered by the by-law was ignored.

The above and other decisions mentioned below, made clear that personal aims guided officers more than public aims, and this curbed trust in them, as in Banfield's (1958) backward Italian village. They sought solutions acceptable by power elites and some members, even though many others were injured. It encouraged violation by powerful members, such as the above cook, who was well-networked to elite members, and three veteran Talented professionals (see below).

Was the Turn to the Outside Worthwhile?

Turning to the outside was presented as a necessity in a dire situation that required any kind of instant solution, but, while selling services to outside customers instantly added revenues, due processes caused a financial balance sheet which was no better. In addition to the aforementioned disadvantages, outsiders' work required more control than that of members' and more bookkeeping, adding costly bureaucracy. Instead of qualified personnel taking outside jobs, only less qualified substitutes who caused failures were found. Worse still, markets might provide, at a price, qualified cooks and mechanics, but not trusted leaders. For instance, even if a qualified manager was found and appointed plant head, no market could assure that he would choose direct involvement in the problem-solving required to gain subordinates' trust, learn local secrets, and lead a cooperative search for best

⁸ See Chapter 17 on the creation of the norm of parallel two kibbutz secretaries.

solutions that would bring success like Thomas. Like many 'parachutists', such a one might choose detachment and coercion, breeding destructive conflicts, resignations, brain-drain and plant failure, as Chapters 6-7 explained.

This explains why mediocre insiders in the plant replaced those who "jumped" to the outside: Cooperation with them was good and little coercion was used; alas, they abandoned major changes for which predecessors had worked so hard in favor of efficiency efforts which brought only modest results. The lack of better inside candidates for top jobs was explicable by the fact that the plant was partially open to market forces from inception due to hired labor. Hired labor deterred young talented members from joining as line workers; they gained academic educations and were 'parachuted' to jobs with similar negative effects as Reg.Ents' 'parachutings' (Shapira 1987). Moreover, tradition of conservatism commenced by the plant's founder and his successor, both *ex-pe'ilim* of the Reg.Ents, also caused brain-drain. Thus, lack of competent insiders was not incidental, but was caused by the low-trust culture which used market and hierarchy controls, rather than trust and democracy. Worse still, this was self-perpetuating: both detached 'parachutists' and mediocre insiders suppressed talented innovators, enhancing Hirschman's (1970) negative selection of radicals and critical thinkers, as in many kibbutz plants with hired labor (Shapira 1980).

Rama's power elites bothered little about these problems, and were mainly interested in easing restrictions on adding perks for themselves (see below). Rama's officers, on their part, wanted easy-to-put-into-practice solutions which would prove their functioning, enhancing control and promising promotion. In accord with Hosmer (1995), trust was curbed, or even ruined, as public interests were not given just and fair precedence over elite interests. Injured members who pointed to injustices were suppressed, and unfair execution proved that officers aimed at maintaining rule, not at genuine solutions for public problems.

Distrust, Dwindling Democracy and Failed Solutions

A proper preference for public interest over one's own, however, is not enough to evoke full trust in a leader; in addition to good intentions, positive results are required. Failure of genuine efforts by incompetent officers, also ruined trust.⁹ This was the case with efforts by former secretaries to stem the deteriorating authority of the General Assembly: Only a handful of members regularly attended, while most did so only when interested in topics on the agenda or as combatants, a well-known problem of kibbutz assemblies.¹⁰ In accord with Parkinson (1957), crucial topics were often dealt with in a brief debate involving few members, and

⁹ Shapira 1987, 1995b; Kramer & Tyler 1996.

¹⁰ Shatil 1977: 40; Rayman 1981: 225; Kressel 1983: 154; Argaman 1997: 85, 88, 93, 97, 155.

interested parties often appealed a decision and reversed it by mobilizing supporters.¹¹ Decisions lost the legitimacy of what Yankelovich (1991) called “public judgment”, they seemed to be the casual preference of an accidental composition of the few who gathered, or worse still, of these few being almost only those with a particular interest in a decision. Distrust of the public-serving motives of participants encouraged appeals by opponents; debates repeated themselves and became a nuisance, and many decisions were violated outright without sanctions against violators, or ineffective sanctions whose ineffectiveness was known in advance.¹²

While some large kibbutzim try to solve these problems by instituting representative democracy, i.e., a quasi-parliament of a few dozen members who would decide on most matters and leave the General Assembly to decide only on principle issues (Cohen & Rosner 1988: 261), Rama's two former male secretaries tried to cope with these issues by a ballot box approach for decision-making, whereby not only those in General Assembly attendance could vote. However, in order to prevent opposition of power elites to this new practice that empowered ordinary members, it was limited to the relatively marginal question of acceptance of new members, ignoring more acute and decisive problems, such as work allocation, car use and the planning, budgeting, and construction of apartments (see below). When the two secretaries had completed their terms, unsolved problems and the deepening economic crisis caused growing demands for a change which officers did not deliver.

The Rise of Lesser Officers and Their Weakness

The outcome was that two advocates of wholesale privatization, a man and a woman, were elected as Secretaries, not so much because of their views or managerial prowess, but since there were no other volunteers, as is common in conservative kibbutzim (Am'ad & Palgi 1986), and because they were devoted foreman and forewoman, respected veterans (over fifty years old), with decent families and many friends and relatives. The two, however, failed to promote solutions to major problems, as is usually the case with short-term officers. Short-term office in a new area of responsibility prevents introduction of major changes, especially if one is inexperienced, coming up from the ranks, with little chance of advance, while continuous power elites dominate, as in this case.¹³ The two power elites of the Talented, outside careerists, and economic *pe'ilim* and *ex-pe'ilim*,

¹¹ See Argaman 1997 for this phenomenon in kibbutz assemblies.

¹² Cohen and Rosner (1988) and Topel (1992) ignored these problems which Kressel (1983: 154-84) exposed vividly, and Argaman (1997) corroborated.

¹³ See *rotatzia* literature cited in Chap. 1 and 6, and: Kochan 1986; Shapira 1990, 1992, 2001; Pettigrew et al. 1992: 278, 298; Friedman 1995.

largely neutralized the Secretaries, who were perceived by many as impostors who cultivated an image of coping without doing much. One of their predecessors, Ilan, said:

“There were so many discussions in the Secretariat on changes, with so many outside experts consulted [naming four consultants], that, when nothing happened, even supporters of these changes stopped participating in despair”.

Weakness drove the Secretaries to solutions which proved to be unjust, such as the provisions for cars which were instantly violated. They also circumvented the authority of other officers: A decision to construct 16 cheaper flats of lower quality, financed by the Ministry for Immigrant Absorption, was handled by them without consulting the Planning Committee, whose chairman tended to oppose it. Another subterfuge was the elimination of committees, using difficulties in manning them as an excuse for usurping their authority. This caused faulty decision-making due to a lack of proper prior study of problems and alternative solutions.

Distrust, Minimal Communication, Meager Promotion Prospects

In their isolation and weakness, the Secretaries monopolized information, rarely reporting to the General Assembly and the local bulletin. Rama's social worker, herself a member of an adjacent kibbutz, compared Ilan's functioning to that of his successor:

“Ori is not communicative. In his predecessor's days, there were always people around, coming to discuss various personal and public problems. Now it is quiet, no one comes, he is afraid to talk with them, he fails to build relationships with people. You see his desk [pointing at it] is almost empty. Before, it was always piled this high [indicating some five inches]. (I suggest that Ori has no answers to Rama's complex problems, and she retorts:) I am not sure of that, but I am sure he is not communicative. There is much confusion and anxiety among members, but he leaves them in their plight”.

Ilan's partner as secretary depicted the difference as follows:

“In our time, we tried to bring maximum information to the members, including things which some members said must not be publicized, since we wanted to create interest. And members came to the [General] Assembly since everything was on the table, openly discussed... Now there is a lack of information and no interest in the Assembly which, as a result, convenes only every other week [instead of weekly], and fewer people come”.

This has characterized low-trust situations, which Zamir (1996) found in kibbutzim where the debt crisis was acute. Sociologists Cohen and Rosner (1988: 241), however, have presupposed that kibbutz democracy assures high-trust and reliable information flow for proper decision-making, though it may not reach all

members when officers are incompetent, and “there is a possibility of hiding or even distorting information in the belief that it is in the public interest”. Self-serving manipulation of information by officers is out of the question for these naive veteran kibbutz members.

Members' trust diminished since outcomes were disappointing, major problems were bypassed or efforts to solve them failed. The new Secretaries preferred detachment, as proven by their empty desks and minimal communication, a major reason for distrust, like uninvolved ‘parachuted’ *pe'ilim* in the Reg.Ents (Shapira 1995b). In fact, after a short time, their few changes brought further anarchy. For instance, more outside workers tried to emulate the cook's car arrangement without authorization. The Secretaries gave up coping with problems, and only intervened when they saw prospects for “quick fixes” that could mask dysfunction. The members' trust in them, which was not high to begin with, vanished as they lost credibility, and they began to be seen by many members as inauthentic leaders or even impostors.¹⁴

A major reason for their abandoning efforts to cope with problems, was the fact that their prospects for promotion were slight. Even at the peak of FO success, in the 1970s, when Helman (1987) did his study of managerial circulation, only half of the ex-kibbutz secretaries had advanced to *pe'ilut*. In the 1990s, very few advanced, as Movements were drastically downsized (Chap. 3). Besides, they had no patrons and had few qualifications for *pe'ilut*, while the branch teams from which they had come and with whom they had close ties, wanted them to return. Thus, both chief officers who genuinely sought new solutions in accord with kibbutz ethos, and those who wanted to solve problems by dispensing with the ethos, failed. Leaders are trusted if they solve problems, but identifying them, seeking new solutions, campaigning for them and, after gaining approval, attending to their implementation, required longevity which officers lacked.¹⁵ The Secretaries failed, although at first glance they seemed bound to succeed, as they strove for increased capitalist conformity which was desired by both power elites. Their failure can be largely explained by major debilitating conflicts being, in fact, supremacy competitions between the two self-serving power elites and the officers.

Rama's Self-Serving Power Elites

Ever since the kibbutz field became oligarchic in 1930s-1940s, FO heads, senior *pe'ilim* and others who continued in high outside offices or continued circulating between them, have been top local power-holders and patrons, using power and capitals to build loyalist cliques which enhanced power. Within kibbutzim patrons

¹⁴ Badaracco & Ellsworth 1989; Kets De Vries 1993; Kouses & Posner 1993; Terry 1993.

¹⁵ Ample support for this kind of etiology is found in Giuliani 2002.

usually headed cliques of clients who held local main offices or were *pe'ilim*, in what Topel (1979: 119) called "fortified power structures". Patrons were also main speakers at the General Assembly, members of major committees and of Movement Council/Executive Committee, delegates to conventions, and brokers of kibbutz interests in FOs and other outside organizations where they were usually well-networked.¹⁶ They mostly led the group who had established the kibbutz and were its first chief officers, while, when they advanced to *pe'ilut*, loyalists succeeded them. They then helped loyalists advance to FO jobs and became their patrons. This was true of all kibbutzim depicted below except Carmelit during Tomer's era (Chap. 15), while in Kressel's (1974) Netzer Sireni, the founders competed for dominance with a large group of veteran ex-KM's Givat Brenner members who had left it in the 1951 partition and joined Netzer Sireni. After a decade, the founders headed by the treasurer carried out a *coup d'etat*, replaced the veterans in the management of the kibbutz's two plants, and reigned for good by plant enlargements with hired labor, patronage and privileges which clearly symbolized supremacy, like FO heads and *pe'ilim*.

In Rama, however, old guard patronage seemed to be weak due to mediocre success as *pe'ilim*; none had headed any FO. They were conservative loyalists of FO heads and suppressed local creative officers. This, plus the fact that they had established careers in the Movement's political and cultural sectors, encouraged a competing elite of younger circulative economic *pe'ilim*. Old guard rule declined in the 1950s after the Movement's political crisis caused the exit of forty members which devastated Rama (Anonymous 1967: 50). Economists introduced hired labor in seasonal agricultural work, but no industry, as yet. It was only in the 1960s, with the growing power of economic FOs, that the economists became dominant, one of them heading a large FO and another a smaller one. When the latter finished *pe'ilut*, he founded the plastics plant by buying and removing to Rama the older production line of an adjacent plant and operating it with the same hired staff, adding new lines staffed by members. The FO head retired in the early 1970s, and no member has since advanced to FO headship or senior *pe'ilut*. Thus, no strong patronage emerged and a competing power elite of the Talented evolved out of successful outside careerists who accumulated power and intangible capitals, equalizing that of the Economic elite, and preventing it from limiting their discretion, while foiling egalitarian decisions which curbed their power and privileges, such as car sharing. However, earlier violations of egalitarianism by veteran *pe'ilim* had legitimized this foiling.

Veteran *Pe'ilim* Created a Tradition of Violating Egalitarianism

Rama's old guard leaders were continuous *pe'ilim* from the late 1930s; a few

¹⁶ Kressel 1974, 1983; Shapira 1978, 1990, 2001.

more became *pe'ilim* later on, and all violated egalitarianism with their privileges. In some cases, their violations far exceeded that of *pe'ilim* like Beit Alfa's David Kahana, who bought himself a private radio. For instance, a member who had been Israel's ambassador, returned home with assortment of electric appliances which were unknown in any other flat. This was exceptional, but violations by *pe'ilim* legitimated similar ones by members who obtained presents due to various social ties with outsiders. When Kochav and other kibbutzim introduced sharing of *pe'ilim* cars in the early 1960s, Rama's *pe'ilim* prevented it, and when this norm was adopted many years later, many of them violated it.

The continuous *pe'ilut* of the old guard legitimized continuity in outside jobs by three professionals who did not have company cars. As FO cars proliferated, the three pressed Rama to furnish them with cars and, after a long struggle, the kibbutz surrendered. This enhanced their career success and they became models of a career alternative to *pe'ilut*. Since Rama lacked FO heads whose auspices assured advance of ex-officers to *pe'ilut* and circulation, instead of exiting when faced with status loss at a term end, some ex-officers followed the professionals and turned to outside careers. Later on, younger talents chose such careers from the beginning. Thus, a large elite group of talented outside careerists was created whose interests were promoted by non-egalitarian practices, which were legitimized by following *pe'ilim* practices.

The Talented Followed *Pe'ilim*'s Violations of Egalitarianism

Most of the Talented got company cars from employers in various arrangements which were often at Rama's expense, as in the case of the cook, but unlike her, they brought in higher salaries. However, they could not prevent egalitarian changes which imitated creative kibbutzim and curbed privileges; when Rama adopted car-sharing a decade and a half after Kochav had innovated it and some *pe'ilim* violated it, the Talented, including the three professionals using Rama's own cars, followed suit. They suffered no sanction, like violator *pe'ilim* and *pe'ilim* of other kibbutzim.¹⁷ I know of just one kibbutz, Hatzor (true name), which fully enforced car sharing by stopping *pe'ilut* of violators. This was explicable both by Hatzor's unique location which made car use more essential than in most kibbutzim, and by the strong egalitarianism of its leaders.¹⁸

At the time of observation, Rama's few outworn cars were shared by hundreds of members, while newer and better cars were held by dozens of *pe'ilim* and Talented who rarely shared them. Asked about this inequality, Ilan, the former secretary, explained:

¹⁷ Adar 1975; Ilana & Avner 1977; Shapira 1979b; Ginat 1981; Atar 1982; Kressel 1983.

¹⁸ My wife is Hatzor offspring; I lived and worked there in 1973-4, and ever since, have visited it regularly.

“They [the three professionals] attained powerful positions and determined norms their fellow members no longer had the strength to cope with. All those who violate norms have tall trees to lean on. For instance, G. [a professional with his own office in town] does whatever he wants, as if it were his own car. He buys a new one every two years and has not put it at the disposal of other members, despite its being formally owned by the kibbutz”.

Weak Officers Surrendered to the Talented and the Economists

Rama's short-term officers were clearly weak and unable to tackle major problems. G.'s car was kibbutz-owned; without chief officers' authorization, he could not sell it and buy a new one. Since other cars were much older and in much worse condition, officers consented to the deal, not because he was right, but due to his might which stemmed from accumulation of power and intangible capitals, helped by privileges symbolizing superiority. However, G. and his two mates could point to both *pe'ilim* who violated car sharing, and to many members who had violated egalitarian decisions by holding various profitable assets, such as urban apartments for rent inherited from parents or other relatives, financial assets which formally should have been handed over to Rama's treasurer but never were, etc. Thus, officers could not blame G. and his mates as the only ones who advanced personal interests at public expense by violating egalitarianism.

An especially problematic violation of egalitarianism, about which no one agreed to talk, were outside incomes, not defined formally as salary. These included expense accounts, accommodation allowances, severance payments, pensions, etc. There were quite expensive and uncommon durable goods that I saw in flats of some of the Talented which were a clear indication of wealth, in addition to private enlargements of flats. The possible magnitude of wealth obtained by top level outside jobs, could be grasped when Kibbutz Ayelet Hashachar sued its ex-member, Itzhak Landesman, who had been Tnuva's head for 26 years, to retrieve almost a million \$US he secretly retained from his income, instead of handing it over to the kibbutz (Lifshitz 1998). Landesman headed Tnuva which imitated capitalist firms in both salaries and fringe benefits; thus, it pointed to possibilities which some of the Talented also had.

Officers could not enforce egalitarianism on power elites without a clear mandate and stable trust by members and Movement leaders support. As we know, the latter enhanced privileges, while the two local power elites defeated officers on many occasions (below), since the crippled General Assembly rarely gave clear mandates, while most members did not trust them without successes as leaders. Such a mandate and trust were decisive when enforcement proved problematic and caused a bitter conflict. For instance, in the past Rama's secretaries had tried to enforce car sharing on a young *pa'il*, a financial expert of the Movement Fund. He had resisted, pointing to other, more veteran violators, and when they insisted on his sharing, he relinquished his formal membership in

Rama; the Fund agreed to his continuing as a hired employee instead of *pa'il*, and he remained a resident of Rama due to his wife's membership. Membership is personal, and his wife and children were valued enough by members to prevent expulsion. Officers could do little if they were not perceived as just and fair public servants; even those who censored his deed as unfair use of family connections, said it was unfair that veteran violators of car sharing had not been reprimanded like him. No sanction was used against him; his payments for the services his family got from Rama left him better off, and soon, six others followed suit and the powerful clique of seven non-member residents caused major norm changes.

Rama's Power Eclipse: Family Boarding, Private Construction

The power of the seven was proven soon after the norm of boarding children in nurseries with their peers was changed, in 1987, to family boarding. The change was affected after many years during which a growing number of parents violated the norm of communal boarding until anarchy became intolerable. Each evening it was unknown how many children would come to board at a specific nursery, and if too few came, they would have to return to their family flats. Concomitantly, communal boarding arrangements dwindled: Night watchwomen sometimes did not appear or came very late since they were taking care of their own children boarding in their flats, or since some had arranged to be replaced and the replacement had forgotten her promise; the old collective intercom that enabled night watchwomen to hear what was going in each house frequently failed, among other such defects.

Although it had been quite clear for some years before the change that communal boarding was in a terminal state unless something drastic was done, no officer did anything and no one planned the change to family boarding. It was well-known that this change would require huge investment in flat enlargements, since this change had already occurred in other kibbutzim. When Rama decided to forego communal boarding, the economic crisis was already acute; money for flat enlargement was almost unavailable and families had to accommodate their children in the modest living room of their tiny, 38-48 square-meter, one-and-a-half room flats, with no prospect of a better solution in the foreseeable future. Soon after, the norm of collective construction of flats collapsed: The father of the first family to add a room to his flat on his own initiative was the non-member resident financial expert. The Secretaries tried to convince him to stop, but to no avail. They brought the matter to the General Assembly which decided he must demolish the half-finished addition. However, with support of other residents and some member friends and relatives, he completed construction. Subsequently, other residents followed him, then a few members, and soon after, private construction was authorized without any limitations, although all flats were in two- or four-flat buildings and the neighbors' interests should have been defended

by setting some limits. Alas, nothing of the sort was decided; everything was left to individual whim.

Low Morality of the Economic Elite

Most members could not afford construction from the small monthly allowances they were given by Rama, while the first to enlarge flats included economic elite members, *pe'ilim*, *ex-pe'ilim* and outside employed managers aged over forty-five, who had money saved from fringe benefits, expense accounts, etc. Almost none of them needed space for boarding small children as theirs were already grown up and the youngest of them boarded at the regional high school dormitory. However, as members of the Economic Committee, they found no money to enlarge members' flats, although \$120,000 was found for building new offices for the food factory, an expenditure the factory manager deemed inessential. Like low-moral officers of capitalist firms, they ignored the plight of about half the kibbutz members, preferring a marginal interest in their own sector.¹⁹

When added to the fact that some of them did not share their cars, that the careers of some of them ignored Rama's needs, and that they rarely participated in shift-work sharing in the plastics plant, a norm which imitated self-work kibbutzim like Kochav, their low morality clearly resembled that of Talented elite members.²⁰ Both elites could not be trusted to care for Rama's member needs in a way conducive to democratic egalitarianism, resembling the selfish elite of the backward Italian village studied by Banfield (1958). Indeed, in interviews, members expressed feelings of helplessness, distrust and suspicion about officers' and other elite members' morality, much like the Italians in Banfield's study.

Low Morality of 'the Slaves Who Turned Masters'

Rama members had good reasons for such feelings: power elites were indifferent to their plight, and incompetent officers evaded problems or introduced faulty solutions. Worse still, the latter evaded public problems, but private ones came to their desks due to the collective structure and low-moral use of authority causing injustices. The pages of kibbutz weeklies since the 1990s have been full of stories of such cases, but Dvorkind's (1996) autobiographical book, called '*A Slave Turned a Master*', has better exposed how authority given to mediocre, short-term, self-serving officers caused mounting injustices. It details a row which continued for years between Kibbutz Hamaapil's officers and a veteran member who was an FO comptroller and member of the Board of Israel Comptrollers Association. The gist of the matter was his desire to help his poor son and young wife who had left her kibbutz, penniless, to buy a small apartment with some of a

¹⁹ See similar low morality in: Banfield 1958; Dalton 1959; Maccoby 1976; Jackall 1988.

²⁰ On shift work sharing see Shapira 1977 and Chaps. 15-16.

lump sum of money which he had received in place of the pension he was to receive upon retirement. He felt that he was entitled to this sum since he had brought Hamaapil a great deal of money over the previous fourteen years by working some 7000 extra hours. He said he had worked so hard in order to overcome long neglect of improper payments, due to deficient procedures, corrupt 'cost plus' pricing and mismanagement by FO heads and *pe'ilim*, all of which were common phenomena in Reg.Ents and other FOs (Shapira 1987; Shure 2001).

Formally, he was entitled to nothing, and should have turned this money over to the kibbutz account, but since he had already turned over much more money than he was required, and since the same was true of the lump sum, using some of it to help his son was quite fair. This was especially so in view of the many members who did not turn over inherited money and other assets to the kibbutz. However, neither one secretary nor his two successors solved the problem and the conflict turned into an undeclared war between him and all chief officers who insisted on turning the money over without an agreed solution. After two and a half years, KA *pe'ilim* intervened and their arbitration led to a compromise which was ratified by the General Assembly. Alas, in the process of execution, the secretaries disavowed much of the agreement, until he left the kibbutz.

While his testimony is, by nature, subjective, one point seems clear: no supreme power, local or federal, stopped mediocre officers from using their powers to torment a member for years. Their use of power seemed ill-intended and cruel, or, at best, incompetent and aimed at concealing this fact, proving members could not trust them to care for their interests, as with Rama's officers and power elites whose self-serving, conservative shirking of leadership duties engendered anarchy, divisiveness, distrust and destructive conflicts, as next chapter will expose.

CHAPTER 18

Conclusions and Sustainable DWOs

“The hardest part of ethnographer’s work is to discern the context of phenomena”
(Marx 1985: 147).

Landshut (2000[1944]) and Buber (1958[1945]) pointed to the decisiveness of FOs and kibbutz societal involvement, but the dominant scientific coalition ignored them and used conventions of communal studies, although the kibbutz was incomprehensible without the contexts of FOs and the Socialist Zionist movement which it spearheaded. Contrary to other communal societies, its culture flourished due to societal involvement and FOs mediating societal relations. Customary kibbutz paradigm was a fatal mistake, missing how FOs became Trojan horses of capitalist society that encouraged low morality by their autocratic, low-trust, market- and hierarchy-controlled cultures which associated authority with private gain.¹ The proper paradigm for the study of kibbutz resembles Bourdieu’s (1977, 1984) paradigm of a complex stratified field, one in which kibbutzim and FOs struggled for cultural hegemony and the latter won after many decades. At first the federative structure, high-trust cultures and high-moral leaders enhanced innovation and technological advance with capital intensity that led to specialization and other inequalities, which were curbed by creative solutions with exceptional success. Success enhanced growth, oligarchization, conservatism and moral decline of FO heads and staff which harmed and then ruined kibbutz essential cultural components: creativity, egalitarianism, self-work, solidaristic democracy and high trust relations. Alas, students evaded FOs for non-scientific reasons (Shapira 2005; Chap. 3), leading to gross misunderstanding.

Though Admors were among the most continuous leaders of any known democracy, kibbutz students ignored oligarchic processes. Due to FOs evasion, they also missed the lessons of large organization ethnography and studies of power elites, social movements, democracy and leadership which were decisive for exposing negative effects of oligarchization. Critical historians exposed some of these, but not their etiology, ignoring findings of critical anthropologists and sociological theories, while the dominant scientific coalition of sociologists and behaviorists, in addition to FOs evasion, used only formal quantitative methods and ignored findings of other disciplines. Critical sociologists alluded to FOs, but failed to integrate them into analysis, ignored findings of ethnographers, missed the simultaneous functioning of elites in the field’s two contradicting sectors, as

¹ Triandis 1989; Chatman & Barsade 1995.

well as how *rotatzia* became circulation, enhancing the iceberg phenomenon of power and furthered oligarchic processes. Thus they missed the true powers which shaped kibbutz cultures and the field's prime change process.

Anthropologists missed the context of FOs, the field's complexity and its societal contexts, although pioneering Landshut pointed to Movements' role in the shaping of kibbutz cultures. Buber (1958[1945]) also pointed, though in academic language, to the Achilles heel of kibbutz society, Movements' and other FOs' violations of its principles. However, both points were ignored and ethnographies missed how FOs' violations enhanced oligarchization and accumulation of power, capitals and privileges by their heads and a few power-holders in each kibbutz who often became patrons of its officers and turned them into pawns on their chessboards, decided their careers, castrated democracy, and achieved self-serving conservative hegemony for good. Though critical anthropologists exposed local oligarchs and some of their self-serving deeds, they missed FO contexts which elevated them and assured their status, power, privileges and continuity; thus they missed the field's main etiology and the major forces that shaped its cultures.

The missing of stratification was students' most spectacular failure, caused by seeking it only inside kibbutzim, while it was mainly shaped outside them in FOs and other hierarchic organizations. They viewed chief kibbutz officers as the highest stratum, but they were really juniors, far beneath Admors, their deputies who were Cabinet Ministers and Knesset Members, heads of large FOs and other senior *pe'ilim* who, due to power and capitals accumulation, evaded *rotatzia*. *Pe'ilim* were stratified by FO hierarchies, degree of job continuity and size, power and prestige of their FO or outside organization. Due to *rotatzia*, which mostly became circulation, their formal roles scarcely testified to their status, power, prestige and other intangible capitals which were accumulated along careers in both one's kibbutz and FOs/other organizations. Without salaries or with uniform ones for most *pe'ilim*, FO fringe benefits became main status and power symbols, explaining *pe'ilim*'s sticking to the stratifying company car system, contrary to kibbutz ethos and culture. With FOs oligarchization, power and capitals were largely gained as in other bureaucracies by patronage and clique formation. This was another major reason why status and power of *pe'ilim*, *ex-pe'ilim* and patrons were less dependent on current jobs, than on their past careers and positions in local and FOs or other external power cliques which almost all students missed.

Circulation and Other *Rotatzia*'s Perils Were Missed

Rotatzia created egalitarianism only in low local kibbutz offices, but from the rank of chief kibbutz officers and upward it became circulation, especially with the growth of FOs. Then return to the ranks became rare and mostly short-lived, and motivated more by expediency than egalitarianism. Circulation violated egalitarianism, but maintained *rotatzia* since it assured officers of their status and

power, while the return of some *pe'ilim* to lower ranks kept the egalitarian image. As in all historical and current cases of *rotatzia*, it enlarged continuity gaps as well as power and capital differentials among officers, since higher-ups evaded it while most others conformed, primarily to obtain promotion by proving conformity. *Rotatzia* caused a huge waste of knowledge and expertise by 'parachuting' officers to jobs in which their intangible assets were useless or even intrusive. 'Parachutists' opted either to detachment and hands-off management in order to conceal ignorance and protect authority, or to coercive strategies that used formal authority and market forces. This caused destructive conflicts and suppression of committed-to-tasks innovative experts and critical thinkers who were demoted, sidetracked and exited (Hirschman 1970). Brain-drain enhanced promotion of mediocre loyalists of conservative patrons, but, unable to promote public aims, they shifted to personal ends (Hirschman 1982). This ruined trust, cooperation (Axelrod 1984), creativity (Jaques 1990) and democracy, while furthering brain-drain. Less common were involved 'parachutists' who became trusted transformational leaders that achieved organizational successes, as in Guest's (1962) case.

As in other *rotatzia* cases, suppressed talented innovators who did not exit turned to other careers in which success was rewarded by job continuity, power, capitals and promotion, furthering managerial brain-drain. When such careerists succeeded on the outside without help of local officers, they followed *pe'ilim* violations of egalitarianism, sometimes leading to anarchy which impaired trust, democracy, public innovation and morality. Oligarchic processes enhanced this by encouraging both violations of egalitarianism and self-serving motivation. Very few *pe'ilim* abided by *rotatzia* due to ideological zeal or a negative balance of rewards, contrary to student explanations. This balance was true only of most local kibbutz offices, but was rare among *pe'ilim* who usually conformed due to either failure in jobs, and/or loss of patrons' auspices, and/or to keep kibbutz good-will for future *pe'ilut*. *Rotatzia* served the rule of conservative FO heads while concealing this fact from both members and researchers, who missed how it enhanced patronage and cliques formation by making officers' status vulnerable, and thus encouraged their seeking patrons' auspices. Even critical anthropologists who exposed some of its perils, missed its major effects; hence, even the few sociologists who used their insights, missed these effects.

Patronage Promoted Conservative Loyalists, Marred Creativity

Contrary to democratic ideals, with oligarchization the promotion of officers accorded more patrons' auspices and clique membership rather than competence, devotion to the kibbutz cause and ingenious promotion of public aims. Only few patrons remained high-moral, and these were almost only within kibbutzim. These patrons, and/or influential veteran officers or ex-officers, nurtured democracy and

trust by allowing officers' discretion and supporting creativity. Grass-roots democracy elevated effective radicals to local chief offices, and their creative solutions to major problems which enhanced kibbutz ethos and culture, diffused to other kibbutzim in which patronage was weak or high-moral patrons did not bar implementation of democratically-ratified changes which they opposed. This high morality was explained by patrons' involvement in solving local problems which made them sensitive to members' interests and distress, and by a democratic tradition of high-trust cultures. High-moral patrons curbed some perils of *rotatzia*, but even then creativity suffered as these patrons rarely promoted creative radicals to FO jobs, in accord with Hirschman (1970), while many such radicals who believed in *rotatzia*'s positive effect, conformed to it, lost status, were sidetracked and/or exited. Worse still, the few of them who did advance to FOs, at best enhanced FOs functioning, but failed to cause lasting changes without supporting cliques, in accord with Dalton (1959), and departed quite early.

In some kibbutzim, patronage was rare or weak without continuous senior *pe'ilim* and/or successful circulators, who could care for clients' circulation in managerial jobs. Clients have to be loyal to patrons and keep positive images, rather than genuinely succeeding in jobs by trustful relations with members (or subordinates in FOs) and solving major problems. Students missed this and were misled by the public servant masks of circulative patrons who came back to the ranks for short periods. Topel (1979) detected patronage, but missed patrons' true aims and interests, analyzing their behavior without the context of FOs' power and status competition. Thus he missed the main aim of his circulative patrons, to prove loyalty to supreme patrons, the conservative FO heads who controlled FO jobs. Most of the negative effects of self-serving patronage and the nurture of cliques have not been elucidated, nor has the breach of members' trust by patrons' Machiavellianism, such as red tape and loyalist nominations which obstructed implementation of democratic decisions.

Missing Unique Elite Careers and Their Grave Consequences

Without untangling true stratification, circulation and patronage, the uniqueness of elite careers was missed. These careers have barely been studied, contrary to Goldschmidt's (1990) maxim that, even in the most egalitarian societies, people seek a career which is esteemed by a community. By studying kibbutz officers' balance of rewards without their careers, both the cost of status and power loss due to *rotatzia* was ignored, and how *rotatzia* was avoided by circulation with promotion prospects, which was often at the cost of servile loyalty to patrons' conservatism. At the height of kibbutz research, few chief officers returned to the ranks for long, and they were mostly radicals and critical thinkers which many of whom soon exited. Thus, survey researchers who studied only members missed this loss and did not explain shortages of competent managers. Due to CKP they

missed another reason: non-egalitarian circulation by privileged mediocre clients encouraged talents' exits. According to economists, such talents exited due to the fact that egalitarianism deprived them of extra tangible rewards for extra contributions, but, as many of the talented were critically minded and/or radicals, they were deprived even more of intangible rewards. They suffered low and insecure status, heavy responsibility but little power, little appreciation for successful problem solving, unfair criticism and obstruction of innovation efforts by powerful loyalist circulators, who even obstructed some conformist solutions, apprehending that successes would enhance innovative officers' power and status.

Without a Renewed Socialist Vision, Radicals' Incoherent Efforts Failed

Oligarchic conservatism caused no renewal of a social-democratic vision after the leftist bluff was exposed. Admors stuck to leftist concepts, barring renewal and the updating of movements' vision, ideology and tasks. Socialist and liberal ideas clashed, resulting in conflicts between their holders while conservatives reigned, causing stagnation, apathy and abstention from offices by talented. The inevitable manning by lesser members, degraded office status and prestige and furthered abstentions. Mediocre officers defended their authority by detachment, hands-off conservatism, coercive means and suppression of innovators. This was prevented only when high-moral leaders created a truly democratic tradition, abiding by decisions which curtailed their own and loyalists' privileges and refraining from interfering in grass-roots promotion of radical officers to chief offices. Creativity by these radicals modeled genuine care for the public good, which was imitated by other officers and members, and led to successes.

However, without a renewed socialist vision, while the gravity of the kibbutz field elevated to power conservative, low-moral circulators when the high-moral old guard had vanished, even in creative kibbutzim cultures eventually deteriorated as trust and creativity declined. Liberal ideas encouraged critical thinkers and radicals whose managerial careers were derailed to remain and to turn to outside, non-FO careers. However, they became alienated when kibbutz officers did not care for their special needs or even tried to fail them by false egalitarianism. A critical mass of such successful careerists caused anarchy when they managed to extract privileges and violate egalitarianism; officers could not stop them as they imitated *pe'ilim* practices. Anarchy degraded officers' status, deterred talented members from taking office, marred creativity and curbed democratic participation, as no one knew if decisions would be upheld or would crumble when violated by power elites. Strong rule by conservative patrons in other kibbutz prevented such anarchy, but at a cost of stagnation, ineffectiveness, brain-drain, a failed economy and repeated mass exodus crises following exits by disenchanted leaders of *hashlama* groups and cohorts of offspring.

This explains some kibbutz failures and the flawed demography of many survivors: Contrary to Rosolio's (1999) dependency explanation, the main reason was not officers' complacency, but a self-enhancing cycle of suppression of innovative young talents by conservative patrons and their loyalists. The exit of the talented was followed by that of most of their group; only mediocre loyalists, naive zealots and expediency seekers remained. A new *hashlama* came to fill the ranks, the cycle repeated itself and became a vicious one: residues of previous exits either backed patrons' suppression of innovators, or abstained from the democratic process. Thus both ways enhanced patrons' conservative rule and its perils, which ruined kibbutz culture and caused further failures.

An exception that proves the rule was the case of a kibbutz with an ultra-high exit rate which left only a small residue, enabling a coalition of two veteran high-moral leaders and radical *hashlama* leaders to defeat conservatives, initiate major creative solutions, promote kibbutz ethos, stop brain-drain, introduce self-work factory and accomplish major success, though only for two decades. Then a conservative patron who kept managerial status by circulation, regained power by Machiavellian tactics along with the repeated aid of FO heads and other outsiders, while his radical rival leader left as he lost hope for a change of FO heads' complacency when the system's debt crisis ensued. Then other opponents of the patron left as his ruling clique proved unbeaten, leading to eradication of kibbutz culture.

Servant Leaders and High-Trust, Solidaristic Democracy Were Rare

All five cases reiterate the decisiveness of the leadership factor, but, contrary to students' assertion, transformational rather than charismatic leaders explained success. Genuine solidaristic democracy was created in only a minority of high-trust, creative kibbutzim, by ascetic, high-moral, radical, public servant leaders committed to the kibbutz cause, who devoted much of their meager free time to local committees and the Assembly, even while holding high-level FO jobs. They supported implementation of decisions which they had opposed, and this, as well as the vast amount of information they brought and knowledge diffused by a critical local press, enhanced participation in decision-making, made disobedience rare, and ensured that democratic decisions were upheld in spirit. The rarity of disobedience in the studied democratic kibbutz stemmed in part from a creative solution which enhanced justice in exceptional personal cases, through a special, non-rotational appeals committee in which the leaders participated. Though leaders became conservative patrons and frustrated radical officers of new generations, the democratic tradition enhanced creativity for additional decades, especially after the 1956 blow to Admor's conservative leftism, despite scale curbing trust, democracy and equality. Creative solutions by servant officers

retained self-work and egalitarianism, curbed brain-drain, bred economic success and overcame economic setbacks. Thus, the original ethos was largely retained despite its dereliction in most of the kibbutz field.

Students could not explain the dwindling solidaristic democracy because they missed oligarchy, Admors' power self-perpetuation by autocratic means and leftism, and the negative effects of circulation, patronage and cliques. They exposed perils, such as excessive debates about nominations and procedural matters, various ailments of committee work and abstention from voting, but not the deeper flaws, primarily rule by privileged FO oligarchy and its local clients, and the disappearance of servant, highly trusted transformational leaders. In addition to egalitarianism, the lifeblood of solidaristic democracy was such credible, authentic leaders to whom members listened as this helped them to understand the fast changing reality, the movement's mission and tasks, and the choice between clashing ideas about how to solve problems. These vital elements of a healthy solidaristic democracy were fatally damaged by oligarchic rule of Admors and FO heads, leftism, suppression of the critically minded and radicals, and dissociation of *pe'ilim* from members. Democracy became adversarial as patronage, cliques, intangible capitals and privileges made a few conservative *pe'ilim*, *ex-pe'ilim*, local plant managers or ex-managers de-facto rulers of kibbutzim, self-servingly suppressing the critically minded and talented radicals by Machiavellian tactics and Iron Law means.

The grass-roots democracy of kibbutz branches and committees continued to elevate chief officers with creative solutions that might have renewed kibbutz cultures, but even in past creative kibbutzim, they were too weak to solve major problems such as 'lunatic' *rotatzia* which kibbutz students supported, and were soon replaced by loyalist circulators who evaded problems and rendered debates futile. Hidden icebergs of irreplaceable power elites failed efforts at influencing true decision-makers (e.g., Freeman 1974); thus, even during eras of radical officers, most democratic sessions were not worth participating in and solved no major problems. Moreover, participation was an act of trust in democracy, but this trust was undeserved as the 'democracy' was largely a show orchestrated by power elites who denounced proposals by the critically minded and radicals not because they were wrong, but since they might elevate fresh powers.

'Parachutings', Imitative Hired Labor and Leaders Detachment

Contrary to Helman (1987), circulation did not preserve rare managerial talent. My Reg.Ents findings (1987) were repeated in kibbutzim: circulation bred detached 'parachutists', mismanagement, conservatism, suppression of critically minded and radicals, brain-drain and abstention from offices by the talented. Not all 'parachutists' fail; if one was talented, chose direct involvement and became a trusted servant leader, he usually succeeded. But even then 'parachuting' caused

brain-drain and exits of radicals since it damaged mid-level officers' belief in rewarding devotion to tasks and ingenuity in solving problems by promotion. The perils of 'parachutings' were ignored by evading FOs and critical ethnographies, while missing how local 'parachutists' succeeded, by clique formation, patronage and autocratic rule, helped by supreme patrons' backing, use of hired labor and other capitalist practices, like in FOs. As involved, high-moral innovative leaders were purged from managerial ranks and mostly exited, students did not meet them to learn from them how really kibbutzim functioned under 'parachutists' rule.

Even if 'parachutists' followed Admors' rejection of hired labor, they were detached from members' work, did not experience their complex tasks, barely appreciated their efforts and ingenuity outside the 'reading room' of deliberations, were deaf to their opinions and indifferent to their plight. Trusting them little, a usual 'parachutist' furthered distrust by minimizing discretion and shop-floor democracy, sought market and hierarchy controls and self-aggrandizement by growth using hired labor, and violated kibbutz ethos by privileges that symbolized high-status. Their camouflages of low morality as job requirements and in other ways, were soon exposed by members as bluffs, furthering distrust, hampering both work motivation and problem-solving, as it impaired the free flow of knowledge and information.

A few directly involved 'parachutists' made radical changes that promoted the kibbutz ethos, such as ridding factories of hired labor by innovation, including egalitarian work practices, but their example was rarely followed by others, especially in Ichud kibbutzim where hired labor was de-facto legitimate. Admors ignored or suppressed innovators, using leftism to maintain that exploitation was the prime drawback of hired labor. Helped by the dominant scientific coalition of kibbutz students, they neglected the main defect of hired labor, enhancing low-trust, market and hierarchy controlled cultures leading to oligarchic rule, as Kressel (1974, 1983) exposed. The coalition ignored Kressel and missed how other kibbutzim barred oligarchization by dissociating the kibbutz from a mass hired labor plant, rotating its managers and using other solutions invented by creative kibbutzim. Nor did this coalition explain the failed industrialization of some kibbutzim: Patrons did not allow it as they feared the rise of competing leaders who would head mass hired labor plants as in Kressel's Netzer Sireni.

Ignoring Stryjan, Scale, Creativity and Democracy Problems

Kibbutz students ignored Stryjan who was right concerning the decisiveness of creativity and federative structure, as Brumann (2000) has proven. But like them Stryjan ignored critical ethnographies, missed oligarchization and its perils, and the integrality of high-trust cultures and high-moral leaders for both democracy and creativity. In a democracy public trust decides continuity or succession of leaders, but Stryjan praises *rotatzia* which negates this maxim, transferring power

to self-chosen, unaccountable patrons and power elites, while scale proved to be a more difficult problem than he had imagined. Handy (1989) pointed to the conservatism of federative systems due to power accumulation at the center which stifles units' creativity. My study supported him, but in accord with Stryjan, it pointed to creativity due to smallness and autonomy of kibbutzim and branches, despite FO heads' and chief officers' conservatism. Stryjan pointed to the flow of innovations among kibbutzim, but missed that it was limited to agriculture and consumption, and was rare in industry where secrets were guarded against competitors, often other kibbutzim. This could have been solved as in Mondragon cooperative plants,² but it would have required trusted and creative movement leaders open to learning from other successful radical cultures. Contrary to Stryjan and other students' suppositions, keeping branch or plant democracy alive was difficult even when small, due to social gaps created by specialization, hierarchy and generational gaps. These obstacles multiplied in FOs. However, had their heads been replaced when the dysfunction phase commenced by transformational servant leaders, the latter could have nurtured democracy and creativity.

The Plausibility of High-Trust, Democratic and Creative FOs

Kibbutz research ignored Michels and complementary studies, but democracy required solutions for oligarchic tendency. Washington and Jefferson had created the solution of limiting presidencies to eight years, but if Admors had resigned after eight years, Tabenkin in 1931 and Yaari in 1935, at peak effectiveness, the kibbutz movement could hardly have succeeded. Hence, an improvement is required to allow additional terms for such leaders, as proposed below. If this proposal had been adopted, Admors would have been replaced in the late 1930s or early 1940s. Could such succession have assured the viability of KM's and KA's democracy, egalitarianism and creativity? There are signs that it could have.

Tabenkin became leftist in 1937 and fatally damaged KM democracy in 1939 (Naan convention). If a new leader had succeeded him in 1935 or in 1939 in accord with the proposal below and had this leader opted to renew democracy, he certainly would have faced opposition by Tabenkin's loyalists, but he could have overcome this opposition if he had used almost unanimous deputies' opposition to leftism and belief in egalitarianism and democracy. Yaari became leftist in 1939; if Hazan had succeeded him in 1939 or 1943 due to the proposal below, leftism could have been suppressed, and Mishmar Ha'emek's lively democracy (Argaman 1997) might have been replicated by other kibbutzim and could have influenced KA democracy, in accord with Buber's 1945 directive. New leaders would have replaced predecessors' loyalists by critical thinkers and radicals like Shenhabi,

² Whyte & Whyte 1988; Morrison 1991.

Allon, Avidan and Reiner, and would have published critics like Maletz (1945) and KA's partisan survivors without censorship. The large kibbutz field also required a constitution to balance leaders' rights and duties with those of members, as well as a judicial system with an appeal mechanism that would have assured justice. Therefore, the tasks which awaited these leaders would have been quite formidable and might not have been accomplished by them, but only by radical successors whose elevation would have been plausible, had the solution proposed below been adopted.

New leaders could have kept Movement headquarters and FOs inside kibbutzim like the Palmach, staffing them by members, and gearing them to their cultures, instead of urban locations and capitalist imitation. Barker (1997: 352) talked about "a process of change where the ethics of individuals are integrated into the mores of a community"; FOs could have been integrated into kibbutz mores by the above idea and by involvement of their *pe'ilim* in hosting kibbutzim, as were teachers of KA's boarding high school in Mishmar Ha'emek. Another great help for kibbutzim could be establishing regional plants inside them as integral parts of their economies, sparing them the hurdles of establishing plants aimed at outside markets and competing with other kibbutzim. Why was this idea not adopted? A Reg.Ents concern head reacted when I raised this idea:

"Are you crazy? Do you want me to decide which price the kibbutz [which operates such a regional plant] will get from other kibbutzim for its products?"

A trusted regional leader and FO executives chosen democratically by a regional parliament of kibbutz delegates could have decided this price, fairly balancing the interests of the plant, its host kibbutz and its client kibbutzim. Alas, for the shaky authority of my interlocutor, a 'parachuted' circulator chosen by an old-boys clique of *pe'ilim* whose continuity depended on power and capitals accumulation, it was a menace; such a delicate decision would have made him vulnerable. FOs situated inside kibbutzim would have required trusted leaders whose "ethically justifiable behavior consists of morally correct decisions and actions, in which the interests of society take the degree of precedence that is right, just and fair over the interests of individuals" (Hosmer 1995: 399). Leaders' authority should have been assured by genuine democracy in which a relevant and knowledgeable constituency had decided periodically by ballot to what extent leaders were trusted, and those who did not gain enough trust were replaced by high-moral, trusted, competent and critically minded ones who had proven these characteristics in lower echelons. This is the ultimate solution for high-trust, creative DWOs which are viable for long periods, no less than bureaucracies.

Sustainable DWOs: High-Trust Cultures, High-Moral Leaders

Unlike Stryjan, high-trust cultures and high-moral leaders were found to be more decisive than scale for creativity, and scale's negative impact on creativity was

found largely due to curbing trust and democracy by hierarchy, specialization and oligarchization which enhanced social gaps and curbed solidarity. Scale increases decisiveness of leadership for internal and external coordination and guidance of efforts by specialized units and participants, and for shaping effective strategies and tactics, but growing power and capitals gaps enhance suspicions and distrust that hamper democratic leadership. They encourage a leader's use of coercive means, enhancing oligarchization and its perils, including elevation of loyalists one of whom succeeds the leader and continues anachronistic policies, but often implement them even worse, causing failures which cause distrust and minimal conformity; s/he then uses coercive means which further mistrust, destructive conflicts and failures (Gouldner 1954, 1955). Efforts to avert this scenario by 'parachuting' a talented outsider, usually further it, as outsiders tend to use coercive means (Kipnis 1976). Therefore, the prime step to make DWOs creative and plausible sustainable alternatives to bureaucracies is a new succession system that elevates critical thinkers and creative radicals to leadership, and replaces them just as oligarchic tendencies commence.

DWOs can last if they retain creativity (Stryjan 1989), and kibbutz analysis points out that the ultimate condition for lasting creativity is high-trust cultures led by high-moral leaders. Ample works cited support it, but most organizational innovation and learning literature have only recently alluded to trust decisiveness for sincere conveyance of critical knowledge among collaborators in innovation, and even then, the pivotal role of leaders in trust creation was mostly ignored.³ The literature pointed to innovation flourishing in small units which collaborated within large structures: business groups, R&D networks, strategic alliances, industrial districts, etc.⁴ However, who created trust among unequal partners, and how was the domineering tendency of stronger partners curbed? The role of leaders in the creation of high-trust cultures in such structures has been ignored. For instance, Powell (1990) found networks of innovative firms were predicated on trust, but he did not explain how trust of smaller and weaker partners was kept, and who assured them getting a fair share of the fruits of cooperation. These structures are more egalitarian than usual bureaucracies, but one may suppose that low-trust relations reign much of the time in many of their parts due to the stronger partners' dominance and the tendency of market forces to ruin trust.⁵

³ A few authors in Dierks et al. (2001) and Kramer & Cook (2004) discuss trust and leadership, while authors in Huysman & Wulf (2004) barely deal with trust and not with leadership.

⁴ Sako 1992; Dodgson 1993; Saxenian 1994; Its reviews: Fukuyama 1995; Powel et al. 1996.

⁵ Gouldner 1955: 160-2; Shapira 1987.

Federalization of DWOs is a better solution, provided federation democracy is genuine, solidaristic and defended constitutionally against oligarchization. This will allow discretion for DWOs innovation, as well as for their grass-roots democracy and high-trust cultures to elevate critically minded, creative radical officers, who, due to genuine democracy, will have a fair chance, no less than federation officials, to be chosen federation head or executives.

However, both the kibbutz experience and that of Semler's (1993) Semco show that the scale of work units which may achieve grass-roots democracy, must be much smaller than that of a kibbutz or Jay's (1972) 'tribe' of up to 500 people, containing no more than 10-15 people, like a kibbutz branch and a Kochav plant department. Thus, a triple- or quadruple-deck federative structure is required, which will enable enough smallness within a large federation of DWOs.⁶ A federation's success, however, enhances the prestige and power of its head and may elicit coercion efforts even during his period of effectiveness, for instance, by limiting the discretion of units and elevating loyalists. Mitigation of such tactics requires a parliament of delegates who are chosen personally by members in each DWO, proportional to its size, as in the Movements' early days, and may also be a senate of equal DWOs representation. It will enable critically minded and creative radicals who have been negatively selected for managerial promotion, to become delegates, allowing them the opportunity to gain trust, power and capitals by parliamentary activity and the use of a free press. They would be able to use these resources to overcome federation executives conservatism and/or enhance creativity by replacing them.

Genuine democracy was not easy to create and sustain even in a branch of 10-15 permanent workers and dozens of seasonal ones with kibbutz agricultural technology of the 1930s. It succeeded only in high-trust kibbutzim wherever talented, high-moral and competent managers trusted workers, encouraged their involvement in branch problem-solving and adopted their ingenious solutions, did not apprehend their success as high-trust relations assured that members would not try to succeed them prematurely. Premature succession in higher offices such as DWO managers and DWO federation executives, can be mitigated by the proposals detailed below which will slow down promotion. However, where will successors come from? Can DWOs and their FOs use outsiders?

Inside Successors and Grass-Roots Democracy

A major reason for misconstrued failures of DWOs is the complex etiology of organizational leadership succession and its effects on various outcomes. It has been studied intensively since the 1960s, but with poor results; there has been no

⁶ The Shakers used this idea to maintain trust in autonomous "families": Latimore 1991.

agreement on its etiology and on its outcomes. Past findings have been recently brought into doubt or found to be correct only in specific scenarios.⁷ Some found that outsider successors enhanced innovation and performance, but Melman (1983) found that these effects were short-lived: to get a grip on power, outsiders tend to seek instant achievements to boost prestige at the expense of long-range aims, as others and I have found.⁸ Outsiders were common in corporate US where mostly ineffective managers won the promotion race,⁹ much less so in Europe and rare in corporate Japan. After many Japanese firms succeeded in besting US ones innovatively, interest in high-trust cultures led by insiders has grown.¹⁰

In addition to Japan, past exceptional success of kibbutzim also support the exclusiveness of insiders in such cultures, but no one has proven that it assures high-trust and creativity for good. First of all, no such culture has a succession system that suppresses leaders' oligarchic tendency, which is not prevented by periodic formal succession, as *rotatzia* analysis has proved.¹¹ Secondly, no any current succession system suppresses leaders' tendency to promote loyalists and ruin trust of public servant officers whose career suffer due to criticizing mistaken superior decisions (Hirschman 1970). Thirdly, succession studies have suffered from the basic flaw described above concerning *rotatzia*: Succession is only one among many factors which shape leadership and are shaped by it, thus the inside/outside succession question must be answered in the context of these factors, but ethnographies which identify these factors, has not been used by succession students.

The right type of succession system for lasting DWOs' success, is that which encourages leadership by trust and consent resulting in creativity. Two prime leaders' choices largely decide it: One between detachment and involvement, and the other between conformist imitation and creative innovation. Only the two latter choices combined can engender high-trust, creative DWO cultures, and both choices are much depend on a leader's habitus. Though most Reg.Ents managers preferred detachment and conformist imitation, Yaakov and Thomas chose the opposites, largely due to habitus shaped for decades by a kibbutz culture which encouraged these choices. As DWOs can only control habituses of insiders, nurturing insiders is a main tool to assure the above choices. Insiders are integral

⁷ Melman 1983; Chung et al. 1987; Cannella & Lubatkin 1993; Cannella & Rowe 1995; Khurana & Nhoria 1997; White et al. 1997.

⁸ Gabarro 1987; Gouldner 1954, 1955; Shapira 1987, 1995a, 1995b.

⁹ Campbell et al. (1995) found 58% outside successions. Career succes of ineffective managers: Luthans 1988.

¹⁰ Dore 1973; Rohlen 1974; Ouchi 1981; Sieff 1988; Semler 1993; Fukuyama 1995. For other explantions of Japan's success: Kamata 1981; Van Wolferen 1989.

¹¹ See for instance oligarchic rule in a Japanese factory: Mehri 2005.

to DWOs minority cultures which require morally committed, servant leaders who believe in their cause, rather than outsiders who may be moved by expediency. Moreover, critically minded, talented insiders who have been socialized to a DWO's unique values and norms are better equipped for DWOs leadership due to better knowledge of followers' needs, aims and wishes, since they had come from their ranks. They can also better use networks in which they are enmeshed to influence others and introduce required radical innovations without coercion, can solve major problems in ways that enhance mutual trust, solidaristic democracy and egalitarianism. For instance, in corporate US most successors are outsiders and value considerations in choosing them are minimal; however, suitable values enhanced success: 33% of successors in whose choice was considered suitability to extant corporate cultures clearly succeeded; only 11% of them clearly failed (Campbell et al. 1995: 4).

Insiders are integral to high-trust DWO cultures for another major reason: As main rewards in these cultures are received in the long-run, and the major one is promotion, outsiders curtail this reward for devoted and competent officers. Promotion also expresses trust, and especially so, if it is achieved by ballot which indicates public trust, as in many DWOs. High-trust Japanese firms use a kind of a ballot: The Ringi system, asking the consent of prospective role-partners for an officer's nomination, a kind of open ballot which proves trust by the relevant constituency. In contrast, a low-trust Japanese firm with American practices, including 'parachuting' outsiders, had no Ringi system (Clark 1979). This is not incidental; a truly democratic ballot takes place when the choice is between well-known alternatives. A ballot truly measures trust only if an incumbent is equated with well-known candidates for succession, and not if voters equate him with prestigious outsiders for whom the true reasons for their successes are barely known, their mistakes and failures have been concealed or masked in order to 'jump', and their competencies, beliefs, aims, commitments and trustworthiness are largely unknown. "The neighbor's grass is always greener" since, due to this lack of knowledge, an outsider's prestige is not contaminated by his real past as that of equally talented and competent insiders, while they possess precious local knowledge which he lacks. Such knowledge often encourages continuing current practices which may require radical changes, but if a DWO's information system joins the openness of high-trust informal information networks in acknowledging members of candidates' leadership qualities as they were exposed along their career, they can choose the right insider who will introduce the required radical changes as in many democracies.

Slow Promotion

A norm of slow promotion helps to assure trustworthy creative leaders. Even if the Iron Law of Oligarchy is solved by the proposal detailed below and successful

leaders continue only up to a dysfunction phase, Kets De Vries's (1993) findings point to power's negative effects commencing earlier, after a number of major successes, some loyalist promotions and cementing a ruling clique. In accord with Ansell and Fish (1999) and kibbutz findings, a leader may become indispensable by failing critical ascenders by using his/her loyalists. However, a strong incentive against such low morality can be a succession system that slows promotion and immunizes leaders against early loss of standing, as Dore (1973: Chap. 9) explains. Even the semi-*rotatzia* of US Presidents, the two-term-only system, speeds up promotion as it bars some of them from continuing for their full period of effectiveness. Hambrick and Fukutomi (1991: 723) presume that this period is up to 11 years. Vancil (1987: 83) found that US corporations were aimed at a CEO (Chief Executive Officer) tenure of up to 12 years, and decisive successful deeds by leaders indicate that it may be even longer: Ben-Gurion's most praised deed, the establishment of the State of Israel, was taken after he had headed the Jewish community in Palestine for 13 years, and Tabenkin set up the Palmach after 19 years of KM leadership. However, he commenced oligarchic leftism in his 14th year in office, and Yaari in his 12th year. Thus, allowing highly trusted leaders 12 years in office, and a few, ultra-trusted ones even 16 years, seems preferable as it slows down promotion by allowing full use of their phase of effectiveness.

Slowing promotion in a DWOs' federation requires a reward provision, which will encourage heads of DWOs and branch/department managers to prefer seeking additional terms over seeking promotion. A proper reward could be formal symbolization of members' extra trust of better leaders: If each re-election to a managerial office requires a higher majority than the previous term, this symbolizes extra trust, publicly proving the extra esteem a leader enjoys. S/he will be known as an excellent leader since only few are re-elected for a third term due to support by a majority of more than two-thirds, and even fewer to a fourth term by a majority of over 88% (see below). This extra esteem may be even more rewarding if it also leads its bearers to head the federation, rather than a federation official who had been a DWO head only one or two terms. This way, higher trust in previous offices will become a prime yardstick for choosing leaders, while creating a strong incentive for DWO heads to remain for more terms, preferring to seek re-election rather than promotion to a federation executive job.

Extant Iron Law Solutions, Their Defects and a New Solution

However, before detailing the proposal for deciding continuation or succession of a federation head, let us look at extant Iron Law solutions. Large American corporations try to obviate the Iron Law by a norm of early retirement of CEOs: they are rewarded by generous severance benefits known as 'Golden Parachutes'. Vancil (1987: 83) found this a success, as only 13% of CEOs stayed longer than the maximum anticipated tenure of 12 years (p. 79). This expensive instrument,

however, has considerable negative effects: Like *rotatzia* it is formally unrelated to a leader's efforts and successes, while due to its egoistic nature, self-serving deeds are encouraged, such as adding outsiders to the Board of Directors who have approved generous 'parachutes' elsewhere (Davis 1994: 220). This solution is certainly not the right one for DWOs.

Another solution is a formal limit for re-election, as that of US presidents. However, F.D. Roosevelt violated this limit in 1940 despite institutionalization for 143 years, thus it pointed to vulnerability of a formal limit, as also proved *rotatzia* violations by senior *pe'ilim*. Thus, a more robust solution is required. Roosevelt's violation was not just an outcome of voters' trust in him; quite significant seemed to be power and capitals accumulated during eight years in office that gained him support of influential figures, support of loyalists which he promoted, etc. Hence, the 55% of the votes he received included a significant part of the constituency that might not have really trusted him and would not have voted for him without these figures' and loyalists' influence, and other impacts of his power and capitals accumulation. Thus, the intruding effect of these resources should be neutralized if trust level is to decide continuity. Neutralization can be a threshold of higher trust, for instance, requiring a two-thirds majority for a third term. Accordingly, re-election for a fourth term must be conditional on an even higher majority, so that only very few exceptional leaders who remained high-moral and creative for 12 years will gain it. This threshold should be high enough to shatter further continuity in accord with an aimed limit of sixteen years; thus a fifth term threshold on the same gradient would have to be above 100%, i.e., impossible. How much higher does each threshold have to be in order to assure that? Must the gradient of threshold elevation be linear or is an exponential one more proper?

Goode (1978) found leaders' prestige tends to exponential growth with continuity; thus, in order to neutralize its growth, exponential growth of majority thresholds should be required. A first re-election contest is selective even with a simple majority threshold, as indicated, for instance, by only some half of US presidents being chosen to a second term. Hence, higher majority thresholds are required only from a second re-election onward, and they should be raised exponentially. Thus, if a re-election for a third term requires, let us say, a two-thirds majority, then for the fourth term, the threshold for re-election will have to be a 88% majority, and this creates a built-in mechanism that bars fifth term since the same elevation gradient means over 122% majority, i.e. impossible. This limitation will be more robust than a formal limit of terms, if it will be applied to all managers of branches/departments, DWOs, FOs and to federation heads, as well as to parliament delegates and federation officials, to prevent their oligarchization.

The idea of a higher majority threshold for political decisions of special importance is not new in democracies, and is common in deciding constitutional

changes. It was also used at least once against Iron Law: In 1977, the Israeli Labor Party decided to refresh its Knesset representation by asking members who wanted a third term or more to obtain approval by a 60% majority of its Central Committee to be eligible. Many of its Knesset members, including KM's Galilee, failed to pass this test and retired (Brichta 1986: 23). However, while the 60% threshold was high enough for making a selection among Knesset members who were secondary to party heads, it seems too low for DWO heads and calls for manipulations which a threshold of a two-thirds may deter. Moreover, the 60% threshold is not high enough to bar a fifth term.¹² Of course, only experience will show the right thresholds for obtaining optimal leader successions.

Constituency: Membership and Eligibility to Participate in Voting

A major question which must be answered is: Whose trust must a candidate gain in order to be elected or a leader to be re-elected? For branches/departments and DWOs where everyone personally knows officers, the answer is simple: all members with a few years of seniority, i.e., those with some knowledge of both the current head's performance and his prospective successors' records are the right constituency that will also choose federation parliament delegates. The same principle of constituency consisting of all knowledgeable role-partners can be used to decide continuity of federation officials, only that it is not a natural group, but one decided upon constitutionally. There is, however, the question of ownership equality: Is it necessary that they all equally share holding of DWO assets as in a worker cooperative?

In accord with Fox (1974: Chap. 2), this is not essential; high-trust relations require that everyone is considered an equal partner in decision-making concerning his/her work, and not an employee whose fate and the fate of his/her work unit is decided by superiors which others have chosen. In Brazilian Semco, in which Semler (1993) and his family hold equity, democracy and high-trust seem to prevail, as everyone votes on all major decisions, including the choosing and replacing of unit managers and their remuneration. Ownership differences must not hamper trust and democracy if everyone with enough seniority and proved trustworthiness becomes an equal partner in decision-making, no more a replaceable market commodity which is discarded in rough times or fired when criticizing boss's mistakes. High-trust cultures flourish by preferring members' and community needs over immediate profits, though long-range profitability is essential to compete in markets. This preference does not mean equality of ownership and salaries. As Dore (1973) and others found, lifetime employment was integral to high-trust Japanese firms, while its breach degraded trust (Clark

¹² 60% threshold for a third term, means 72% for a fourth term, and 87% for a fifth term.

1979). Kibbutzim and Mondragon proved that secured employment was feasible within large federations of varied enterprises. No kibbutz ever fired superfluous members, while, in Mondragon, during periods of economic recession or when a cooperative collapsed, cooperators were moved to cooperatives where there was work, and the unemployed received redundancy payments until new jobs had been created in extant cooperatives or in a new one which the federation established (Morrison 1991: 172-80). Thus, a large and well-led DWO federation can assure lifetime employment for all those who proved competence and trustworthiness.

No Bi-Partisan Politics, Parliament of Directly Chosen Delegates

In DWO federations the question of constituencies which choose and replace leaders is more complex and more important, as the case of kibbutz FOs indicates. Lipset et al. (1956) studied the International Typographical Union and concluded that only bi-party politics prevented oligarchy in this union. According to Michels, however, political competition enhanced parties' oligarchization, as was true of parties in this union; thus, it was not a solution. Moreover, Stepan-Norris (1997) found that democracy was viable for long in a trade union federation where two ideologies competed without organized parties. Parties are inappropriate for deciding leadership for another reason: Thriving in competitive markets requires the mustering of best talents and creative, critical minds in authority jobs, while party politics curbs this, rewarding loyalty, acumen and Machiavellianism which deters such talents and hampers competitiveness. Bi-partisan politics in the KM, Tabnkin's supporters versus Ben-Gurion-Berl's, enhanced oligarchy, leftism and brain-drain, while such politics in Israel's large bus cooperatives Egged and Dan, led to incessant scandals, corruption charges and counter-charges, even some criminal deeds and Machiavellianism: postponing elections to hold power, co-opting the opposition and other tricks which signal the ailing democracy of low-trust cultures (Russell 1995: Chap. 4).

Without parties who will choose federation heads, decide continuity or succession, and how will they be chosen? A presidential-like vote by a mass of federation members who are not role-partners of an incumbent and his challengers is not suitable as they are not knowledgeable enough, while his role-partners tend to include too many interested loyalists. A parliament of delegates and a senate chosen by DWO members are better; delegates and senators who are periodically convened to decide major decisions are better equipped for making wise choices of federation heads and their replacement as they are more intimately involved than ordinary members with leaders' behavior and can discern early moral decline and dysfunctioning. In addition, an independent press is required, and a third necessary provision is a continuity norm that makes delegates and senators both powerful and knowledgeable, but bars oligarchization. The same higher majority norm for each additional re-election, can prevent this major defect of American

presidential regimes.¹³

An important question is how to assure that many delegates will come from among low officers and artisans, to curb pitfalls of patronage and cliques among elites. There are also other constitutional questions: Who will chose the federation's Executive Committee, and how many delegates and senators versus DWO heads and federation officials will it include? Will they hold portfolios like Cabinet Ministers? Will DWOs establish FOs in addition to the federation, like for instance the Reg.Ents? What kind of judiciary is required? These are not easy questions since answers determine power structures and require the balancing of rights and duties of all concerned, while, unlike state constitutions, these answers must assure competitiveness and suit both size and ramifications of a DWOs system. Mondragon students alluded to the parallel governance structures of Social Councils and Managerial Councils, but ignored the problem of oligarchic rule, though managers continued for life, as against Social Council members' maximum two four-year terms.¹⁴ Casmir (1996) findings accorded Michels (1959[1915]): The latter were quite powerless as against continuous managers, thus the same constraints on continuity have to reign in all major offices.

Can the Proposed Solution Make DWOs Sustainable for Decades?

The last question to be answered is whether the proposed solution will assure sustainable DWOs. Critics may be right in pointing to my own analysis of kibbutzim and FOs, which prove that problems of retaining genuine democracy and high-trust cultures in a large and complex modern organizational field cannot be solved by just one measure, the institution of a new succession system of leaders, executives, managers and delegates. However, they have to put the proposal in context: It will not only enhance leaders' morality, engender high-trust cultures and creativity by itself, but one can presume that the leaders who adopt the proposal will also cope creatively with derivative constitutional questions and other problems of sustaining such cultures. Their actions will surely use kibbutz and other DWO lessons to enhance constitutional creativity in the service of solidaristic democracy, trust and egalitarianism, as these factors are now known to be decisive, and their etiology is much clearer. Every history of a viable democracy has witnessed constitutional amendments, and the same will be true of DWOs once they become sustainable by the basic, decisive change proposed here.

This is also plausible because once the principle of a higher majority among a relevant constituency decides officers' continuity, a creative leader will have a stronger incentive to promote what Yankelovich (1991) called high quality public judgment among constituency, since, when such judgment fully appreciates

¹³ See Latin America's literature cited in Chap. 1, and Drury 1959 on US senators.

¹⁴ Whyte & Whyte 1988: 37-41, 96-102, Chap. 14; Morrison 1991: Chap. 7.

his/her achievements, it will enhance trust and career success. This incentive is lacking in kibbutz FOs and extant DWOs; such judgment is inconsequential where mostly Iron Law, Hirschmanian laws, patronage and cliques prevail. High quality public judgment is feasible where information and knowledge flow freely and sincerely, which is more plausible in high-trust cultures led by high-moral, highly involved servant leaders. Kochav proves that such a culture has its own self-enhancing tendencies. For instance, it breeds cultural creativity, which enhances value consensus that enhances trust, and critical journalism which, in turn, diffuses information and knowledge for high quality public judgment. When the basic laws of the democratic game are changed by the adoption of the proposal, these self-enhancing tendencies will emerge, and ascending trust spirals due to competent, high-moral and creative leaders will expedite the suppression, sidetracking and exiting of self-servers and power mongers, as has occurred in creative kibbutzim in their creative periods. These exits will curb opposition to radical new solutions, and the enhanced creativity will enable DWOs to be victorious over bureaucratic rivals in markets, as has been many DWOs until their oligarchic phase.¹⁵

Large, sophisticated organizations cannot succeed without a minimal hierarchy; even a quadruple-deck federative structure is a kind of a hierarchy which creates social gaps. Genuine democracy with trust-dependent continuity of leaders that encourages their involvement in solving problems shoulder-to-shoulder with lower echelons, in addition to enhancing better, creative solutions, will minimize social gaps and enhance solidarity. This will help leaders' care for members' needs, wishes and aspirations, thus increasing commitment for their fulfillment and encouraging transformational leadership whenever circumstances make it essential. Hence, crises will more often be tackled effectively, and no desperate public will remain loyal to seemingly charismatic saviors as kibbutz members depended on Admors in the 1950s crises, and on consultants who just sold them capitalist solutions during the current crisis (Dloomi 2000).

The proposal can also change the fate of DWOs because it prefers trusted, effective leaders who prove themselves for long periods in lower echelons, over 'high fliers', 'meteoric' careerists who advance due to seemingly outstanding performance, achieved by brilliant solutions which are often proven to be spurious after the 'high fliers' are off the scene and take no responsibility for bad long-term effects. 'High fliers' are part and parcel of low-trust bureaucracies where only superiors decide on promotion, causing a negative correlation between career advance and officers' effectiveness, as has been proven by students from Dalton

¹⁵ Shapira 1979a, 1980, 1990; Whyte & Whyte 1988; Morrison 1991; Heller et al. 1998; Altman 2002; Cloke & Goldsmith 2002; Sen 2003.

(1959) to Luthans (1988). The proposed solution will curb this tendency by preferring servant trusted leaders like the many who brought about kibbutz success, from Shenhabi, Avidan, Allon and my late father, to Reiner, Yaakov, Ran and Thomas, because the main yardstick for promotion will not be an officer's few recent successes, but years of effective, creative leadership with a long-time horizon (Jaques 1990), continued high performance of his/her branch/DWO/FO achieved by mustering participants' intangible resources for optimal solutions. While some brilliant officers will advance faster in lower echelons, less brilliant but more effective and committed leaders who solve cardinal problems by seeking deeper understanding and trying varied solutions, will advance slower. However, since they will be re-elected repeatedly, they will surpass the brilliants and will head the federation or other FOs due to the conspicuousness of exceptional levels of trust in them. Moreover, even many brilliant officers will seek re-elections as branch/DWO head to prove the wide trust they enjoy. Thus, the proposal can reverse the negative correlation between effectiveness and career success, and this will greatly help DWOs to best bureaucracies in competitive markets.

With all due modesty required of a proposal which stems from the work of a single student, I do not think the decisiveness of the change I propose is very different from that provided by Washington's and Jefferson's norm which spared the US many oligarchic perils that have troubled Latin America with *rotatzia* of presidents. Moreover, the great difference between US democracy and that of Latin America emerged despite the partial nature of the US solution: On the one hand, it has caused premature replacement of some presidents while still in their phase of effectiveness, while on the other, it did not bar oligarchic Senators, Congressmen and officials like J. Edgar Hoover (Drury 1959).

The decisiveness of succession timing can be seen in Ben-Gurion's most acclaimed decision, the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, when Jews were only 32% of the population of Palestine and were a tiny minority in a large, hostile Arab region. He decided it when he had headed the Jewish Agency for 13 years and the World Zionist Organization for about a year and half; he was very powerful while still effective. Earlier, he might not have been strong enough to lead the state's establishment through all of the fateful consequences of the decision, while a year later (September 1948), signs of his dysfunction emerged: The dismantling of the Palmach and the sidetracking and pushing of its best commanders out, which seriously hurt army effectiveness, enraged Admors and left him with no alternative but a coalition with religious, anti-socialist parties, which survived only two years due to repeated political crises. Despite his signed promise in the Independence Declaration, no constitution was adopted and excessive immigration caused a major economic setback, misery for years for half a million people and malignant social conflicts (Shitrit 2004). If Ben Gurion had been replaced before December 1946 as head of the Jewish Agency, he would not

have been chosen WZO head and this surely would have changed history of Israel's establishment. If he had been replaced in 1950, after a series of grave failures, it could have spared Israel many of the troubles of his dysfunction phase, up to 1963 and beyond.¹⁶

Timely succession of leaders is decisive, as is the choice of the right successors. A genuine democracy which can be achieved with the above ideas may not assure optimization of both in every case, but it can prevent oligarchic processes in most cases, making DWOs sustainable in the long run by the elevation of high-moral, effective and creative, servant transformational leaders, the ultimate condition for DWOs succeeding bureaucracies as the hegemonic organizational form of a highly specialized and very complex working world.

¹⁶ Failures led to his resignation in late 1953, but he returned in early 1955 (Shapira 1984: 140-1). After last resignation in 1963 he impeded his successor, Eshkol, up to 1969, both directly and through loyalists Dayan and Peres.

REFERENCES

Please note that names of Hebrew references are translated to English and marked (Hb.); names of journals and newspapers are not translated.

- Abramovitz, Shlomo. 1988. "Megalomania: The Full Ben-Shachar Report." *Hadashot*, July 6 and August 3 (Hb.).
- Adar, Benko. 1975. "Company Car: Needs and Passions." *Hashavua Bakibbutz Haartzit*, January 3 and 10 (Hb.).
- Adar, Gila, B. Tornianski and M. Rosner. 1993. *Ways of Introducing Change*. Haifa: Kibbutz Research Institute (Hb.).
- Adler, Paul S. 2001. "Market, Hierarchy, and Trust: The Knowledge Economy and the Future of Capitalism." *Organization Science* 12/2: 215-34.
- Aharoni, Arie. 2000. *From the Diary of a Candidate for Treason*. Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim (Hb.).
- Alexander, Ester. 1998. "Figuring Discrimination." In *Women the Rising Power*, ed. Anat Maor. Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim (Hb.).
- Altman, Morris. 2002. "Economic Theory and the Challenge of Innovative Work Practices." *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 23/1: 271-90.
- Am'ad, Zvi, and Michal Paldi. 1986. *Causal Factors of Readiness for Managerial Roles in the Kibbutz*. Haifa: Kibbutz Research Institute (Hb.).
- Amir, Erel, D. Chosh, B. Tabechnik, A. Shapira and S. Cohen. 1983. *Kibbutz Industrial Cooperations*. Seminar paper, Management Studies Dept., Ruppin College (Hb.).
- Amir, Eli. 1984. *A Rooster for Remittal*. Tel Aviv: Am Oved (Hb.).
- Amudim (Unsigned). 1990. "The Case of the Religious Kibbutz in The Eyes of Sociologists and Kibbutz Members." Vol. 38/5 [529]: 183-5 (Hb.).
- Annual Report of Mishkay Hamerkaz Manpower Department, 1976* (Hb.).
- Anonymous. 1967. *Rama's 40s Anniversary Book*. Published by Kibbutz Rama (Hb.).
- Ansell, Christopher K., and M. Steven Fish. 1999. "The Art of Being Indispensable." *Comparative Political Studies* 32/3: 283-312.
- Arad, Nurit. 1995. "More Secret than the Nuclear Reactor, Larger than the Electric Corporation." *Yedi'ot Achronot*, September 15 (Hb.).
- Argaman, David. 1997. *The Kibbutz Will Discuss and Decide*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- Arieli, Edna. 1986. "A Stumbling Block in the Yzrael Valley Kibbutzim." *Hashavua Bakibbutz Haartzit*, November 14 (Hb.).
- Armoni, Ora. 2000. "The Roaring Lion Settles Accounts." *Hakibbutz*, August 17 (Hb.).
- Arnon, Ofra. 1982. *The Collapse of Chimavir*. Final Thesis, Ruppin College (Hb.).
- Atar, Asaf. 1982. "Nothing is New in the Regional Enterprises." *Yahad*, November 19 (Hb.).

- Avneri, Arye L. 1983. "Exchange of Fire Between the State Revenue Director and the Income Tax Commissioner." *Yedi'ot Achronot*, March 11 (Hb.).
- . 1985. *From Velos to Taurus*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- Avrahami, Eli. 1993. *The Functioning of the TKM - Dilemmas and Directions for Change*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- Ayalon, Hana. 1992. "Settlement, Ethnicity and Students' Prospects of Joining Academic High- Schools." *Megamot* 34/3: 382-401 (Hb.).
- Axelrod, Robert. 1984. *The Evolution of Cooperation*. New York: Basic Books.
- Badaracco Joseph L. (Jr.), and Richard R. Ellsworth. 1989. *Leadership and the Quest for Integrity*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- Baer-Lambach, Ruth. 1992. *Colony Girl*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- Bakibbutz* (Unsigned). 1977. A Poem Cited from Kibbutz Na'an's Bulletin, February 14 (Hb.).
- Banay, Arye. 1979. "The Kibbutz Industry Continues Growth." *Al Hamishmar*, July 27 (Hb.).
- Banfield, Edward D. 1958. *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. New York: Free Press.
- . 1961. *Political Influence*. New York: Free Press.
- Bar-El, Lia, and Amalia Ben-Yehuda. 1989. *The Foundation of Kibbutz K – A Group in a Process*. Seminar Paper, Social Work Dept., Hebrew University, Jerusalem (Hb.).
- Bar-Gal, Yoram. 1976. "Kibbutz Industrialization as a Diffusion Process." *The Kibbutz* 3-4: 221-36 (Hb.).
- Bar-On, Dan and Moshe Shelhav. 1984. *The Regional Enterprises*. Ramat-Efal: Yad-Tabenkin (Mimeo. Hb.).
- Bar-Sinay, Boris (Ed.). 1997. *Valuables, Kibbutz Be'eri Lexicon*. Kibbutz Be'eri: Be'eri publishing (Hb.).
- Barak, Moshe. 1992. "Leave Equality [aside]." *Kibbutz*, November 24 (Hb.).
- Barbuto, John E., Jr. 1997. "Taking the Charisma Out of Transformational Leadership." *Journal of Social Behavior and Personality* 12/3: 689-97.
- Barkai, Yavel. 1982. "No More Rotten Tomatoes." *Hadaf Hayarok*, September 29 (Hb.).
- Barkai, Haim. 1977. *Growth Patterns of the Kibbutz Economy*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
- Barker, Richard L. 1997. "How Can We Train Leaders If We Do Not Know What Leadership Is?" *Human Relations* 50/4: 343-62.
- Barley, Stephen R., and Pamela S. Tolbert. 1997. "Institutionalization and Structuration: Studying the Links Between Action and Institution." *Organization Studies* 18/1: 93-117.
- Barnard, Chester I. 1938. *The Functions of the Executive*. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
- Bashan, Arik. 1993. "A Reward for a Commandment?" *Kibbutz*, August 25 (Hb.).
- . 2000a. "Tzemach's 60[th anniversary]." *Hakibbutz*, July 6 (Hb.).
- . 2000b. "Prevent the Cow From Enjoying Life." *Hakibbutz*, December 7 (Hb.).
- . 2000c. "Sde Nachum: A Settlers' Association." *Hakibbutz*, March 2 (Hb.).
- . 2001. "The kibbutz is Going Back to 'Arrangement' Sessions." *Hakibbutz*, June 6 (Hb.).

- Bass, Bernard M., and Paul Steidlmeier. 1999. "Ethics, Character, and Authentic Transformational Leadership Behavior." *Leadership Quarterly* 10/2: 181-217.
- Bate, Paul S. 1997. "Whatever Happened to Organizational Anthropology? A Review of the Field of Organizational Ethnography and Anthropological Studies." *Human Relations* 50/9: 1147-75.
- Beilin, Yosi. 1984. *Sons in the Shade of Fathers*. Tel Aviv: Revivim (Hb.).
- Ben-Avram, Baruch. 1976. *Hever Hakvutzot*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- Ben-David, Itzhak. 1975. "Review of 'Stratification versus Equality in the Kibbutz' by G.M. Kressel." *The Kibbutz* 2: 177-8 (Hb.).
- Ben-Hilel, Sara. 1988a. "Very Large Hats." *Hashavua Bakibbutz Haartzit*, August 11 (Hb.).
- . 1988b. "A Balance of Terror." *Hashavua Bakibbutz Haartzit*, November 17 (Hb.).
- Ben-Horin, Tzvi. 1984. *Disintegration of Founding Groups in the Kibbutz Movement*. Ph.D. Thesis, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan (Hb.).
- Ben-Rafael, Eliezer. 1983. "Dynamics of Social Stratification in Kibbutzim." In *The Sociology of Kibbutz*, ed. Ernest Krausz. New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction.
- . 1986. *Progress Versus Equality*. Tel Aviv: Ramot (Hb.).
- . 1996. *Non-Total Revolution*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- . 1997. *Crisis and Transformation*. Albany (NY): SUNY Press.
- , and Ephraim Yaar 1992. "Kibbutz stratification." In *The Kibbutz Society - Change and Continuity*. unit 10. Tel Aviv: The Open University (Hb.).
- Bennis, Warren, and Burt Nanus. 1985. *Leaders*. New York: Harper.
- Berger, Bennet. 1987. "Utopia and its Environment." In *Communal Life*, eds. Yosef Gorni et al. New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction.
- Berger, Peter L. 1966. *Invitation to Sociology*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Bettelheim, Bruno. 1969. *Children of the Dream*. New York: Macmillan.
- Beyer, Janice M. 1999. "Taming and Promoting Charisma to Change Organizations." *Leadership Quarterly* 10/2: 307-30.
- Bien, Yehuda. 1995. "Kibbutz in the Trap of the Counseling Model." Paper read at the International Communal Studies Association Conference, Ramat Efal, Israel, May 30.
- Bierly III, Paul E., and J.-C. Spender. 1995. "Culture of High-Reliability Organizations: The Case of the Nuclear Submarine." *Journal of Management* 21/4: 639-56.
- Bigley, Gregory A., and Jone L. Pearce. 1998. "Straining for Shared Meaning in Organizational Science: Problems of Trust and Distrust." *Academy of Management Review* 23/3: 405-21.
- Bijaoui, Silvi F. 1986. *Regional Integration or Alienation?* Research Report, Yad Tabenkin, Ramat Efal (Hb.).
- Binenfeld, David. 2000. *Summing Up TKM Demography*. Ramat Efal: TKM Statistical Dept. (Mimeo. Hb.).
- Bird-David, Nurit. 1990. "The Giving Environment: Another Perspective on the Economic System of Hunters-Gatherers." *Current Anthropology* 31/2:189-96.
- . 1992. "Equality, Communism and Liberty in Hunters-Gatherers Society." in *The Kibbutz Society - Change and Continuity*, unit 12. Tel Aviv: The Open University

- (Hb.).
- Blalock, Jr., Hubert M. 1989. *Power and Conflict*. Newbury Park (CA): Sage.
- Blasi, Joseph R. 1980. *The Communal Future: The Kibbutz and the Utopian Dilemma*. Norwood, Pa. (IL): Norwood.
- Blau, Peter M. 1963. *The Dynamics of Bureaucracy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 1964. *Exchange and Power in Social Life*. New York: Wiley.
- Bloch, Ze'ev 1984[1921]. "The Burning of Boxes." *Mekorot Le'heker Hashomer Hatza'ir* No. 1: 32-33 (Hb.).
- Bloomfield-Ramagem, Sonia. 1993. *The Moral Economy of a Kibbutz in a Time of Crisis*. Ph.D. Thesis, Catholic University of America, Washington D.C.
- Bobbio, Norberto. 2002. *The Future of Democracy*. Jerusalem: Magnes (Hb.).
- Bott, Elizabeth. 1957. *Family and Social Network*. London: Tavistock.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1977. *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- . 1984. *Distinction*. London: Routledge.
- . 1988. *Homo Academicus*. Cambridge: Polity.
- . 1990. *The Logic of Practice*. Cambridge: Polity.
- . 1993. *Sociology in Question*. London: Sage.
- . 1996a. *The State Nobility*. Cambridge: Polity.
- . 1996b. "The Family as a Realized Category." *Theory, Culture & Society* 13/1: 19-26.
- , and Jean-Claude Passeron. 1990. *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*. London: Sage.
- , and Loic J.D. Wacquant. 1992. *An invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Bowes, Allison M. 1989. *Kibbutz Goshen*. Prospects Heights (IL): Waveland.
- Bowra, Cecil M. 1971. *Periclean Athens*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson
- Bradach, Jeffery L., and Robert G. Eccles. 1989. "Price, Authority, and Trust: From Ideal Types to Plural Forms." *Annual Sociological Review* 15: 97-118.
- Brichta, Avraham 1986. "Selection of Candidates to the Tenth Knesset." In *Israel at the Polls 1981*, eds. Howard R. Penniman and D. J. Elazar. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Brockner, Joel, P. A. Siegel, J. P. Daly, T. Tyler and C. Martin. 1997. "When Trust Matters: The Moderating Effect of Outcome Favorability." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 42/3: 558-83.
- Br"t, Yehuda. 1998. *We Wanted a Kibbutz*. Jerusalem: Shashar (Hb.).
- Brum, Avraham. 1986. *Always Controversial*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- Brumann, Christoph. 2000. "The Dominance of One and Its Perils: Charismatic Leadership and Branch Structures in Utopian Communes." *Journal of Anthropological Research* 56/4: 425-51.
- Bryman, Alan, M. Stephens and C. a Campo. 1996. "The importance of context: Qualitative research and the study of leadership." *Leadership Quarterly* 7/3: 353-70.
- Buber, Martin. 1958[1945]. *Paths in Utopia*. Boston: Beacon.

- Burawoy, Michael. 1979. *Manufacturing Consent*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- . 1985. *Politics of Production*. New York: Verso.
- Burn, Andrew R. 1964. *Pericles and Athens*. New York: Collier.
- Burns, James M. 1978. *Leadership*. New York: Harper.
- Burns, Tom. 1955. "The Reference of Conduct in Small Groups." *Human Relations* 8/4: 467-86.
- , and Gerald M. Stalker. 1961. *The Management of Innovation*. London: Tavistock.
- Campbell, Richard J., V. I. Sessa and J. Taylor. 1995. "Choosing Top Leaders: Learning to Do Better." *Issues & Observations* 15/4: 1-5. Greensboro (NC): Center for Creative Leadership.
- Cannella, Albert A., and Micheal Lubatkin. 1993. "Succession as a Sociopolitical Process: Internal impediments to outsider selection." *Academy of Management Journal* 36/4: 763-93.
- , and W. Glen Rowe. 1995. "Leader Capabilities, Succession, and Competitive Context: A Study of Professional Baseball Teams" *Leadership Quarterly* 6/1: 69-88.
- Cappelli, Peter, and Ann Crocker-Heffer. 1996. "Distinctive Human Resources are Firms' Core Competencies." *Organizational Dynamics* 24/3: 7-22.
- Carmel, Amos. 1986. *Hashomer Hatzza'ir Youth Movement in Palestine 1938-1948*. Ph.D. Dissertation, Haifa University (Hb.).
- Caspi, Dan, and Yehiel Limor. 1992. *The Mediators: The Mass Media in Israel 1948-1990*. Tel Aviv: Am Oved (Hb.).
- Chatman, Jennifer, and Sigal G. Barsade. 1995. "Personality, Organizational Culture, and Cooperation: Evidence from a Business Simulation." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 40/2: 423-43.
- Chang, Chu L. 1955. *The Chinese Gentry*. Washington: University of Washington Press.
- Chizik, Moshe. 1982. "Milu'ot Hill does Not Answer" *Hashavua Bakibbutz Haartzit*, March 18 (Hb.).
- . 1983. "Is This a Relevant Answer?" *Hashavua Bakibbutz Haartzit*, January 21 (Hb.).
- Chow, Yang T. 1966. *Social Mobility in China*. New York: Atherton.
- Chung, Kae H., R. C. Rogers, M. Lubatkin and J. E. Owers. 1987. "Do Insiders Make Better CEOs than Outsiders?" *Academy of Management Executive* 1 (3): 325-31.
- Clark, Rodney. 1979. *The Japanese Company*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Cloke, Kenneth, and Joan Goldsmith. 2002. *The End of Management and the Rise of Organizational Democracy*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Cohen, Avraham. 1978. "The National and the Regional Organizations of the Kibbutz Movement". *Hedim* 43, No. 107: 95-111, No. 108: 89-99 (Hb.).
- Cohen, Erik. 1983. "The Structural Transformation of the Kibbutz." In *The Sociology of the Kibbutz*, ed. Ernest Krausz. New Brunswick: Transaction.
- Cohen, Mulla. 2000. *To Give and to Receive*. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad (Hb.).
- Cohen, Nisim, and Menachem Rosner. 1988. *The Democracy and the Kibbutz*. Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim (Hb.).
- Cohen, Reuven. 1978. *The Singles Society*. Final Thesis, Efal Seminar Center (Hb.).

- Collins, Randall. 1975. *Conflict Sociology*. New York: Academic.
- Comaroff, John, and Jean Comaroff. 1992. *Ethnography and the Historical Imagination*. Boulder (CO): Westview.
- Cook, Karen S. (ed.) 2001. *Trust in Society*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Criden, Yosef, and Saadia Gelb. 1974. *The Kibbutz Experience*. New York: Herzl Press.
- Crozier, Michel. 1964. *The Bureaucratic Phenomenon*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Czarniawska-Joerges, Barbara. 1992. *Exploring Complex Organizations*. Newbury Park (CA): Sage.
- Dagan, Sha'ul, and Eliyahu Yakir. 1995. *Shimon Avidan Giv'ati*. Giv'at Haviva: Yad Yaari (Hb.).
- Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1959. *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Dalton, Melville. 1959. *Man Who Manage*. New York: Wiley.
- Dangoor, Eyal. 1994. *The Decision-Making Stratum of Kibbutz Tzidon*. Seminar paper, Sociology Dept., The Open University (Hb.).
- Daniel, Avraham. 1975. *The Kibbutz Movement and the Hired Labor Problem* (Mimeo. Hb.).
- Darr, Asaf, and Alisa Lewin. 2001. "Democratic Justice Regimes in Work Organizations: The Case of Israeli Taxi Cooperatives." *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 22/3: 383-405.
- , and Robert N. Stern. 2002. "Coopting Change Toward Industrial Democracy: Professionals as Agents of Structural Constraint." *Sociological Inquiry* 72/2: 171-94.
- Davis, Gerald F. 1994. "Corporate Elite and the Politics of Corporate Control." *Current Perspectives in Social Theory, Supplement 1*: 215-38.
- Davis, Herold E. 1958. "The Presidency." In *Government and Politics in Latin America*, ed. Herold E. Davis. New York: Ronald.
- DePree, Max. 1990. *Leadership is an Art*. New York: Dell.
- Deutsch, Morton. 1958. "Trust and Suspicion." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2/2: 265-79.
- , 1962. "Cooperation and Trust: Some theoretical notes." In *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*, ed. Marshall R. Jones. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press.
- , 1969. "Conflicts: Productive and Destructive." *Journal of Social Issues* 25/1: 7-42.
- Dierkes, Meinolf, A. B. Antal, J. Child and I. Nonaka (eds.). 2001. *Organizational Learning and Knowledge*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- DiMaggio, Paul J. 1991. "Constructing an Organizational Field as a Professional Project: U.S. Art Museums, 1920-1940." In *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, eds. Walter W. Powell and P.J. DiMaggio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- , and Walter W. Powell. 1983. "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields." *American Sociological Review* 48/1: 147-60.
- Dloomi, Ezra. 2000. "A Billion Shekels for Consultants." *Hakibbutz*, April 6 (Hb.).

- Dodgson, Mark. 1993. "Learning, Trust, and Technological Collaboration." *Human Relations* 46/1: 77-95.
- Don, Yehuda. 1988. *Industrialization of a Rural Collective*. Aldershot (UK): Avebury.
- Dore, Ronald. 1973. *British Factory - Japanese Factory*. Berkeley (CA): University of California Press.
- Downs, Anthony. 1966. *Inside Bureaucracy*. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Downton, James V. Jr. 1973. *Rebel Leadership*. New York: Free Press.
- , and Paul E. Wehr. 1991. "Peace Movements: The Role of Commitment and Community in Sustaining Member Participation." *Research in Social Movements* 13: 113-34.
- Drin-Drabkin, Haim. 1961. *The Other Society*. Merhavia: Sifriat Poalim (Hb.).
- Dror, Levy. 1956-1964. *Hashomer Hatz'a'ir Book* (3 Vols.). Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim (Hb.).
- Dror, Tzvika. 1999. "A Commander is Burdened with Much Pain and Frustration." *Hakibbutz*, December 9 (Hb.).
- Drucker, Peter F. 1992. *Managing for the Future*. New York: Dutton/Truman Tally.
- Drury, Allen. 1959. *Advise and Consent*. New York: Doubleday.
- Dvorkind, Dov. 1996. *A Slave Turned a Master*. Jerusalem: Karmel (Hb.).
- Edgerton, Robert B. 1967. *The Cloak of Competence*. Berkeley (CA): University of California Press.
- Einat, Yehezkel. 1991. *The Influence of Rotatzia Patterns, Type of Manager and Organizational Changes on Performance in the Kibbutz Industry*. M.A. Thesis, Labor Studies Dept., Tel Aviv University (Hb.).
- Emerson, Joan. 1969. "Negotiation the Serious Import of Humor." *Sociometry* 32/2: 161-81.
- Erickson, Eric H. 1950. *Childhood and Society*. New York: Norton.
- Estrin, Saul, and Derek C. Jones. 1992. "The Viability of Employee-Owned Firms: Evidence From France", *Industrial and Labor Relations Review* 45/2: 323-38.
- Etzioni-Halevy, Eve. 1993. *The Elites Plot and Israeli Democracy*. Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim (Hb.).
- Evens, Terens M.S. 1995. *Two Kinds of Rationality*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Fadida, Michael. 1972. *The Dynamics of Career Patterns among Political Activists in a Kibbutz*. M.A. Thesis, Sociology and Anthropology Dept., Tel Aviv University (Hb.).
- Feenberg, Andrew. 1995. "Subversive Rationality: Technology, Power, and Democracy." In *Technology and the Politics of Knowledge*, eds. Andrew Feenberg and A. Hannay. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Fishman, Arie. 1993. "Religion and success in the religious kibbutz." *Katedra* No. 68: 127-39 (Hb.).
- Folsom, Kenneth E. 1968. *Friends, Guests and Colleagues*. Berkeley (CA): University of California Press.
- Fox, Alan. 1974. *Beyond Contract*. London: Faber.
- . 1985. *Man Mismanagement*. London: Hutchinson.
- Frank, Robert H. 1985. *Choosing the Right Pond*. New York: Oxford.

- Freeman, Jo. 1974. "The tyranny of structurelessness." In *Women in Politics*, ed. Jane L. Jaquette. New York: Wiley.
- Friedman, Victor. 1995. "Equality and Fairness: Conflict and Learning in Kibbutzim." Paper read at the International Communal Studies Association Conference, Ramat Efal, Israel, May 30.
- Fuks, Alexander. 1976. *Studies in Politics and Society in Ancient Greece*. Jerusalem: Bialik (Hb.).
- Fukuyama, Francis. 1995. *Trust*. New York: Free Press.
- Gabarro, John J. 1987. *The Dynamics of Taking Charge*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- Gabriel, Richard A., and Paul L. Savage. 1981. *Crisis in Command*. New Delhi: Himalayan.
- Galbraith, John K. 1971. *The New Industrial State*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
- Gambetta, Diego (Ed.). 1988. *Trust: The Making and Braking of Cooperative Relations*. New York: Blackwell.
- Gamson, William A. 1991. "Commitment and Agency in Social Movements." *Sociological Forum* 6/1: 27-50.
- Gamson, Zelda F. 1977. "Kibbutz and Higher Education: Cultures in Collision." *The Kibbutz* 5: 63-83 (Hb.).
- Gelbard, Regina. 1993. *Kibbutz - the True Story*. Kibbutz Dalia: Maarechet (Hb.).
- Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. New York: Basic Books.
- . 1983. *Local Knowledge*. New York: Basic Books.
- . 1995. *After the Fact*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
- Gelb, Saadia. 2001. *The Chase is the Game*. Englewood Cliffs (NJ): Dworkin.
- , and Yosef Criden. 1974. *The Kibbutz Experience*. New York: Herzl Press.
- Geneen, Herold. 1984. *Managing*. New York: Avon.
- Gherardi, Silvia, and Attilio Masiero. 1990. "Solidarity as a Networking Skill and a Trust Relation: Its Implications for Cooperative Development." *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 11: 553-74.
- Gilboa, Nachman. 1991. "Much Downsizing." *Hadaf Hayarok*, May 14 (Hb.).
- . 1997. "There Were Many Tears in This Room." *Hadaf Hayarok*, December 18 (Hb.).
- . 2000. "Still Afraid of Yaari and Hazan." *Hadaf Hayarok*, April 18 (Hb.).
- Ginat, Avshalom. 1979a. "The Second Blow of Botulism." *Hashavua Bakibbutz Haartz*, November 2 (Hb.).
- . 1979b. "All for Silencing [of the Fiasco], and Who Profits from It." *Hashavua Bakibbutz Haartz*, December 14 (Hb.).
- . 1981. "Will the Cars of Pe'ilim Be at the Car Manager's Disposal?" *Hadaf Hayarok*, December 7 (Hb.).
- Gini, Al. 1997. "Moral leadership: An overview." *Journal of Business Ethics* 16: 323-30.
- Giuliani, Rudolf W. (with Ken Kurson). 2002. *Leadership*. New York: Talk Miramax.
- Goldenberg, Musa. 1965. *And The Fund is Still Exists*. Merchavia: Sifriat Poalim (Hb.).
- Goldschmidt, Walter R. 1990. *The Human Career*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Goldstein, Yossi. 2003. *Eshkol - Biography*. Jerusalem: Keter (Hb.).

- Goleman, Daniel, R. Boyatzis and A. McKee. 2002. *Primal Leadership*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- Goode, William J. 1978. *The Celebration of Heroes*. Berkeley (CA): University of California Press.
- Gorkin, Michael. 1971. *Border Kibbutz*. New York: Hart.
- Goren, Yaakov. 1992. *Israel Bar-Yehuda*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- Gorni, Yosef, Y. Oved and I. Paz (eds.). 1987. *Communal Life*. New Brunswick: Transaction.
- Gouldner, Alvin W. 1954. *Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy*. New York: Free Press.
- . 1955. *Wildcat Strike*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Govier, Trudy. 1997. *Social Trust and Human Communities*. Montreal: McGill-Queen.
- Graham, Jill W. 1991. "Servant-Leadership in Organizations: Inspirational and Moral." *Leadership Quarterly* 2/2: 105-19.
- Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. *Selections From the Prison Notebooks*. New York: International.
- Granovetter, Mark. 1983. "The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited." In *Sociological Theory*, ed. Randall Collins. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- . 1985. "Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness." *American Journal of Sociology* 91(November): 481-510.
- Greenleaf, Robert K. 1977. *Servant Leadership*. New York: Paulist Press.
- Grinberg, Lev L. 1993. *The Histadrut Above All*. Jerusalem: Nevo (Hb.).
- Grint, Keith. 2000. *The Arts of Leadership*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Grosman, Avishay. 1991. "Privileges in the Kibbutz Sector." *Al Hamishmar*, November 29 (Hb.).
- Guest, Robert H. 1962. *Organizational Change*. London: Tavistock.
- Gulati, Ranjay, and Martin Gargiulo. 1999. "Where Do Interorganizational Networks Come From?" *American Journal of Sociology* 104(March): 1439-93.
- Gur-Gurvitch, Baruch. 1995. *After Gorbachev*. Jerusalem: Zionist Library (Hb.).
- Gurevitch, Michael, and Tzipora Levi. 1973. "Television in Kibbutz: A Study of Innovation Proliferation." *The Kibbutz* 1: 103-20 (Hb.).
- Gvirtz, Yael. 2003. *Unexpected Child*. Tel Aviv: Miskal (Hb.).
- Hacohen, Devora. 1994. *Ascent [immigration] in a Storm*. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi (Hb.).
- Hakibbutz*. 2004. Kibbutz Industry Supplement. July (Hb.).
- Halevi, Run. 1990. "Tnuva and I All the Time." *Kibbutz*, June 26 (Hb.).
- . 1994. "The Trend of Hired Labor is Upward." *Kibbutz*, April 27 (Hb.).
- . 1995. "The 'Silicon Committee': Four Senior Executives are Suspected of Offences." *Davar*, November 14 (Hb.).
- . 1997a. "The Rule of the Regional Enterprises." *Hakibbutz*, September 18 (Hb.).
- . 1997b. "Preventing Brain-Drain." *Hakibbutz*, October 9 (Hb.).
- Halperin, Ariel. 1999. "The Connection of a Member to His Kibbutz Will Be Through His Pocket." *Hakibbutz*, December 23 (Hb.).
- Hambrick, Donald C., and Phyllis A. Mason. 1984. "Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of its Top Managers." *Academy of Management Review* 9/2: 193-206.

- , and Gregory D. S. Fukutomi. 1991. "The Seasons of a CEO's Tenure." *Academy of Management Review* 16/4: 719-42.
- Hammersley, Martyn. 1992. *What's Wrong with Ethnography*. London: Routledge.
- Handelman, Don, and Bruce Kapferer. 1972. "Forms of Joking Activity: A Comparative Approach." *American Anthropologist* 74: 484-517.
- Handy, Charles. 1989. *The Age of Unreason*. London: Random Century.
- Harris, Marvin. 1990. *Our Kind*. New York: Harper.
- Hart, Paul, and Carol Saunders. 1997. "Power and Trust: Critical Factors in the Adoption and Use of Electronic Data Interchange." *Organization Science* 8/1: 23-42.
- Harpazi, Shmuel. 1982. "Rotatzia and Milu'ot'." *Hashavua Bakibbutz Haartzi*, November 19 (Hb.).
- Harvey-Jones, John. 1988. *Making it Happen*. London: Fontana.
- Hawthorn, Geoffrey. 1991. *Plausible Worlds*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Heidenheimer, Arnold J. 1970. *Political Corruption*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Heller, Frank, E. Pusic, G. Strauss and B. Wilpert. 1998. *Organizational Participation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Helman, Amir. 1987. "The Development of Professional Managers in the Kibbutz." *Rev'on Lekalkala* 33(137): 1031-38 (Hb.).
- Henderson, William D. 1990. *The Hollow Army*. New York: Greenwood.
- Hickson, David J., C. R. Hinings, D. S. Pugh, C. A. Lee, R. E. Schneck and J. M. Pennings. 1971. "A Strategic Contingencies Theory of Intraorganizational Power." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 16/2: 216-29.
- Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
- , 1982. *Shifting Involvement*. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
- , 1984. *Going Ahead Collectively*. New York: Pergamon.
- , 1995. *A Propensity to Self-Subversion*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
- Holzach, Michael. 1982. *Das Vergessene Volk*. Hamburg: Hoffman Verlag.
- Hosmer, Larue T. 1995. "Trust: The Connecting Link Between Organizational Theory and Philosophical Ethics." *Academy of Management Review* 20/2: 379-403.
- Hughes, Everett C. 1958. *Man and Their Work*. Glenco (IL): Free Press.
- Huysman, Marleen, and Volker Wulf (eds.). 2004 *Social Capital and Information Technology*. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press.
- Iacocca, Lee. 1984. *Iacocca, an Autobiography*. New York: Bantam.
- Ilana and Avner. 1977. "The Desired." *Bakibbutz*, February 14 (Hb.).
- Ingram, Paul, and Tal Simons. 2002. "The Transfer of Experience in Groups of Organizations: Implications for Performance and Competition." *Management Science* 48: 1517-33.
- Israel, Baruch. 1986. *Carta Book of Israel's Personalities*. Jerusalem: Carta (Hb.).
- Izhar, Uri. 2005. *Between Vision and Power*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin.
- Jackall, Robert. 1988. *Moral Mazes*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Jackson, Kevin T. 2004. *Building Reputational Capital*. New York: Oxford University

- Press.
- James, Allison, J. Hockey and A. Dawson (eds.). 1997. *After Writing Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Jaques, Elliot. 1990. *Creativity and Work*. Madison (CN): International Universities.
- Jasper, James M. 1997. *The Art of Moral Protest*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Jay, Anthony. 1969. *Management and Machiavelly*. New York: Bantam.
- . 1972. *Corporation Man*. London: Jonathan Cape
- Joas, Hans. 1996. *The Creativity of Action*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Jones, Michael O., M. D. Moore and R. C. Snyder (eds.). 1988. *Inside Organizations*. Beverly Hills (CA): Sage.
- Kafkafi, Eayl 1988. "Leadership Patterns in the KA as Exposed in the 'Prague Affair'." *Me'asef Lechekeer Tnu'at Havoda Hatzionit Vehasocialism* 18: 25-34 (Hb.).
- . 1992. *Truth or Faith*. Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi (Hb.).
- . 1998. *Pinchas Lavon – Anti Messiah*. Tel Aviv: Am Oved (Hb.).
- Kanari, Baruch. 1989. *Hakibbutz Hameuchad - Mission and Reality*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- . 2003. *Tabenkin in Palestine*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- Kane, John. 2001. *Moral Capital*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kanter, Rosabet M. 1972. *Commitment and Community*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard.
- . 1977. *Men and Women of the Corporation*. New York: Basic Books.
- . 1985. *The Change Masters*. London: Allen and Unwin.
- Kasmir, Sharryn. 1996. *The Myth of Mondragon*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Katzir, Hana. 1999. *Golden Chain*. Kibbutz Dalia: Maarechet (Hb.).
- Kedem, Ali. 1988a. "The Double Report." *Kibbutz*, August 3 (Hb.).
- . 1988b. "If We Fall – Then Together." *Kibbutz*, November 9 (Hb.).
- Kedem-Hadad, Naama. 1998. *Life Stories of the Gar'in Bavli of Be'eri Members and Leavers: Formative Experience*. Seminar paper, History Dept., Hebrew University, Jerusalem (Hb.).
- Keene, Arthur S. 1995. "The Retreat From Community and the Language of Disengagement." Paper presented at the International Communal Studies Association Conference, Yad-Tabenkin, Ramat Efal, Israel, May 30.
- Kendrick, J. Richard. 1991. "Meaning and Participation: Perspectives of Peace Movement Participants." *Research in Social Movements* 13: 91-111.
- Kerem, Moshe. 1994. "The Kibbutz Community in Change." In *Kibbutz: An Alternative Lifestyle*, eds. David Lichman and I. Paz. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin.
- Keshet, Shula. 1995. *The Spiritual Underground: The Beginning of the Kibbutz Novel*. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad (Hb.).
- Kets de Vries, Manfred F. R. 1993. *Leaders, Fools, and Impostors*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Khurana, Rakesh, and Nitin Nhoria. 1997. "The Ins and Outs of CEO Selection." *HR Focus* 74 (11): 7.
- Kibbutz* (Unsigned). 1987. "Strong Numbers." May 20 (Hb.).
- Kinkade, Kat. 1994. *Is It Utopia Yet?* Twin Oaks (VA): Twin Oaks Publishing.
- Kipnis, David. 1976. *The Powerholders*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- Knaani, David. 1960. *Houses of Ethics*. Merhaviva: Sifriat Poalim (Hb.).
- Kochan, Run. 1986. "A Short Essay On the Certain and Unavoidable Failure of a Kibbutz Officer." *Kibbutz*, December 17 (Hb.).
- Korczyński, Marek. 2000. "The Political Economy of Trust." *Journal of Management Studies* 37: 1-21.
- Kostova, Tatiana, and Kendall Roth. 2003. "Social Capital in Multinational Corporations and a Micro-Macro Model of Its Formation." *Academy of Management Review* 28: 297-317.
- Kouzes, James M., and Barry Z. Posner. 1993. *Credibility*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Kovner, Rotem. 1993. "The Rise and Fall of the Man Who Crowned Kings." *Haaretz*, April 9 (Hb.).
- Kramer, Roderick M. 1996. "Divergent Realities and Convergent Disappointment in the Hierarchic Relation: Trust and the Intuitive Auditor at Work." In *Trust in Organizations*, eds. Roderick M. Kramer and T. R. Tyler. Thousand Oaks (CA): Sage.
- , and Tom R. Tyler (eds.) 1996. *Trust in Organizations*. Thousand Oaks (CA): Sage.
- , and Karen S. Cook (Eds). 2004. *Trust and Distrust in Organizations*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Kressel, Gideon M. 1971. *G-R: The Dynamics of a Kibbutz Community on a Transition from Agricultural to Industrial*. Unpublished manuscript, Tel Aviv University (Hb.).
- . 1974. *Stratification Versus Equality in the Kibbutz*. Tel Aviv: Cherikover (Hb.).
- . 1983. *To Each According to His Needs*. Tel Aviv: Cherikover (Hb.).
- . 1991. "Managerial Blunders in the Kibbutz Enterprise: The Problem of Accountability." *Journal of Rural Cooperation* 19/2: 91-107.
- . 1996. "Reducing Collectivity in a Kibbutz; Advancement the Economic Analysis of Participatory and Labor-Managed Firms." *Journal of Rural Cooperation* 24/1: 35-45.
- Krol, Yoram. 1989. *The Economic Crisis in the Kibbutzim of TKM 1984-1988*. Tel Aviv: TKM (Hb.).
- Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Kynan, Ofra. 1989. *In Our Own Image: Hashomer Hatzair and the Mass Immigration*. M.A. Thesis, Jewish History Dept., Tel Aviv University (Hb.).
- Lafferty, William M., and Eliezer Rosenstein (eds.) 1993. *International Handbook of Participation in Organizations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Landshut, Siegfried. 2000[1944]. *The Kvutza*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- Lane, Christle, and Reinhard Bachmann. 1996. "The Social Constitution of Trust: Supplier Relations in Britain and Germany." *Organization Studies* 17/3: 365-89.
- Lanir, Yoseph. 1990. *The Kibbutz as a Political System*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- Latimore, James. 1991. "Natural Limits on the Size and Duration of Utopian Communities." *Communal Societies* 11/1: 34-61.
- Lazar, Yaakov. 2001. "Sorry, It is Not Succeeding." *Hadaf Hayarok*, June 14 (Hb.).
- Lenski, Gerhard. 1966. *Power and Privilege*. New York: Free Press.
- Leshem, Eliezer. 1969. *Patterns of Deviation from the Economic Manager's Role in the*

- Kibbutz*. M.A. Thesis, Sociology Dept., Hebrew University, Jerusalem (Hb.).
- Leshem, Shlomo. 1986. "More Secretariats, Less *Pe'ilim*." *Yachad*, May 30 (Hb.).
- Levanon-Morduch, Ester. 2000. "So Transparent." *Hadaf Hayarok*, April 6 (Hb.).
- Levenson, Bernard. 1961. "Bureaucratic Succession." In *Complex Organizations*, ed. Amitai Etzioni. New York: Holt.
- Levy, Yarden. 1991. *Who Really Manages the Kibbutz?* Final Thesis, Brenner Regional High School, Givat Brenner (Hb.).
- Leviatan, Uriel. 1975. "Industrialization and Kibbutz Values - Contrast or Complementation?" *The Kibbutz* 2: 11-27 (Hb.).
- . 1978. "Organizational Effects of Managerial Turnover in Kibbutz Production Branches." *Human Relations* 31/2: 1001-18.
- . 1992. "Involuntary Leadership: Leadership Crisis in Kibbutzim." *Mifne* No. 10: 32-46 (Hb.).
- . 1993. "Rotation in Managerial Positions and the Balance of Rewards as a Function of Time in Office." *Israel Social Science Research* 8/1: 71-90.
- . 1994. "Bad Marks for the Movement Leadership." *Kibbutz*, September 29 (Hb.).
- . 1995. "The Heavy Price of Working Outside." *Kibbutz Trends* No. 17: 49-50.
- . 1998. "Faith on the Decline." *Kibbutz Trends*, No. 29: 57-58.
- . 1999. "Rotatzia is Not to be Blamed." *Hakibbutz*, March 11 (Hb.).
- , H. Oliver and J. Quarter (eds.) 1998. *Crisis in the Israeli Kibbutz*. Westport (CN): Praeger.
- Lewicki, Roy J., and Barbara B. Bunker. 1996. "Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work Relationships." In *Trust in Organizations*, eds. Roderick M. Kramer and T. R. Tyler. Thousands Oaks (CA): Sage.
- Lewin, Eliezer. 1988. *The Banks' Stocks*. Tel Aviv: Matar (Hb.).
- Lewin, Kurt. 1951. *The Field Theory in Social Science*. New York: Harper.
- Liberman, Yaakov. 1997. "The Crisis of Trust in the Kibbutz and the Legalization Paradox." *Mifne* No. 18: 26-9 (Hb.).
- Liblich, Amia. 1984. *Kibbutz Place*. Jerusalem: Schocken (Hb.).
- Lifshitz, Oded. 1983. "Uncontrolled Power." *Hadaf Hayarok*, June 6, July 18, August 15 (Hb.).
- . 1985. "The 'Power Man' of the Western Galilee." *Hadaf Hayarok*, May 7 (Hb.).
- . 1986a. "A Banal Regional Tale." *Hadaf Hayarok*, February 11 (Hb.).
- . 1986b. "The Hat of the Kibbutz Journalist." *Hadaf Hayarok*, April 22 (Hb.).
- . 1986c. "He Who Controls the Money - Rules." *Hadaf Hayarok*, October 21 (Hb.).
- . 1987. "It is Not Revolving." *Hadaf Hayarok*, March 24 (Hb.).
- . 1990. "Thin is Nice." *Al Hamishmar*, March 11 (Hb.).
- . 1992. "For God's Sake, Who Owns This Property?" *Kibbutz*, April 2 (Hb.).
- . 1993. "How Ganir Was Rescued." *Hadaf Hayarok*, October 12 (Hb.).
- . 1997. "NIS30,000 Salary for Granot CEO Bader." *Hadaf Hayarok*, November 13 (Hb.).
- . 1998. "The Profit is All Theirs." *Hadaf Hayarok*, July 2 (Hb.).
- . 1999. "A Hump on the Back of Kibbutzim." *Hadaf Hayarok*, November 4

- (Hb.).
- . 2000a. "A Proposal for an Arrangement in the Comptroller Alliance." *Hadaf Hayarok*, August 3 (Hb.).
- . 2000b. "Assets of 'Agricultural Insurance' to the Kibbutzim." *Hadaf Hayarok*, August 3 (Hb.).
- . 2001. "Careful, a Collapse!" *Hadaf Hayarok*, June 14 (Hb.).
- Linstead, Stephen, R. Grafton Small and P. Jeffcutt 1996. *Understanding Management*. London: Sage.
- Linz, Joan J. 1990. "The Perils of Presidentialism." *Journal of Democracy* 1: 51-70.
- Lipset, Seymour M., M. Trow and J. S. Coleman. 1956. *Union Democracy*. Glenco (IL): Free Press.
- Luthans, Fred. 1988. "Successful versus Effective Managers." *Academy of Management Executive* 2/2: 127-32.
- Lynn, Jonathan, and Anthony Jay. 1986. *Yes, Prime Minister*. London: BBC Publications.
- Maccoby, Michael. 1976. *The Gamesman*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Mainwaring, Scott. 1990. "Presidentialism in Latin America." *Latin America Research Review* 25: 157-79.
- Maister, David H., C. H. Green and R. M. Galford. 2001. *The Trusted Advisor*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Malchi, Mordechai. 1978. *Background Material for KA's Central Committee Discussion of the Regional Enterprises*. Tel Aviv: Hamerkaz Hachaklai (Mimeo. Hb.).
- Maletz, David. 1983[1945]. *Circuits [Maagalot]*. Tel Aviv: Am Oved (Hb.).
- Maman, Daniel. 1989. *The Second Career of Top Military Officers and the Civilian Elites 1974- 1984*. Jerusalem: Academon (Hb.).
- Manor, Hadas. 1998. "Don't Cry Over Spilled Milk." *Maariv* May 29 (Hb.).
- Manor, Giora. 1997. "My life with the KA." *Hadaf Hayarok*, September 11 (Hb.).
- March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 1989. *Rediscovering Institutions*. New York: Free Press.
- Maron, Stanley. 1988-1997. *Kibbutz Movement's Demography*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- Martin, Joanne. 1992. *Cultures in Organizations*. New York: Oxford.
- Martin, Norman H., and Anselm L. Strauss. 1959. "Patterns of Mobility in Industrial Organizations." In *Industrial Man*, eds. W. Lloyd Warner and N. H. Martin. New York: Harper.
- Marx, Emanuel. 1980. "On the Anthropological Study of Nations." In *A Composite Portrait of Israel*, ed. Emanuel Marx. London: Academic.
- . 1985. "Social-Anthropological Research and Knowing Arab Society." In *To Know Neighboring People*, ed. Aluf Har'even. Jerusalem: Van Leer (Hb.).
- McCall, Morgan W., M.M. Lombardo and A.M. Morrison. 1988. *The Lessons of Experience*. Lexington (MA): Lexington Books.
- McEvily, Bill, V. Perrone and A. Zaheer. 2003. "Trust as an Organizing Principle." *Organization Science* 14/1: 91-103.
- McGill, Michael E., and John W. Slocum, Jr. 1998. "A Little Leadership, Please?" *Organizational Dynamics* 26/3: 39-49.

- McGregor, Douglas. 1967. *The Human Side of the Enterprise*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Mechanic, David. 1964. "Sources of Power of Lower Participants." In *New Perspectives in Organization Research*, ed. W. W. Cooper. New York: Wiley.
- Meged, Hagay, and Offer Sobol. 1970. *Rotatzia of Secretaries and Economic Managers in the Ichud Kibbutzim*. Seminar paper, Labor Studies Dept., Tel Aviv University (Hb.).
- Melman, Seymour. 1983. *Profits Without Production*. New York: Knopf.
- Melucci, Alberto. 1989. *Nomads of the Present*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
- Merton, Robert K. 1957. *Social Theory and Social Structure*. Glenco (IL): Free Press.
- Michels, Robert. 1959[1915]. *Political Parties*. New York: Dover.
- Minutes of World Zionist Organization Congresses, 1925-1931*. Congresses No. 14-17.
- Miller, Gary J. 2001. "Why Is Trust Necessary in Organizations? The Moral Hazard of Profit Maximization." In *Trust in Society*, ed. Karen S. Cook. New York: Russell Sage.
- Misztal, Barbara A. 1996. *Trust in Modern Societies*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Morrison, Roy. 1991. *We Build the Road as We Travel*. Philadelphia: New Society.
- Muller, Jerry Z. 1993. *Adam Smith in His Time and Ours*. New York: Free Press.
- Near, Henry. 1992-1997. *The Kibbutz Movement: A History*. Vol. I - New York: Oxford University Press; Vol. II - London: Littman Library.
- Newsweek* (unsigned). 1993. "Building and Corruption." October 4.
- Niv, Amitai, and Dan Bar-On. 1992. *The Dilemma of Size From a System Learning Perspective: The Case of the Kibbutz*. Greenwich (CN): JAI.
- Noteboom, Bart. 2002. *Trust*. Cheltenham (UK): Edward Elgar.
- Noy, Dan. 1977. "The Development of the Kibbutz Attitude Towards Higher Education." *The Kibbutz* 5: 51-62 (Hb.).
- Ofaz, Aviva (Ed.). 2001. *The Book of Life: Kiryat Anavim's Dairy*. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi (Hb.).
- Ofer, Dalia. 1990. *Illegal Immigration During the Holocaust*. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi (Hb.).
- Oplatka, Izhar. 2002. *Burnout and Renewal*. Beer-Sheva: Ben-Gurion University Press (Hb.).
- O'Toole, James. 1999. *Leadership from A to Z*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Ouchi, William G. 1981. *Theory Z*. Reading (MA): Addison-Wesley.
- Oved, Yaakov. 1988. *Two Hundred Years of American Communes*. New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction.
- Parkinson, C. Nortcote. 1957. *Parkinson Law and Other Studies in Administration*. Boston (MA): Houghton-Mifflin.
- Pavin, Avraham. 1991. *Relations Between Developing Towns and Kibbutzim*. Ph.D. Thesis, Tel Aviv University (Hb.).
- . 1994. *Organizational Consultants in the Kibbutz*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- . 1996. *Stratification and Change in an Egalitarian Society*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- Pearlman, Maurice. 1938. *Collective Adventure*. London: William Heinemann.
- Pe'eri, Ig'al. 1977. "We are Raising a Generation of Managers." *Hashavua Bakibutz*

- Haartzi*, August 19 (Hb.).
- Peleg, Gidi. 1991. "Sold Half to Outside Factor." *Kibbutz*, May 8 (Hb.).
- Peleg, Soli. 1999. *The Israeli Economy 1950-1998*. Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics (Hb.).
- Perkins, Kenneth B., and Darryl G. Poole. 1996. "Oligarchy and Adaptation to Mass Society in an All-Volunteer Organization: Implications for Understanding Leadership, Participation, and Change." *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly* 25/1: 73-88.
- Perrow, Charles. 1970. *Organizational Analysis*. London: Tavistock.
- Peter, Lawrence J., and Richard Hull. 1969. *The Peter Principle*. London: Souvenir.
- Peters, Thomas, and Robert H. Waterman. 1982. *In Search of Excellence*. New York: Harper.
- , and Nancy Austin. 1986. *A Passion for Excellence*. London: Fontana.
- Petersburg, Ofer. 1994. "Buildings in the Air." *Maariv*, May 17 (Hb.).
- Pettigrew, Andrew M. 1995. "Longitudinal Field Research on Change." In *Longitudinal Field Research Methods*, eds. George P. Huber and A. H. Van de Ven. Thousand Oaks (CA): Sage.
- , E. Ferlie and L. Meckee. 1992. *Shaping Strategic Change*. London: Sage.
- Pitzer, Donald E. (Ed.). 1997. *America's Communal Utopias*. Chapel Hill (NC): University of North Carolina Press.
- Platt, Jennifer. 1976. *Realities of Social Research*. London: Sussex University Press.
- Porat, Dina. 2000. *Beyond the Reaches of Our Souls; The Life and Times of Abba Kovner*. Tel Aviv: Am Oved (Hb.).
- Powell, Walter W. 1990. "Neither Markets Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization." *Research in Organizational Behavior* 12: 295-336.
- Powell, Walter W., K.W. Koput and L. Smith-Doerr. 1996. "Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of Innovation: Networks Learning in Biotechnology." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 41: 116-45.
- Preece, Jennifer. 2004. "Etiquette, Empathy and Trust in Communities of Practice: Stepping-Stones to Social Capital." Downloaded 15.7.2005: www.ifsm.umbc.edu/~preece/papers
- Presthus, Robert. 1964. *Man at the Top*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Putnam, Robert D. 2000. *Bowling Alone*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Rabin, Albert I. 1965. *Growing Up in the Kibbutz*. New York: Springer.
- Ram, Uri. 1995. *The Changing Agenda of Israeli Sociology*. Albany (NY): SUNY Press.
- Rayman, Paula. 1981. *Kibbutz Community and Nation Building*. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.
- Raz, Avi'ad. 1996. *Kibbutz Discourse*. Kibbutz Be'eri: Be'eri publishing (Hb.).
- Raz, Rami. 1986. *Yearly Report of Milu'ot Manpower Department* (Mimeo. Hb.).
- Ravid, Shlomi. 1992. *The Kibbutz Process of Change*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- Reed, Michael I. 2001. "Organization, Trust and Control: A Realist Analysis." *Organization Studies* 22(2): 201-28.
- Reiner, Ephraim. 2005. *The Democratic Manifest*. Bney-Brak: Hakibbutz Hameuhad (Hb.).
- Rev'on Lekalkala* (Unsigned). 1979. "Tnuva Export". Vol. 26, No. 103: c-d (Hb.).

- Rev'on Lekalkala* (Unsigned). 1983. "The Mashbir Merkazi". Vol. 30, No. 117: 713 (Hb.).
- Rifkin, Gllen, and George Harrar. 1988. *The Ultimate Entrepreneur*. Chicago: Contemporary.
- Riker, William H. 1974. "The Nature of Trust." In *Perspectives on Social Power*, ed. John T. Tedeschi. Chicago: Aldine.
- Ring, Peter S., and Andrew Van de Ven. 1992. "Structuring Cooperative Relationships Between Organizations." *Strategic Management Journal* 13/7: 483-98.
- Ringel-Hofman, Ariela. 1988. "28 Years of Singular Rule, 390 Million Shekels Debt." *Yedi'ot Achronot*, July 29 (Hb.).
- Rohlen, Thomas P. 1974. *For Harmony and Strength*. Berkeley (CA): University of California Press.
- Ron, Yaakov. 1978. "The Kibbutz Ideology – Theory and Reality." *Hedim* 43, No. 108: 170-89 (Hb.).
- Rosenfeld, Eva. 1983[1951]. "Social Stratification in a 'Classless' Society." In *The Sociology of Kibbutz*, ed. Ernest Krausz. New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction.
- . 1957. "Institutional Change in the Kibbutz." *Social Problems* 5/1: 110-36.
- Rosenhak, Dov. 1988. *My Way in Bror Cha'il*. Kibbutz Bror Cha'il: Bror Cha'il publishing (Hb.).
- Rosolio, Daniel. 1975. *The Regional Structure in the Kibbutz Movement: Sociological Aspects*. Tel Aviv: Am Oved (Hb.).
- . 1993. *The Study of the Kibbutz in the Process of Change*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- . 1995. "Factors in the Crisis and the Changes in the Kibbutz System." Discussion paper, Golda Meir Institute, Tel Aviv University (Hb.).
- . 1998. "Inter-Kibbutz Organizations and Cooperatives." In *Crisis in the Israeli Kibbutz*, eds. Uriel Leviatan et al. Westport (CN): Praeger.
- . 1999. *System and Crisis*. Tel Aviv: Am Oved (Hb.).
- Rosner, Menachem. 1964. "Hardship and Rewards in the Job of Branch Manager." *Hedim* 29, No. 76: 46-77, and No.77: 67-80 (Hb.).
- . 1971. *Hierarchy and Democracy in Kibbutz Industry*. Ph.D. Thesis, Hebrew University, Jerusalem (Hb.).
- . 1982. *Democracy, Equality, and Change*. Darby (PA): Norwood.
- . 1991. *Kibbutz*. Haifa: Kibbutz Research Institute (Mimeo).
- . 1992. "Kibbutz work." In *The Kibbutz Society - Change and Continuity*, unit 3. Tel Aviv: The Open University (Hb.).
- . 1993. "Organizations Between Community and Market: The Case of the Kibbutz." *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 14: 369-97.
- , I. Ben-David, A. Avnat, N. Cohen and U. Leviatan. 1978. *The Second Generation: Continuity and Change in the Kibbutz*. Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim (Hb.).
- , U. Leviatan, M. Palgi and R. Shapira. 1980. *Self-Management and Hired Labor in the Kibbutz Industry*. Tel Aviv: Kibbutz Industry Association (Hb.).
- , and Shlomo Getz. 1996. *The Kibbutz in the Era of Changes*. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad (Hb.).
- Roy, Donald. 1952. "Quota Restriction and Goldbricking in a Machine Shop." *American*

- Journal of Sociology* 57: 427-42.
- Russell, Raymond. 1995. *Utopia in Zion*. Albany (NY): SUNY Press.
- , and Veljko Rus (eds.) 1991. *International Handbook of Participation in Organizations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sabar, Naama. 1996. *Kibbutz L.A.* Tel Aviv: Am Oved (Hb.).
- Sack, Yaakov. 1996. *Idea and Money – Spirit and Material*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- Sako, Mary. 1992. *Price, Quality and Trust*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sanders, Sol. 1989. *Mexico: Chaos on Our Doorstep*. New York: Madison.
- Sasson-Levy, Orna. 1995. *Radical Rhetoric, Conformist Practice: Theory and Praxis in an Israeli Protest Movement*. Jerusalem: The Shane Center, Hebrew University (Hb.).
- Satt, Ehud, and Haim Ginzburg. 1992. "On the Dynamic Effects of Using Hired Labor in the Kibbutz - Theory and Case Study." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 16: 688-700.
- Saxenian, AnnaLee. 1994. *Regional Advantage*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
- Scharfstein, Ben-Ami. 1995. *Amoral Politics*. Albany (NY): SUNY Press.
- Schwartz, Moshe, and Reuven Naor. 2000. *Without Breaking the Tools*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- Schwartz, Richard D. 1955. "Functional Alternatives to Inequality." *American Sociological Review* 20: 424-30.
- Segal, David R. 1981. "Leadership and Management: Organizations Theory." In *Military Leadership*, eds. James H. Buck and L.J. Korb. Beverly Hills (CA): Sage.
- Segev, Tom. 1984. *1949 - The First Israelis*. Jerusalem: Domino (Hb.).
- Seligman, Adam B. 1997. *The Problem of Trust*. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.
- Selznick, Phillip. 1949. *TVA and the Grass Roots*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Semler, Ricardo. 1993. *Maverick*. New York: Warner.
- Semyonov, Moshe, and Vered Kraus. 1982. "The Social Hierarchies of Communities and Neighborhoods." *Social Science Quarterly* 63: 780-9.
- Sen, Asim. 2003. *Democratic Management*. Lanham (MD): University Press of America.
- Sergiovanni, Thomas J. 1992. *Moral Leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Shalem, Eldad. 2000. *Public Funding of Collective Organizations*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin (Hb.).
- Shapira, Anita. 2004. *Yig'al Allon: Spring of His Life*. Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad (Hb.).
- Shapira, Reuven. 1974. *Avraham Shlonski: From a Rebel to Mapam Member*. Seminar paper, Sociology and Anthropology Dept., Tel Aviv University (Hb.).
- . 1977. *Shiftwork in Kibbutz Industry*. Tel Aviv: KA Industrial Department (Hb.).
- . 1978. *The Dynamics of the Employment of Kibbutz Members in a Regional Inter-Kibbutz Factory*. MA Thesis, Sociology and Anthropology Dept., Tel Aviv University (Hb.).
- . 1978/9. "Autonomy of Technostructure: An Inter-Kibbutz Regional Organization Case Study." *The Kibbutz* 6/7: 276-303 (Hb.).

- , 1979a. *Women Member Employment in the Kibbutz Industry*. Tel Aviv: Kibbutz Industry Association (Hb.).
- , 1979b. "A Cancer Called Company Car." *Bakibbutz*, April 17 (Hb.).
- , 1980. *The Absorption of Academicians in Kibbutz Plants*. Tel Aviv: Kibbutz Industry Association (Hb.).
- , 1986. "The Inter-Kibbutz Regional Enterprises: The Double Disappointment." *Rev'on Lekalkala* 32(130): 772-7 (Hb.).
- , 1987. *Anatomy of Mismanagement*. Tel-Aviv: Am-Oved (Hb.).
- , 1990. "Automatic Rotation and Organizational Conservatism in a Kibbutz." *Megamot* 32/4: 522-536 (Hb.).
- , 1992. "Non-Leadership in Israel: The Paradox of *Rotatzia*, Fast Promotion and 'Parachuting'." *International Problems, Society and State* 31: 56-77 (Hb.).
- , 1995a. "The Voluntary Resignation of Outsider Managers: Interkibbutz Rotation and Michels's 'Iron Law'." *Israel Social Science Research* 10/1: 59-84.
- , 1995b. "'Fresh Blood' Innovation and the Dilemma of Personal Involvement." *Creativity and Innovation Management* 4/2: 86-99.
- , 2001. "Communal Decline: The Vanishing of High-Moral Leaders and the Decay of Democratic, High-Trust Kibbutz Cultures." *Sociological Inquiry* 71/1: 13-38.
- , 2005. "Academic Capital or Scientific Progress? A Critique of Studies of Kibbutz Stratification." *Journal of Anthropological Research* 61/3: 357-80.
- Shapira, Yonatan. 1984. *An Elite Without Successors*. Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim (Hb.).
- , 1993. "The Historical Sources of Israeli Democracy: Mapay as a Dominant Party." In *The Israeli Society: Critical Aspects*, ed. Uri Ram. Tel Aviv: Brerot (Hb.).
- Shatil, Yosef. 1977. *Hazorea – the First Ten Years*. Kibbutz Hazorea: Hazorea publishing (Hb.).
- Shavit, Moshe. 1985. "Thoughts On the Issue of the Historical Leadership - and Afterwards." *Hedim* No. 122: 54-61 (Hb.).
- Shavit, Yosef. 1980. "Alone at the Top." *Yedi'ot Achronot*, July 11 (Hb.).
- Sheaffer, Zacharry, and Amir Helman. 1994. *Brain Drain: The Israeli Kibbutz Experience*. Haifa: Kibbutz Research Institute (Mimeo).
- Shem-Tov, Victor. 1997. *One of Them*. Kibbutz Dalia: Maarechet (Hb.).
- Shepher, Israel. 1980. "The Boundaries of Kibbutz." In *A Composite Portrait of Israel*, ed. Emanuel Marx. London: Academic.
- , 1983. *The Kibbutz: An Anthropological Study*. Norwood, (PA): Norwood Editions.
- , and Reuven Shapira. 1992. "Individual and Community in the Kibbutz." In *The Kibbutz Society - Change and Continuity*, unit 9. Tel Aviv: The Open University (Hb.).
- Shepher, Yosef. 1964. "Public Activity Outside Home [kibbutz]." *Niv Hakvutza* 15: 39-59 (Hb.).
- , 1967. *The Reflection of Children Boarding Systems in the Social Structure of the Kibbutz*. Tel Aviv: Ichud Hakibbutzim Vehakvutzot (Mimeo. Hb.).
- , 1975. "Kibbutz Sodom and Gomorra." *Social Research Quarterly* 9-10: 383-8 (Hb.).
- , and Sylvie Fogel-Bijaoui. "The Family in the Kibbutz". In *The Kibbutz Society* -

- Change and Continuity*, unit 6. Tel Aviv: The Open University, 1992 (Hb.).
- Shimony, Uzi. 1983. *Patterns of Kibbutz Industrialization*. Ph.D. Thesis, Hebrew University, Jerusalem (Hb.).
- Shitrit, Sami S. 2004. *The Oriental Jews Struggle in Israel*. Tel Aviv: Am Oved (Hb.).
- Shortell, Stephen M., E.M. Morrison and B. Friedman. 1992. *Strategic Choices for America's Hospitals*. San Francisco: Jossey Bass.
- Shtanger, Shlomo. 1971. *Kibbutz Industry Annual Report*. Tel Aviv: Kibbutz Industry Association (Hb.).
- Shteinberg, Dov. 1974. *Letter to the Board of the Agricultural Center*, November 24; *Letter to Movement Heads*, December 12. Tel Aviv: Organization of Field Workers (Hb.).
- Shur, Shimon. 1977. "Decision-Making in the Sphere of Higher Education: The Case of the Kibbutz." *The Kibbutz* 5: 129-56 (Hb.).
- . 1987. "The Study of Distributive Justice in Communal Micro Societies: The Lesson of the Kibbutz." In *Communal life*, eds. Yosef Gorni et al. New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction.
- Shure, Chaim. 1997. "The Mistakes of a Great Leader." *Haaretz*, April 10 (Hb.).
- . 2001. *I Bring Him Down From Heaven*. Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense Publishing (Hb.).
- Sieff, Marcus. 1988. *Memories of a President: Marx & Spencer*. Jerusalem: Keter (Hb.).
- Simons, Tal, and Paul Ingram. 1997. "Organization and Ideology: Kibbutzim and Hired Labor, 1951-1965." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 42: 784-813.
- Simon, Herbert. 1957. *Administrative Behavior*. New York: Free Press.
- . 1992. *Economics, Bounded Rationality and the Cognitive Revolution*. Aldershot (UK): Edward Elgar.
- Simons, Tony. 2002. "Behavioral Integrity: The Perceived Alignment Between Managers Words and Deeds as a Research Focus." *Organization Science* 13/1: 18-35.
- Sitkin, Sim B., and Darryl Stickel. 1996. "The Road to Hell: The Dynamics of Distrust in an Era of Quality." In *Trust in Organizations*, eds. Roderick M. Kramer and T.R. Tyler. Thousands Oaks (CA): Sage.
- Smith, Peter H. 1986. "Leadership and Change, Intellectuals and Technocrats in Mexico." In *Mexico Political Stability*, ed. Robert A. Camp. Boulder (CO): Westview.
- Snow, David A., and Robert D. Benford. 1988. "Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participation Mobilization." *International Social Movement Research* 1: 197-217.
- Sobel, Lester A. (Ed.). 1975. *Presidential Succession*. New York: Facts on File.
- Solomon, Robert C. 1993. *Ethics and Excellence*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Soros, George. 1998. *The Crisis of Global Capitalism*. New York: PublicAffairs.
- Spilerman, Saymour, and Jack Habib. 1976. "Development Towns in Israel: The Role of Community in Creating Ethnic Disparities in Labor Force Characteristics." *American Journal of Sociology* 81: 781-812.
- Spiro, Melford E. 1955. *Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 1983. "Introduction: Thirty Years of Kibbutz Research." In *The Sociology of Kibbutz*, ed. Erenst Krausz. New Brunswick (NJ): Transaction.

- Staber, Udo. 1989. "Age-Dependence and Historical Effects on the Failure Rate of Worker Cooperatives." *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 10/1: 59-80.
- Statistical (Unsigned). 1999. Jerusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics (Hb.).
- Stein, Howard F. 2001. *Nothing Personal, Just Business*. Westport (CN): Quorum.
- Stern, Robert N., and Stephan R. Barley 1996. "Organizations and Social Systems: Organization Theory Neglected Mandate." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 41: 146-62.
- Stepan-Norris, Judith. 1997. "The Making of Union Democracy." *Social Forces* 76/2: 475-510.
- Stryjan, Yohanan. 1989. *Impossible Organizations*. New York: Greenwood.
- Suttles, Gerald D. 1970. "Friendship as a Social Institution." In *Social Relationships*, eds. George J. McCall et al. Chicago: Aldine.
- Swidler, Ann. 1995. "Cultural Power and Social Movements." In *Social Movements and Culture*, eds. Hank Johnston and B. Klandermans. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- . 2001. *Talk of Love*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Swingle, Paul G. 1976. *The Management of Power*. Hillsdale (NJ): Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Talmi, Meir. 1993. *Mishmar Ha'emek in the Eighties*. Givat Haviva: Yad Yaari (Hb.).
- Talmon, Shlomo. 1990. *The Way it Was, Merchavia 1931-1989*. Tel Aviv: Author's publishing (Hb.).
- Talmon, Yonina. 1972. *Family and Community in the Kibbutz*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
- Terry, Robert W. 1993. *Authentic Leadership*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Teveth, Shabtay. 1980. *David's Jealousy*. Jerusalem: Schocken (Hb.).
- The Kibbutz* (Unsigned). 1997. "Netzer Sireny Metal to Hatakhuf." March 20 (Hb.).
- Thomas, Robert J. 1994. *What Machines Can't Do: Politics and Technology in the Industrial Enterprise*. Berkeley (CA): University of California Press.
- Tidhar, David. 1947-1965. *Encyclopedia of Yishuv's Pioneers* (13 Vols.). Tel Aviv: Rishonim.
- Topel, Menachem. 1979. *To Build and Be Built: Power Elite in an Egalitarian Community*. M.A. Thesis, Sociology and Anthropology Dept., Tel Aviv University (Hb.).
- . 1990. "On Leadership and Organizational Structure in Kibbutz." Paper read at the Conference of Communes and Kibbutz Researchers, Emek Hayarden College, October 15.
- . 1992. "Kibbutz Organization." In *The Kibbutz Society - Change and Continuity*, unit 2. Tel Aviv: The Open University (Hb.).
- Triandis, Harry C. 1989. "Cross-Cultural Studies of Individualism and Collectivism." *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation* 37: 41-133.
- Tucker, Ricahard H. 1970. "The Theory of Charismatic Leadership." In *Philosophers and Kings*, ed. Dankwart A. Rustow. New York: Braziller.
- Turnbull, Collin M. 1972. *The Mountain People*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Turner, Ralph H. 1983. "Figure and Ground in the Analysis of Social Movements." *Symbolic Interaction* 6: 175-81.

- Tyler, Tom R., and Peter DeGoey. 1996. "Trust in Organizational Authorities: The Influence of Motive Attributions on the Willingness to Accept Decisions." In *Trust in Organizations*, eds. Roderick M. Kramer and T.R. Tyler. Thousand Oaks (CA): Sage.
- Tzachor, Ze'ev. 1997. *Hazan - A Life Movement*. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi (Hb.).
- Tzimchi, No'a (Ed.). 1999. *Dan Tzimchi*. Kibbutz Dalia: Maarechet (Hb.).
- Tzur, Eli (Ed.) 2000. "[They] Can't Do Without Us." Givat Haviva: Yad Yaari (Hb.).
- Tzur, Wili 1996. *The Loss That was Found*. Kibbutz Dalia: Maarechet (Hb.).
- Tzur, Yehuda. 1980. "The Car is a Status Symbol." *Hadaf Hayarok*, November 19 (Hb.).
- . 1992. "The Amigo, Don Fiddle." *Al Hamishmar*, April 9 (Hb.).
- Tzur, Ze'ev. 1981. *From the Archives*. Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin, KM Archives (Hb.).
- Vald, Emanuel. 1987. *The Curse of the Broken Tools*. Jerusalem: Schocken (Hb.).
- Vallier, Ivan. 1962. "Structural Differentiation, Production Imperatives, and Communal Norms: The Kibbutz Crisis." *Social Forces* 40/2: 234-42.
- Van den Berge, P.L., and Karl Peter. 1988. "Hutterites and Kibbutzniks: A Tale of Nepotistic Communism." *Man* (N.S.) 23: 522-39.
- Van Maanen, John. 1995. *Representation in Ethnography*. Thousand Oaks (CA): Sage.
- Van Wolferen, Karel. 1989. *The Enigma of Japanese Power*. New York: Random House.
- Vancil, Richard F. 1987. *Passing the Baton*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.
- Vaughan, Diane. 1996. *The Challenger Launch Decision*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Veblen, Thorstein. 1931. *The Theory of the Leisure Class*. New York: Viking.
- Vilan, Yaakov. 1993. *On the Way to Negba*. Tel Aviv: Ofir (Hb.).
- Vogel, Ezra F. 1979. *Japan as Number One*. Cambridge (MA): Harvard University Press.
- Wacquant, Loic J.D. 1989. "Toward a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu." *Sociological Theory* 7: 26-63.
- Wagner, Cynthia. 1995. "Would You Want Machiavelli as Your CEO? Implications of Autocratic versus Empowering Leadership Styles to Innovation." *Creativity and Innovation Management* 4: 120-7.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2004. *The Uncertainties of Knowledge*. Philadelphia: Temple University.
- Warhurst, Christopher. 1996. "High Society in a Workers' Society: Work, Community and Kibbutz." *Sociology* 30: 1-19.
- . 1998. "Recognizing the Possible: The Organization and Control of a Socialist Labor Process." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 43: 470-98.
- Watt, John R. 1972. *The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Webb, Janette, and David Cleary. 1994. *Organizational Change and the Management of Expertise*. London: Routledge.
- Weber, Max. 1946. *Essays in Sociology*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- . 1947. *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*. New York: Free Press.
- Westphal, James D., R. Gulati and S.M. Shortell. 1997. "Customization or Conformity? An Institutional and Network Perspective on the Content and Consequences of TQM Adoption." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 42: 366-94.
- White, Michael C., M. Smith, and T. Barnett. 1997. "CEO Succession: Overcoming

- Forces of Inertia." *Human Relations* 50/7: 805-28.
- Whyte, William F. 1992. *Social Theory for Action*. Newbury Park (CA): Sage.
- , and Kathleen K. Whyte. 1988. *Making Mondragon*. Ithaca (NY): ILR Press.
- Willner, Dorothy. 1969. *Nation-Building and Community in Israel*. Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press.
- Wolf, Eric R. 1999. *Envisioning Power*. Berkeley (CA): University of California Press.
- Woolcock, Michael. 1998. "Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework." *Theory and Society* 27: 151-208.
- Yaar, Ephraim, E. Ben-Rafael and Z. Soker. 1994. "The Kibbutz and the Israeli Society." In *The Kibbutz Society - Change and Continuity*, unit 11. Tel Aviv: The Open University (Hb.).
- Yadlin, Aharon. 1988. "Milu'ot's Lessons." *Kibbutz*, August 3 (Hb.).
- . 1989. "The Budget of the Movement for 1989." *Kibbutz*, January 4 (Hb.).
- Yahel, Ronit 1991. "Oh Kinneret, Owned by Whom?" *Hadaf Hayarok*, December 24 (Hb.).
- . 1995. "Remained Stuck in the Services." *The Kibbutz*, June 15 (Hb.).
- Yanai, Nathan. 1981. *Party Leadership in Israel*. Ramat Gan, Israel: Turtledove.
- Yankelovich, Daniel. 1991. *Coming to Public Judgement*. Syracuse (NY): Syracuse University Press.
- Zamir, Dani. 1979. *Social and Structural Phenomena of Hired-Labor in the Kibbutz Industry*. Tel Aviv: Kibbutz Industry Association (Hb.).
- . 1996. *Economic Success and Coping with Crisis: The Contribution of Organizational Culture*. Haifa: Kibbutz Research Institute (Hb.).
- Zand, Dale E. 1972. "Trust and Managerial Problem Solving." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17: 229-39.
- . 1997. *The Leadership Triad*. New York: Oxford.
- Zait, David. 1993. *Pioneers in the Maze of Politics*. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvi (Hb.).
- . 2005. *The Dreamer and Realizer*. Givat Haviva: Yad Yaari (Hb.).
- Zertal, Moshe. 1980. *Spring of Youth*. Tel Aviv: Sifriat Poalim (Hb.).

NAME INDEX

- Abramovitz, S. 45, 88, 92, 131.
Acton, Lord 14, 125, 212.
Adar, B. 58, 106, 122, 197.
Adar, G. 41.
Adler, P.S. 12, 25.
Aharoni, A. 7, 56, 64, 68, 69.
Alexander, E. 189.
Allon, Yig'al, KM's radical leader 164, 169, 171-5, 213, 340.
Altman, M. 33, 340.
Am'ad, Z. 10, 34, 115, 192, 214, 311.
Amir et al. 299-301.
Amir, E. 178.
Ansell, C.K. 173, 333.
After, Yaakov, Mashbir Merkazi's head 67-8, 87, 112.
Arad, N. 67, 85.
Argaman, D. 6, 10, 15, 64, 71, 82, 84, 103, 135.
Arieli, E. 46, 58, 85, 87.
Aristophanes, Athens playwright 9, 214.
Armoni, O. 56.
Arnon, O. 79.
Atar, A. 58, 104, 122, 197.
Avidan, Shimon, KA's radical leader 175-6, 213, 340.
Avneri, A.L. 106, 152.
Avraham, Carmelit's veteran leader 210, 245, 248-52, 260, 264, 283.
Avrahami, E. 41, 45-8.
Ayalon, H. 292.
Axelrod, R. 8, 35, 145, 213, 319.
- B**
Badaracco, J.L. 139, 194.
Baer-Lambach, R. 24, 35, 74.
Banay, A. 95.
Banfield, E.D. 11-2, 32, 95, 110, 139.
Bar-El, L. 136.
Bar-Gal, Y. 225.
Bar-Sinay, B. 264.
Barak, Carmelit's patron 243-53, 260, 314.
Barak, M. 124.
Baratz, Yosef, Hever Hakvutzot leader 58, 112.
Barbuto, J.E., Jr. 15, 102, 135-7.
Barkai, Y. 85.
Barkai, H. 3, 24, 39, 158.
Barker, R.L. 138-9, 328.
Barley, S.R. 32, 52.
Barnard, C.I. 42.
Bashan, A. 5, 42, 78, 82, 87.
Bass, B.M. 135.
Bate, P.S. 17-8, 142.
Beilin, Y. 7, 43, 56-7, 68-70, 77, 133.
Ben-Aharon, Yitzhak, Tabenkin's deputy 58, 67, 150, 154-6, 163, 167.
Ben-Avram, B. 87, 112, 136, 158.
Ben-David, I. 31, 92.
Ben-Hilel, S. 46, 86.
Ben-Horin, T. 160, 179, 228, 193, 297.
Ben-Gurion, David, Prime Minister 68, 87, 154-6, 163-4, 167, 169, 341.
Ben-Rafael, E. 1, 15, 26, 43, 48, 55, 57, 63.
Bennis, W. 153, 287, 312.
Bentov, Mordechai, KA's Cabinet Minister 59, 64, 157, 178, 180.
Berger, B. 20.
Berger, P.L. 68.
Berl (Katzenelson), 155-61.
Bettelheim, B. 37.
Beyer, J.M. 15, 135.
Bien, Y. 5, 41.
Bierly III, P.E. 23.
Bigley, G.A. 12, 32.
Bijaoui, S.F. 162, 181.
Bilski, Kochav's veteran patron 113, 259, 264, 271, 278, 297, 307.
Binenfeld, D. 42.
Bird-David, N. 52, 119.
Blalock, Jr., H.M. 32.
Blasi, J.R. 1, 55, 57, 61, 88, 120.

- Blau, P.M. 75, 271.
 Bloch, Z. 240.
 Bloomfield-Ramagem, S. 185, 225.
 Bobbio, N. 128, 255.
 Bott, E. 269.
 Bourdieu, P. 1, 19-22, 35, 51-3, 55, 60-5, 103, 119, 143-4, 205, 268, 317.
 Bowes, A.M. 37.
 Bowra, C.M. 9, 256.
 Bradach, J.L. 33.
 Brichta, A. 336.
 Brockner, J.P. 140.
 Br"t, Y. 29, 72, 75.
 Brum, A. 3, 6, 40, 44-5, 58, 69-71, 76, 81, 95, 101.
 Brumann, C. 4, 11, 21-5, 44, 53, 326.
 Bryman, A. 5, 52.
 Buber, M. 1, 4-5, 23, 52, 60, 117, 124, 232, 317-8, 327.
 Burawoy, M. 86, 140.
 Burn, A.R. 9, 145.
 Burns, J.M. 11, 135.
 Burns, T. 23, 41, 109, 269, 280.
- Campbell, R.J. 142, 331-2.
 Cannella, A.A. 14, 331.
 Cappelli, P. 19, 23.
 Carmel, A. 152, 175.
 Caspi, D. 262.
 Chatman, J. 317.
 Chang, C.L. 9, 101, 145-6.
 Chizik, M. 85-6.
 Chow, Y.T. 9, 101, 109, 145-6.
 Chung, K.H. 14, 331.
 Clark, R. 331, 337.
 Cloke, K. 6, 12, 17, 98, 340.
 Cohen, A. 3, 4, 51.
 Cohen, E. 83, 229, 280.
 Cohen, M. 56, 64, 68, 169, 171-2, 213.
 Cohen, N. 6, 60, 192, 194, 296.
 Cohen, R. 6, 26, 94, 204.
 Collins, R. 15, 60, 63, 93.
 Comaroff, J. 52.
 Cook, K.S. 12, 33.
- Crozier, M. 13, 41, 87, 99, 272.
 Czarniawska-Joerges, B. 17.
- D**agan, S. 64, 68-9, 175.
 Dahrendorf, R. 255.
 Dalton, M. 11, 13, 28, 95, 97, 99-100, 109, 111, 142, 200, 212, 215, 272.
 Dangoor, E. 109, 115-6.
 Daniel, A. 30, 35, 47, 177.
 Darr, A. 6, 30.
 Davis, G.F. 88, 109, 334.
 Davis, H.E. 9, 145-6, 256.
 DePree, M. 11, 23, 135, 139, 312.
 Deutsch, M. 25, 32, 98, 100, 138-41, 168, 203, 269, 273.
 Dierkes, M. 12.
 DiMaggio, P.J. 20, 23, 140.
 Dloomi, E. 5.
 Dodgson, M. 34, 329.
 Don, Y. 24, 39, 225.
 Dore, R. 5, 13, 25, 28, 32-3, 41, 48, 95, 138, 142-3, 168, 205, 255, 265, 269, 333, 337.
 Downs, A. 95, 98, 142, 188.
 Downton, J.V. Jr. 11, 20-1.
 Drin-Drabkin, H. 24.
 Dror, Benyamin, Beit Alfa leader 61.
 Dror, L. 69, 71.
 Dror, T. 171.
 Drucker, P.F. 139.
 Drury, A. 145.
 Dvorkind, D. 64, 201, 266.
 Edgerton, R.B. 98, 141, 168.
 Einat, Y. 10, 58, 88.
 Emerson, J. 262.
 Erickson, E.H. 38.
 Eshkol, Levi, Hever Hakvutzot's leader and Prime Minister 58-9, 63, 112, 342.
 Estrin, S. 16.
 Etzioni-Halevy, E. 164.
 Evens, T.M.S. 61.
- F**adida, M. 1, 6, 50, 55, 57, 63, 76, 84,

- 94, 103, 109, 113-4, 124, 149, 186,
223, 229, 233, 236, 296.
- Feenberg, A. 13, 15.
- Fishman, A. 28.
- Fogel- Bijaoui, S. 162.
- Folsom, K.E. 9, 101, 145-6.
- Fox, A. 5, 8, 28, 32, 35, 38, 98, 105-6,
139-41, 252, 269, 271, 273, 304,
336.
- Frank, R.H. 65.
- Freeman, J. 29, 53, 109, 325.
- Fridman, U., Milu'ot's head 46, 85-9,
92, 97, 112, 143, 204.
- Friedman, V. 193.
- Fuks, A. 9, 145, 256.
- Fukuyama, F. 5, 12, 32, 138, 142, 255,
329, 331.
- G**abarro, J.J. 9, 95, 140-2, 331.
- Gabriel, R.A. 9, 145.
- Galbraith, J.K. 88-9, 113.
- Galili, Israel, Tabenkin's protégé 164,
171-2.
- Gambetta, D. 12, 33, 140.
- Gamson, W.A. 20-1.
- Gamson, Z.F. 40, 250, 263, 283.
- Gelbard, R. 266.
- Geertz, C. 19, 287.
- Gelb, S. 4, 45, 56, 58, 64, 73, 81-4, 88,
96, 182.
- Geneen, H. 11, 32, 98, 138, 277, 287.
- Gherardi, S. 4, 53, 183.
- Gilboa, N. 47, 56, 183.
- Ginat, A. 58, 85-8, 122, 197.
- Gini, A. 138.
- Giuliani, R.W. 11, 135, 140, 195, 209,
277.
- Goldenberg, M. 67, 151.
- Goldschmidt, W.R. 52, 93, 120, 297,
321.
- Goldstein, Y. 23, 63, 58, 72, 136, 158.
- Goleman, D.R. 135, 176, 282, 287.
- Goode, W.J. 335.
- Gorkin, M. 37, 67, 241.
- Gorni, Y. 20.
- Gouldner, A.W. 13-4, 33, 35, 86, 95,
99-100, 141-2, 286, 329-31.
- Govier, T. 12, 33, 140.
- Graham, J.W. 11, 16, 135, 139, 312.
- Gramsci, A. 52, 152.
- Granovetter, M. 94, 140.
- Greenleaf, R.K. 11, 16, 139.
- Grinberg, L.L. 67-8, 83.
- Grint, K. 138.
- Grosman, Avishay, veteran *pa'il* 124.
- Guest, R.H. 9, 11, 25, 32-3, 41, 98,
135, 143, 269, 285, 319.
- Gur, Shlomo, "Stokade and Tower"
inventor 152.
- Gur-Gurvitch, B. 168.
- Gurevitch, M. 37.
- Gvirtz, Y. 56, 58, 64, 71-2, 82, 87, 109,
150-1, 156, 163-5, 174, 196, 210.
- H**acohen, D. 177, 375.
- Hacohen, Eli'ezer, Beit Alfa leader 61.
- Halevi, R. 40-1, 58, 67, 85, 87, 92, 146.
- Halperin, A. 5.
- Hambrick, D.C. 14, 21, 102, 136-7,
160, 333.
- Hammersley, M. 17, 52, 142.
- Handelman, D. 262.
- Handy, C. 326.
- Harrar, G. 33.
- Harris, M. 14, 21, 35, 52.
- Hart, P. 33.
- Harpazi, S. 58, 85, 104, 143.
- Harvey-Jones, J. 12, 32, 41, 98, 138.
- Hawthorn, G. 19, 91, 125.
- Hazan, Yaakov, KA's Admor 7, 56,
63-4, 67, 69, 72, 78, 86, 90-1, 120,
125, 127, 131, 134, 150-1, 154, 157,
159, 161-8, 170, 172-6, 178, 213-4,
237, 327.
- Heidenheimer, A.J. 10, 215.
- Heller, F. 6, 340.
- Helman, A. 7, 10, 41, 58, 93, 106.
- Henderson, W.D. 9, 145.

- Hickson, D.J. 70.
Hirschman, A.O. 4, 6, 9, 11, 14, 17, 24, 29, 52, 60, 101, 104, 112, 125, 134, 160, 191, 206, 212, 216, 226, 232, 236, 240, 257, 264, 270, 282, 290, 315, 319, 332, 339.
Holzach, M. 24, 35.
Hosmer, L.T. 12, 32, 137, 139, 143, 166, 188, 191, 212, 268, 273, 320.
Hughes, E.C. 95, 100, 141-2, 146, 163, 168, 212.
Huysman, M. 65, 329.
- Iacocca, L. 205.
Ilana & Avner. 58, 106, 122.
Ingram, P. 4, 5.
Israel, B. 171.
Israel, Kochav's patron 113, 258-9, 262-6, 270-1, 278, 286, 288, 290, 307-8.
Izhar, U. 135, 157, 213.
- Jackall, R. 11, 142, 146, 200, 215.
Jackson, K.T. 139.
James, A. 17.
Jaques, E. 8, 28, 213, 286-7, 319, 340.
Jay, A. 6, 11, 13, 25, 32, 35, 41, 95, 99, 109, 138, 142, 146, 212, 246, 297, 330.
Joas, H. 19, 283, 291, 294.
Jones, M.O. 140.
- Kafkafi, E. 7, 10, 43, 56-8, 63, 68-71, 87, 112, 136, 152-6, 159, 161-5, 173, 228.
Kanari, B. 56, 68, 70, 73, 75-6, 87, 151-3, 156, 158-9, 180, 213.
Kane, J. 139.
Kanter, R.M. 20, 44, 88, 101, 218, 289.
Kasmir, S. 338.
Katzir, H. 160.
Kedem, A. 48, 131.
Kedem-Hadad, N. 179.
Keene, A.S. 40.
- Kendrick, J.R. 20-1.
Kerem, M. 41, 47.
Keshet, S. 56, 161.
Kets De Vries, M.F.R. 12, 14, 99, 188-9, 194, 212, 289, 303.
Khurana, R. 331, 333.
Kinkade, K. 75, 218, 279.
Kipnis, D. 141, 329.
Knaani, D. 2, 20, 27-30, 69, 75, 177, 273, 306.
Kochan, R. 193.
Korczynski, M. 12, 32.
Kornai, Janos, economist 43.
Kostova, T. 65.
Kouzes, J.M. 11, 139, 141.
Kovner, R. 256.
Kramer, R.M. 12, 39, 99, 138, 141, 191, 329.
Kressel, G.M. 1, 5, 17, 27, 31-2, 40-1, 50, 55, 57, 63, 71, 75, 78, 83, 89, 92, 105-6, 110, 115-6, 120, 122, 149, 181, 187, 191-2, 195, 197, 217-8, 222-3, 227, 235, 239, 248, 278, 296-7, 307, 326.
Krol, Y. 5, 46.
Kuhn, T. 63.
Kynan, O. 7, 43, 57, 69, 75, 177-80, 185.
Lafferty, W.M. 6.
Landshut, S. 1, 6, 20, 23, 44, 52, 55, 60, 67, 156, 158, 228, 240, 270, 297, 317.
Landesman, Itzhak, Tnuva's head 85-7, 112, 146, 198, 221.
Lane, C. 138.
Lanir, Y. 48, 93, 110.
Latimore, J. 25, 330.
Lavon, Pinhas, Hever Hakvutzot leader 57-8, 63, 67, 112.
Lazar, Y. 5, 131.
Lenski, G. 8, 14, 59, 76, 89, 119, 223.
Leshem, E. 6-8, 115.
Leshem, S. 47.
Levanon-Morduch, E. 111.

- Levenson, B. 95, 97, 142.
 Levy, Y. 103, 109.
 Leviatan, U. 5, 6, 10, 29, 35, 40-2, 49-50, 58, 88, 91, 104, 115, 188, 222.
 Lewicki, R.J. 33, 138, 141.
 Lewin, E. 46.
 Lewin, K. 1, 37.
 Liberman, Y. 41-2.
 Liblich, A. 164, 257, 261, 264.
 Lifshitz, O. 40-1, 45-7, 58, 80-1, 85-8, 104, 121, 127, 143, 198.
 Lin, Baruch, KA's Histadrut executive 64, 125.
 Linstead, S.R. 17, 52, 140.
 Linz, J.J. 9, 146, 256.
 Lipset, S.M. 337.
 Livenshtein, Eliezer, past KM leader 156, 212.
 Luthans, F. 28, 94, 99, 101, 142, 331, 340.
 Luz, Kadish, Hever Hakvutzot leader 58, 112.
 Lynn, J. 142, 146.
- M**
 Maccoby, M. 11, 88, 94, 99, 101, 142, 200, 215, 218.
 Machiavelli, N. 6-7, 29, 31, 87, 113, 153-4, 157, 176, 245-6, 253, 321-4, 337.
 Mainwaring, S. 9, 145-6, 256.
 Maister, D.H. 12.
 Malchi, M. 40, 58, 76, 95.
 Maletz, D. 73, 144, 280, 295-6, 327.
 Maman, D. 95.
 Manor, H. 146.
 Manor, G. 56.
 March, J.G. 188.
 Maron, S. 3, 24, 42, 47.
 Martin, J. 17, 142.
 Martin, N.H. 97, 142, 289.
 Marx, E. 1, 5, 51-2, 60, 64, 142.
 Mati, Olim's patron 112, 224-31, 286.
 McCall, M.W. 287.
 McEvily, B. 33.
- McGill, M.E. 132.
 McGregor, D. 32.
 Mechanic, D. 86, 97.
 Meged, H. 7, 10, 58, 84, 87.
 Me'ir, Golda, Prime Minister 171.
 Melman, S. 331.
 Melucci, A. 20.
 Merton, R.K. 291.
 Michels, R. 4, 6-7, 11, 13, 21, 59-60, 89, 109, 172, 212, 246, 327, 337-8.
 Miller, G.J. 33.
 Misztal, B.A. 12, 33.
 Moav, cotton gin plant manager 131.
 Morrison, R. 6, 12, 23, 183, 306, 327, 337-8, 340.
 Moshe, Kochav's leader 259, 262-4, 271, 274, 278, 283, 307-8.
 Moti, Chen's chief economic officer 238-9, 256.
 Muller, J.Z. 139, 291.
- N**
 Near, H. 3, 16, 34-5, 56-8, 67, 71-7, 87, 112, 136, 152-8, 161-4, 169, 171, 177, 211, 234.
 Niv, A. 3, 5, 15, 21, 33, 37, 76, 81, 296, 299.
 Noteboom, B. 12.
 Noy, D. 40, 250, 263, 283.
- O**
 Ofaz, A. 136.
 Ofer, D. 152.
 Oplatka, I. 9, 28, 144, 272, 312.
 Ostrovsky, Gershon, past KM leader 156, 161, 212.
 O'Toole, J. 12, 135, 139, 312.
 Ouchi, W.G. 5, 12, 28, 32-3, 48, 138, 143, 255, 269, 331.
 Oved, Y. 2, 22, 24, 27, 29-30, 75, 253.
- P**
 Parkinson, C.N. 13, 89, 120, 127, 191, 248.
 Pavin, A. 1, 5, 41, 55, 181-2, 243.
 Pearlman, M. 31, 71, 98, 228.
 Pe'eri, I. 104, 106.

- Peleg, G. 46, 80.
 Peleg, S. 40.
 Pericles, Athens leader 10, 145, 215, 314.
 Perkins, K.B. 256.
 Perrow, C. 19.
 Peter, L.J. 13.
 Peters, T. 203.
 Petersburg, O. 46, 131.
 Pettigrew, A.M. 52, 193.
 Pinye, Kochav's *hashlama* leader 288-90, 297, 301, 309-11, 314.
 Pitzer, D.E. 2.
 Platt, J. 62.
 Porat, D. 56, 153.
 Powell, W.W. 20, 23, 25, 33-4, 138, 140, 279, 330.
 Preece, J. 12, 25.
 Presthus, R. 112, 143.
 Putnam, R.D. 12, 33, 65, 140.
- Rabin, A.I.** 37.
 Ram, U. 93.
 Ran, Kochav's radical leader 210, 276, 278, 281-5, 288, 301, 311, 313-4, 340..
 Ravid, S. 40.
 Rayman, P. 6, 15, 39, 55, 58, 61, 67, 83, 89, 109, 191, 296.
 Raz, A. 264.
 Raz, R. 58, 88.
 Reed, M.I. 12.
 Reiner, Ephraim, KA's radical leader 154, 163-4, 167, 173, 175, 253.
 Rifkin, G. 33.
 Riftin, Yaakov, KA's leftist leader 154, 163-4, 167, 173, 175, 253.
 Riker, W.H. 32.
 Ring, P.S.
 Ringel-Hofman, A. 58.
 Rohlen, T.P. 32, 138, 143, 255, 331.
 Ron, Y. 6-7.
 Rosenfeld, E. 1, 6, 55, 57, 60-3, 71.
 Rosenhak, D. 58, 64.
- Rosolio, D. 3, 5-7, 15, 39, 43-8, 51, 55, 57, 60-1, 68, 77, 81, 85, 109, 135, 224, 236, 240, 323.
 Rosner, M. 1, 5-6, 22-5, 30-1, 33-6, 39-40, 42, 55, 60, 67-8, 96, 138, 160, 177, 187, 192, 194, 234, 272-3, 296.
 Roy, D. 13, 269, 272.
 Russell, R. 4, 6, 23, 67.
- Sabar, N. 42, 68, 105, 306, 315.
 Sack, Y. 58, 71, 77, 79, 87, 159.
 Sagi, Carmelit's radical 210, 245, 248, 250, 252, 260, 264, 283, 293.
 Sako, M. 138, 255, 324.
 Sanders, S. 9, 146, 256.
 Sasson-Levy, O. 53, 110, 218, 240.
 Satt, E. 187.
 Saxenian, A. 25, 34, 138, 279, 329.
 Scharfstein, B-A. 11, 138, 215.
 Schwartz, M. 39, 109-10, 120, 185, 243, 251.
 Schwartz, R.D. 55, 57, 61.
 Segal, D.R. 9, 145, 218.
 Segev, T. 163.
 Seligman, A.B. 12, 33, 140.
 Selznick, P. 13.
 Semler, R. 4, 12, 23-4, 33, 41, 98, 138, 183, 330-1, 336.
 Semyonov, M. 181, 292.
 Sen, A. 6, 12, 340.
 Sergiovanni, T.J. 11, 135, 138-40.
 Shalem, E. 39, 44-8.
 Shapira, A. 171-2, 175.
 Shapira, R. 1, 3, 5-6, 11-5, 17, 20-33, 49, 64, 82, 92-7, 100-4, 111, 130, 151, 159, 166-8, 177, 182, 191, 194, 201, 259, 302, 317, 326.
 Shapira, Y. 67, 155, 164.
 Shatil, Y. 191, 228, 237, 262-4, 271, 274, 279.
 Shaul, Chen's patron 233-4, 238-9, 300, 310, 314.
 Shavit, M. 57, 69, 169.
 Shavit, cotton gin plant manager 98-

- 101, 111, 126, 131, 168, 174, 205, 215, 229.
- Shavit, Y. 106.
- Sheaffer, Z. 41, 106.
- Shem-Tov, V. 69, 77, 165, 168-9, 213.
- Shenhabi, Mordechai, KA's radical leader 158, 161, 174-5, 210, 213, 327, 340.
- Shepher, I. 1, 20, 22, 44, 58, 61-4, 203, 221, 296, 298, 302.
- Shepher, Y. 1, 31, 37, 55, 83, 92, 236.
- Shimony, U. 31, 35, 39, 223, 234-5.
- Shitrit, S.S. 341.
- Shlonski, Avraham, literary leader 80, 151.
- Shortell, S.M. 218.
- Shtanger, S. 95.
- Shteinberg, D. 78, 121.
- Shur, S. 1, 55, 61, 250, 283.
- Shure, H. 7, 11, 56, 77, 112, 161, 165, 169, 210, 213.
- Sieff, M. 32, 41.
- Simons, Tal 4-5.
- Simons, Tony 277.
- Simon, H. 51, 269.
- Sitkin, S.B. 142.
- Smith, P.H. 176.
- Snow, D.A. 176.
- Sobel, L.A. 90.
- Solomon, R.C. 139.
- Soros, G. 61.
- Spilerman, S. 181, 292.
- Spiro, M.E. 1-3, 21, 55, 61, 75, 84, 114.
- Staber, U. 16.
- Stalin, J.V. 27, 135, 152-7, 161-6, 173, 176, 312. See also: USSR.
- Stein, H.F. 33.
- Stern, R.N. 6, 142, 243.
- Stepan-Norris, J. 337.
- Stryjan, Y. 3-6, 12-3, 16-7, 19, 21-4, 30, 33, 49, 53, 91, 177, 205, 227, 252-3, 268, 279, 326-9.
- Suttles, G.D. 140.
- Swidler, A. 21, 144, 188.
- Tabenkin, Itzhak, KM's Admor 43, 56, 58, 63, 71, 87, 106, 131-6, 151-77, 180, 213, 228, 295, 327, 334.
- Talmi, M. 5.
- Talmon, S. 56, 61.
- Talmon, Y. 1, 6, 55, 227.
- Terry, R.W. 11, 139-41, 194.
- Teveth, S. 68.
- Thomas, cotton gin plant's technical manager 98-101, 120-1, 125-6, 129-31, 174, 182, 190, 216, 259, 218, 284-7, 332, 340.
- Thomas, R.J. 99, 130.
- Tidhar, D. 67-8.
- Tomer, Carmelit's radical leader 205, 244-7, 251, 259-61, 270, 293.
- Topel, M. 6, 10, 28, 50, 55, 57, 61, 63, 109-16, 121-2, 128, 145, 149, 186, 192, 195, 221-3, 227, 230-2, 236, 296, 321.
- Triandis, H.C. 317.
- Tucker, R.H. 102, 135.
- Turner, R.H. 20, 149.
- Tyler, T. 99, 140-1, 191, 287.
- Tzachor, Z. 3, 56, 64, 69-73, 76-8, 123, 150-4, 157-9, 161-170, 173, 213.
- Tzimchi, N. 58, 64, 78, 94.
- Tzur, E. 164.
- Tzur, W. 56, 61, 64, 76, 78.
- Tzur, Y. 58, 122, 146, 256.
- Tzur, Z. 68, 71, 161, 171.
- Vald, E. 9, 95, 106, 145, 171.
- Vallier, I. 55, 57.
- Van den Berge, P.L. 23.
- Van Maanen, J. 52, 142.
- Van Wolferen, K. 255-6.
- Vancil, R.F. 14, 86, 333-4.
- Vaughan, D. 19.
- Veblen, T. 119.
- Velasquez, F. 256.
- Verlinski, Nahum, Tnuva's head 68,

- 87, 112.
Vilan, Y. 7, 10, 56-9, 67, 77-8, 91, 96,
123-4, 165.
Vogel, E.F. 255.
- Wacquant, L.J.D. 21-2, 51, 62-3, 143,
268.
Wallerstein, I. 9, 17, 51.
Warhurst, C. 244, 251, 260.
Washington, George, first US president
90, 103, 214, 327, 314.
Watt, J.R. 9, 101, 145-6.
Webb, J. 33, 139, 218.
Weber, M. 59, 135.
Westphal, J.D. 140.
White, M.C. 331.
Whyte, W.F. 6, 12, 23-4, 35, 37, 53,
62, 141, 183, 287, 306, 327, 338.
Willner, D. 23, 39, 67.
Wolf, E.R. 161.
Woolcock, M. 65.
- Yaakov, cotton gin plant's deputy
manager 100-1, 120, 123, 125, 129,
192, 259, 340.
- Yaar, E. 3, 23, 55, 57, 63-4, 163-4,
181-3.
Yaari, Meir, KA's Admor 43, 56, 61,
63, 68-9, 86-7, 92, 106, 125, 127,
131-4, 136, 149-54, 157-61, 164-76,
213-4, 241, 327, 334.
Yadlin, A. 47, 58, 79, 121, 127, 131,
172.
Yahel, R. 41, 87.
Yanai, N. 58.
Yankelovich, D. 61, 191, 218, 265,
339.
- Zait, D. 153-4, 156-7, 163, 167, 174.
Zamir, D. 30-1, 35, 46, 177, 187, 194,
222.
Zamir, Eli, TKM's general secretary
46.
Zand, D.E. 25, 32, 95, 98, 138, 141,
168, 269.
Zelikovich, Mishkay Hamerkaz's head
84-6, 99-101, 111, 121, 131, 168,
229, 248.
Zertal, M. 153.

SUBJECT INDEX

- Admors** (prime leaders) conservative dysfunction 26, 69-71, 76, 101, 125, 136, 155-60, 162, 172-81, 282, 291, 326; assumed charisma 101, 136, 172-6, 340; criticized 133-5, 143, 174-6, 204, 213, 291; deputies of 59, 102, 112, 163, 167; detached 168-183, 212; initial high morality 136, 150-3; kibbutzim of 56, 73, 102, 159, 170-1; leftism 135, 152-5, 161-6, 172-4, 204, 322, 324; low-moral 27, 68, 101, 149, 154-83; patronage 91, 133, 166, 171-4; power 57, 64, 84, 86, 106, 112, 126-8, 134, 136, 159, 161-81, 324; privileges 69, 120-5; tenure 4, 56, 87, 103, 143, 256, 317.
- Athens** 8-10, 29, 145, 215, 241, 255.
- Anarchy** 41, 185-222, 288, 320-2.
- Beit Alfa** 61, 151, 165, 174, 196, 210.
- Brain-drain** 8, 22, 24, 27, 34, 41, 48, 52, 83, 106, 144, 187, 206, 216, 218, 225, 228, 232, 235, 240, 286, 311, 332-5, 337.
- Cabinet Ministers** 6-7, 56, 58-9, 62-4, 71, 77, 86, 112, 125, 163, 168-71, 175, 263, 274, 318, 338.
- Capitalist culture** 52, 78, 125, 132; firms 4, 13, 17, 120, 150, 182, 198, 200, 221, 243, 249, 251, 292; gravity 32, 143, 217, 223, 243; owners 128, 139, 181; society 5-6, 25, 40-2, 126, 154, 195, 317.
- Careers** 5, 8, 10, 22, 24, 27, 29, 34, 37-9, 52, 57, 62, 69-71, 82-6, 94, 99-104, 106, 114-6, 126, 129, 165, 174, 185, 193, 196, 200, 203, 207, 209, 213-7, 221, 229-32, 249, 264, 270, 275, 279, 282, 284, 286, 288, 310, 318, 321 (Also: *Pe'ilim* circulation).
- Carmelit** 24, 26, 31, 50, 103, 105, 115, 185, 195, 204, 211, 224, 227, 233, 236, 240-53, 260, 264, 283.
- Chen** 76, 103, 114, 185-6, 204, 223, 232-42, 248-9, 256, 293, 299-300.
- CKP** (Customary kibbutz paradigm) 5-6, 20-2, 32, 36, 52, 62, 65, 71, 82, 93, 104, 107, 110, 116, 149, 223, 231, 296, 302, 321.
- Cliques** 17, 31, 55, 90, 100, 107, 109-17, 195, 199, 223, 243-53, 289, 319-21, 323-5, 328, 333, 338.
- Collectivism** 6, 23, 36, 39, 43, 49, 70, 119, 123, 178, 199, 201, 205, 208, 241.
- Cooperation** 34, 178, 190, 279, 285.
- Cooperatives** 13-16, 23, 24, 33, 39, 67, 79, 81, 183, 292, 326, 336.
- Communal societies** 1-5, 19-23, 25, 28, 30, 35, 42, 52, 60, 62, 67-9, 72, 74, 149, 177, 218, 252, 273, 278, 305, 317; isolationism 3, 20, 35.
- Conservatism** 4, 7-9, 12, 14, 21-4, 26-30, 34, 40-52, 69, 71, 76, 99, 104, 112, 114, 117, 125, 134-7, 145, 149, 159, 162, 166, 168, 172, 176, 178, 180-2, 185, 191, 195, 202-5, 209-19, 226, 232, 239-41, 243, 245, 251, 253, 257, 260, 264-8, 270-3, 277, 281, 284, 286, 288, 290, 293, 301, 308, 311-26, 330.
- Corruption of officers** 9-10, 95, 125, 128, 138, 165, 201, 212, 215, 233, 256, 282, 287, 337.
- Creativity** 4, 6, 8, 13-17, 19, 21-44, 48, 50, 69, 97, 101, 105, 112, 115, 117, 124, 136, 144, 146, 150, 160, 164, 174-7, 182, 185, 195, 197, 203, 209, 211, 213, 215, 227, 241,

- 249-53, 255, 257, 260, 264-84, 286, 288, 290, 294, 296, 298, 301, 306, 308-10, 312, 315, 317-19, 322-4, 326-35, 337, 339-42.
- Democracy** 3-4, 6-8, 10-17, 20-31, 36, 42, 51, 63, 70, 76, 88, 90, 101-7, 109, 113, 116, 119, 124, 127-34, 136, 144, 146, 149, 153, 155, 159-62, 164, 168, 173-7, 182, 191, 194, 200, 204, 206, 208, 213, 218, 227, 230, 240, 243-6, 248, 252, 258-282, 293, 296, 299, 306, 308, 312, 315, 317-33, 336-42.
- DWOs (Democratic work organizations)** 12-18, 23, 327-42.
Also: cooperatives, kibbutz, moshav.
- Egalitarianism** 1-4, 6-8, 15, 20-3, 25-33, 36, 41, 43, 50, 52, 55, 63, 72-5, 86, 90, 93, 96, 101-7, 109, 119, 122-8, 134, 137, 143, 149, 152, 156, 160, 162, 165, 178, 185, 196-8, 200, 204, 207, 209-11, 218, 222, 227, 239, 242, 245, 260-4, 274-9, 283, 291, 293, 299, 303-7, 311, 319-24, 326, 330, 332, 339.
- Ein Hamifratz** 122, 124.
- Ein Harod** 73, 144, 156, 159, 171, 213, 278, 295.
- Field theory** 1, 36, 53, 62, 143, 268.
- FOs (Federative organizations)** 1-183, 185, 189, 195, 205, 210, 216, 221, 227, 232, 243, 249, 251, 253, 255, 263, 275, 278, 288, 296, 308-10, 312, 314-20, 325, 327, 331, 335, 337-9, 341 (Also: Hever Hakvutzot, Ichud, KA, KM, Reg.Ents, TKM, Tnuva); capitalist-like cultures 3, 5, 21-3, 30, 36, 116, 159, 183 (Also: Autocracy, Conservatism, Hired labor, Leadership low-moral); capitalist Trojan Horses 6, 159, 317.
- Gan Shmuel** 31, 39, 47, 117, 122, 175-6, 178-9, 2024, 227-8, 253, 259, 264, 271, 278-9, 291, 293.
- Gesher Haziv** 47.
- Geva** 31, 27-8, 241.
- Givat Brenner** 103, 195.
- 'Golden Parachutes'** 14, 17, 86, 334.
- Hatzerim** 31, 39, 227, 241.
- Hachof** 84.
- Hazorea** 237, 262, 264, 271, 274, 279.
- Hever Hakvutzot** 57-8, 63, 67, 75, 87, 112, 136, 156.
- Hulda** 57.
- Hired labor** 4, 17, 24, 29-36, 40, 50, 71, 83, 89, 92, 106, 116, 120, 122, 126, 160, 173, 176, 181, 186, 190, 195, 216, 222, 227, 229, 244, 246, 259, 273, 290, 312, 325.
- Histadrut (Federation of socialist movements & labor unions)** 56, 58, 64, 67, 78, 87, 112, 125, 127, 136, 155, 159, 176, 276, 295.
- Ichud (Hakibbutzim Vehakvutzot) Movement** 7, 56, 58, 76, 80, 86, 112, 115, 133, 177, 222, 224, 229, 231, 234-6, 241, 326.
- Imperial China** 8-9, 101, 146.
- International Communal Studies Association** 20.
- Israeli academy** 53, 61-3, 93, 101; armed forces 8, 64, 95, 101, 106, 164, 225, 279, 299 (Also: Palmach); culture 143; economy 39, 77-82, 85, 98, 130, 171, 188, 243, 257, 278; mass media 262; politics 45, 58, 68, 218, 336 (Also: Socialist parties); population 41,

- 177, 341; society 3, 40, 43, 51, 53, 57, 69, 95, 106, 126, 164, 171, 182, 201, 204, 213; state 3, 58, 68, 112, 228, 334, 341.
- Japan** 13, 138, 142, 205, 255, 280, 331.
- Jewish Agency & subsidiaries** 6, 46, 56, 59, 68, 70, 76, 78, 112, 151, 155, 178, 210, 235, 284, 341.
- Jewish Brigade** 26, 159.
- Jewish Diaspora** 26, 78.
- Kibbutz agriculture** 32, 34, 39, 44, 70, 76-9, 87, 98, 111, 117, 133, 144, 158, 177, 181, 186, 196, 216, 224, 233, 241, 258; boundaries of 1; branch managers 29, 40, 55, 95, 113, 131, 186, 205, 258, 268, 272-3, 279-83, 295, 301; capitalist-like cultures 187, 205, 223, 232, 257, 328 (Also: Carmelit, FOs, Hired labor, Netzer Sireni); capitalist practices 5, 27, 31, 34-6, 43, 50, 74, 110, 150, 160, 176, 188, 205, 210, 244-6, 248, 252, 260, 273, 296, 325, 340; capitalist symbols 52, 78, 125, 132; chief officers 7, 28, 31, 41, 47, 55-8, 76, 83-95, 103, 111, 115, 128, 186, 190, 194, 197, 201, 204, 217, 222, 232, 235, 239, 247, 249, 251, 258, 265, 268, 271-3, 275, 286, 289, 307, 309, 312, 315, 318, 321, 324, 326; culture 5, 18-36, 48-51, 74, 77, 91, 102, 117, 120, 125, 137, 143, 149, 162, 181, 211, 219, 223, 228, 243, 245, 248, 253, 274, 293, 318, 323, 332; culture incoherence 19-21, 144, 315, 322; field 1, 5-7, 9, 16, 20, 24, 26, 36, 41, 45, 51-3, 62-5, 69, 83-6, 88, 91, 95, 98, 101, 106, 110-7, 124, 127, 138, 146, 159, 183, 195, 204, 221, 253-5, 271, 275, 296, 306, 315-8, 322-4, 327; industry 5, 27, 30-2, 36, 39, 45, 74-77, 81, 90, 95, 160, 181, 186, 224-7, 233, 249-51, 258-60, 284, 310, 326; intangible capitals 2, 4, 7, 13, 21, 53, 59, 64, 84, 94, 100, 109, 113, 116, 129, 145, 185, 196, 198, 208, 221, 232, 259, 288, 318-21; 'internal leaving' 8, 10, 34, 83, 214, 243, 289, 315, 322, 325. movement strategies 3, 36, 137, 176, 287, 329; population 2-3, 16, 21, 41, 47, 56, 158, 178, 186, 233, 236, 249, 257-8, 288, 294, 304, 313; power elites 1, 5, 11, 51, 53, 62, 64, 109, 145, 149, 166, 190, 192-204, 213, 215, 217-9, 257, 267, 275, 322, 325; prestige 2, 4, 6, 8, 13-5, 49, 57-60, 65, 83, 89, 92, 96, 98, 114, 119, 129, 188, 204, 207, 216, 223, 229, 240, 244, 246, 249, 252, 275, 279, 285, 288; researchers 3-10, 14, 17, 20, 25-7, 29, 31-3, 35-9, 42, 51-3, 55, 57, 61, 65, 68-71, 74, 78, 80, 91, 102, 106, 135-8, 147, 159, 165, 173, 183, 214, 217, 234, 284, 314, 317-21, 323-7, 332; resurrection 14-16, 69-71, 216, 245, 249-51, 256-82; socialist ideas 3, 67, 90, 106, 182, 239, 282, 305, 308, 312, 315, 322; socialist practices 22, 34, 125, 204, 244, 306 (Also: collectivism, egalitarianism, solidarity); socialist symbols 223.
- Kibbutz Artzi Movement (KA)** 8, 46, 56, 64, 67, 73, 75-7, 80, 86, 123-7, 133, 136, 143, 150-9, 161-7, 173-9, 201, 266, 304, 306, 327.
- Kibbutz Meuchad Movement (KM)** 56-8, 60, 67, 74, 76-80, 87, 134, 136, 151-9, 161, 183-9, 171-5, 177, 180, 226, 228, 266, 327, 334, 337.

- Kiriat Anavim 6, 136.
- Knesset (Parliament) 6-7, 56, 58-9, 62-4, 71, 77, 84, 86-7, 112-3, 125, 163-5, 168, 170-1, 173, 178, 227, 286, 290, 318, 336.
- Kochav 3, 15, 24, 26, 31, 47, 50, 72, 84, 90, 105, 113, 117, 122, 124, 146, 185, 196, 200, 210, 221, 227, 233, 255-316, 330, 339.
- Latin America 8-9, 145, 225, 228, 233, 256, 338, 341.
- Leadership, autocratic 4, 6-7, 12-13, 21, 48, 51, 57, 74, 92, 101, 110, 112, 115, 117, 120, 125, 134, 136-7, 149-183, 232, 239, 243-6, 256, 317, 324-5; charismatic 15, 102, 135-6, 149-50, 152, 173, 272, 323, 340; detached 98, 141, 162-183, 190-4, 212-4, 246, 293-6, 319, 325, 332; dysfunctional 14, 16, 45-9, 75-6, 89-90, 101, 117, 136, 158-61, 166-8, 172, 194, 213, 243, 249, 258, 282, 289, 315, 327, 333, 338, 341; high-moral, servant 7, 10, 12, 15, 17, 26, 29, 32, 34, 68, 89, 113, 117, 126, 136, 140, 145, 149, 165, 182, 199, 215, 221, 226, 242, 253, 257, 260, 263, 267, 273, 282, 293, 303, 310, 320-32, 335, 339-42; low-moral 6, 9, 11, 15, 26, 34, 69, 137, 142, 145, 149, 188, 195, 200-3, 207, 211, 221-53, 303, 309-14, 317-25, 333, 34; much involved 97-100, 133, 206, 213, 239, 250, 259, 263, 269, 274, 284-7, 305, 315, 320, 325, 331; old guard 15, 195, 210, 217, 237, 240, 260, 282, 288, 290, 293, 297, 303, 310, 322; succession 9, 11, 13, 17, 29, 86, 91, 96, 101, 112, 136, 144-6, 167, 215-8, 246, 259, 285, 311, 325-42; radical, transformational 11, 15, 29, 51, 117, 134-7, 149-65, 172-5, 211, 245, 253, 259-82, 288, 315, 319, 323-7, 340-2.
- Maagan Michael 159, 227.
- Machiavellianism 6, 29, 31, 87, 113, 153, 157, 176, 245, 253, 321, 323.
- Makom 257, 261.
- Mashbir Merkazi, see: Tnuva
- Mishmar Ha'emek 63, 67, 73, 120, 125, 150, 159, 170, 174, 178, 253, 293, 327.
- Mizra 47.
- Moshavim 23, 39, 67, 70, 77-9, 81-2, 85, 123, 151, 159, 216, 310, 312.
- Netzer Sireni 30-2, 92, 106, 115, 122, 187, 195, 217, 222-5, 227, 232, 241, 278, 307, 326.
- Oligarchy 4-8, 12, 14, 17, 21, 24, 26-31, 34, 36, 42, 49, 55, 57, 59, 68-71, 82, 87, 90, 93, 101, 105, 116, 127, 134, 138, 143, 145, 150, 159, 162, 171, 175, 185, 195, 205, 213, 218, 221, 246, 251, 256, 263, 268, 273, 282, 290, 296, 302, 308, 315, 317, 322, 324, 326, 329, 334, 336.
- Olim 112, 185, 221-33, 236, 240, 249.
- Palestinian Arabs 151, 154, 156-8, 163, 172, 175, 177, 341.
- Palmach 26, 36, 74, 117, 124, 128, 151-2, 155, 159, 163, 169, 171, 173, 175, 232, 250, 328, 334, 341.
- 'Parachuting' of officers 9, 83, 94-7, 100, 106, 142, 159, 182, 191, 205, 209, 223, 285, 309, 319, 325, 329.
- Patronage 7, 10, 15, 17, 27-31, 50, 57, 90-4, 96, 99, 103, 106, 109-18, 121, 134, 145, 166, 172, 174, 176, 194, 204, 207, 211, 214, 219, 221-6, 228, 230 232, 244, 246, 249, 251, 253, 255, 264-7, 270, 275,

- 279, 281, 284, 288, 302, 308, 314, 318-26, 338.
- Pe'ilim* (FO functionaries) 6-11, 16-7, 28-35, 40, 45, 55-105, 110-134, 149-51, 158, 161, 168, 173, 179, 188, 193-201, 204, 207, 209, 211, 213, 217, 221-4, 229, 231, 234, 244, 253, 257, 260, 263, 273, 276, 282, 288, 293, 302, 309, 312, 314; circulation 6-7, 10, 57, 61, 83-4, 92-5, 101-7, 110-6, 124, 131, 143-5, 159, 181, 197, 207-9, 214, 217, 234, 243, 260, 267, 309, 312, 318-25. *ex-pe'ilim* 10, 17, 56, 71, 115, 131, 185, 191, 193, 200, 204, 231, 283, 288, 319, 324; privileges 2, 4-8, 13, 16, 21, 26, 34, 49, 58-62, 69, 72-6, 82, 89-93, 96, 103-6, 113, 119-30, 143, 160, 168, 185, 195-8, 203, 207, 213-8, 242-7, 263, 273-8, 297, 307-9, 318, 322-5.
- Rama** 24, 32, 41, 48, 64, 74, 185-222, 225, 227, 232, 240, 242, 247, 251, 257, 261, 265, 270, 279, 288, 293.
- Religious kibbutzim 28.
- Reg.Ents (Regional Enterprises) 4, 39, 41, 45, 49, 73, 76, 79-89, 92, 94-6, 100-4, 109, 119-21, 128-32, 168, 181, 189, 194, 201, 221, 229, 245, 251, 306, 310, 325, 328, 331-2; Milu'ot 46, 85-8, 91, 97, 112, 131, 143, 204; Mishkay Hamerkaz 29, 73, 84-9, 91, 99, 111, 119-23, 126-33, 168, 229.
- Rotatzia* 6-11, 14, 21, 27-9, 33, 56, 58, 61, 69, 82-97, 100-4, 106, 110, 113-7, 124, 129, 131, 141, 143-6, 172, 193, 204, 207, 212-8, 223, 232, 241, 246, 255-9, 265, 267, 270, 273, 283-90, 297, 301, 309, 312, 325, 331-5, 341. Procrustean bed 10, 27, 215 (Also: Kibbutz careers, *Pe'ilim*).
- Sa'ad 75.
- Scale 4, 13, 21, 23-5, 36, 42, 50, 65, 84, 130, 216, 283, 290-2, 294, 296-7, 299, 301, 324, 326, 329-30.
- Self-work 22, 24, 29-32, 34-6, 50, 83, 116, 165, 172, 200, 222, 227, 241, 246, 250, 259, 308, 312, 317, 323.
- Silicon Valley 279, 329.
- Social movements 1-3, 5, 11, 20, 29, 34, 51, 62, 67, 73, 149, 152, 173, 305, 317.
- Social research: ethnographers 5-6, 8, 10, 17-8, 31, 47, 49, 52, 60-5, 82, 89, 92, 95, 101, 104, 109, 114, 134, 142, 149, 159, 162, 172, 185, 214, 218, 222, 243, 247, 251, 255, 296, 298, 317, 325, 331; DWO students 6, 11-16, 23, 98, 338-40; historians 43, 49, 51, 56, 60, 68, 70, 102, 136, 163, 317; political scientists 110, 255; divisions of 9, 17, 20, 51, 142; scientific coalitions 15, 31, 35, 63, 93, 104, 109, 256, 317, 326; sociologists 10, 18, 23, 32, 35, 37, 47, 51-3, 57, 60-4, 93, 109, 142, 159, 194, 212, 222, 236, 255, 283, 291, 317, 320.
- Socialist parties: Ahdut Ha'avoda 68; Le'ahdut Ha'avoda 156; Mapay 67-8, 77, 112, 136, 152-7, 162-3, 165, 167, 177, 195, 295, 308, 312; Mapam 59, 69, 77, 80, 92, 149, 152, 163-4, 167-70, 173; Socialist League 157.
- Solidarity 6, 9, 12, 14, 17, 20, 22, 25, 28, 30, 34-6, 150, 154, 165, 182, 217, 245, 248, 251, 267, 279-292, 302, 306, 308-9, 317, 32, 329, 332, 339.
- 'Stockade and Tower' 150, 157.
- Stratification 1, 6, 17, 20, 34, 52-65,

- 71, 74, 93, 102, 104, 112, 119, 121, 124, 127, 134, 140, 182, 214, 222-3, 232, 273, 296, 308, 317, 321, 329 (Also: Oligarchy).
- TKM** (Tnuaa Kibbutzit Meuchedet) movement 41, 45-8, 77, 80, 86, 116, 127, 233, 238, 243, 245, 252.
- Tnuva & Mashbir Merkazi** 67, 77, 85-7, 92, 112, 127, 131, 146, 159, 198, 221, 279.
- Trust** 6, 8-17, 25-8, 38, 41, 49, 52, 69, 89, 95-100, 117, 125, 127, 129, 133-46, 150, 163-8, 172, 177, 182, 185, 190, 194, 198, 203, 206-11, 213-8, 221, 225, 232, 240, 243, 245, 253, 259, 264-73, 279, 283-90, 293, 296, 303, 310, 312-5, 319-41; distrust 8, 13, 29, 32, 34, 41, 98, 129-132, 138, 140-3, 163, 188, 191-4, 200-3, 206, 217-9, 290, 302, 325, 329; low-trust 5, 13, 32, 78, 134, 138, 142, 146, 150, 182, 191, 194, 205, 211, 256, 272, 317, 326, 330, 333, 338, 340; high-trust 5-6, 8, 11, 16, 22, 25, 30, 32-5, 38, 48, 50, 105, 116, 136-8, 140-5, 166, 183, 194, 213, 217, 257, 260, 264, 268-72, 279-82, 296, 304, 317, 320, 323, 326-32, 336-9; trustworthiness 136, 141, 169, 109, 233, 261, 287, 301, 333, 337.
- US agricultural experts** 158; army 8-9, 23; corporations 14, 32, 94, 99, 101, 142, 221, 331-3; officials 10, 215, 218; presidents' *semi-rotatzia* 90, 103, 145, 214, 327, 333, 335, 341.
- USSR** 78, 90, 102, 135, 152-7, 161-6, 168, 170, 173, 176, 204, 228, 282, 305, 312 (Also: Stalin, J.V.).
- Yishuv** (Jewish Palestine community) 2, 87, 149, 151, 155, 157-9, 163, 169.
- Zionist movement** 2, 67, 76, 87, 123, 125, 127, 136, 226, 274, 317; JNF (Jewish National Fund) 78, 151; socialists 2, 56, 67, 317 (Also: Ahdut Havoda, Hever Hakvutzot, Histadrut, Ichud, KA, KM, TKM, Mapay, Mapam); United Jewish Appeal 59; WZO (World Zionist Organization) 2, 67, 87, 341 (Also: Jewish Agency).